Public Safety Committee on May 7th, 2026

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Parkland, AB]

Thank you.

I want to get a quick question in to Ms. St. Germain.

[Technical difficulty—Editor] The integrated childhood exploitation centres were telling me about how many of their child exploitation investigations were shut down because they primarily rely on tips from the FBI.

Does this legislation fix the problems created by the Bykovets 5-4 decision?

[Monique St-Germain]

I didn't hear the first part of your question. There was no sound coming through.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Parkland, AB]

I was told by the integrated childhood exploitation centres that many of their tips come from the FBI. Were they shut down because of the Bykovets decision? Does this legislation fix that issue?

[Monique St-Germain]

It helps.

Part 1 has the provisions about voluntary provision of information and clarifies that police can use information that is voluntarily provided. A lot of the tips that are coming from the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children in the U.S. are voluntarily provided. Those are coming through and are then being sent over to our police forces. In some jurisdictions, there is some uncertainty as to whether or not the police can actually use that information to then start the investigation.

The parts in part 1 that are talking about the “for greater certainty” provision and the clarification about voluntary information, yes, will help.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Frank Caputo]

Thank you.

Ms. Acan, you have the final four minutes, please.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I will go with Mr. Pierce for my first question.

The open letter that we received raises some concerns that the orders could be used to obtain sensitive medical or financial records.

Can you explain for the committee that proposed subsection 487.0121(3) in the bill creates an explicit prohibition against making any demand that would disclose medical information or solicitor-client privilege?

[David Pierce]

I'm sorry. Is this with regard to part 1 or part 2?

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

This is in part 1.

[David Pierce]

I apologize. I'm not familiar with that specific section. If I can come back to you with that afterwards, that would be great.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

No worries.

I will continue my questions with CCCP and the Peel CAS.

I have volunteered countless hours over many years, supporting organizations like SAVIS of Halton. SAVIS serves as a leading agency in my region of Oakville. It's a backbone organization for the Halton Collaborative Against Human Trafficking, which brings together community organizations and partners to create a coordinated regional response to combat human trafficking. It's an organization such as yours.

Organizations like yours play a critical role in protecting vulnerable individuals and in strengthening community awareness and prevention efforts. Unfortunately, traffickers have frequently used Oakville and Burlington as transit hubs because of their proximity to major highways, moving victims between hotels along these corridors in an effort to avoid detection.

We are fortunate to have the dedicated members of our Halton Regional Police Service. I want to sincerely acknowledge and thank them for their continued work in combatting these horrific crimes.

Over the past year, I have spoken with many officials from different levels of law enforcement, and they have consistently emphasized that the child exploitation investigations are extremely complex and time-intensive. These cases can often take more than six months to resolve, particularly due to criminals' use of phones, computers, cloud services and storage devices to conceal illicit material.

From your perspective, how would Bill C-22 improve law enforcement's ability to investigate and combat child exploitation and human trafficking offences?

[Mary Beth Moellenkamp]

Bill C-22 would help law enforcement access this information more quickly. We sometimes have minutes or hours when we're looking at an investigation and trying to protect a child.

I want to speak from a Pearson airport perspective.

Sometimes we have children and youth coming through the airport who have been identified. Being able to access that information and look at that digital footprint is important because, once they go through, we may have no other opportunity to see that child again, and we may not know where they end up.

You rightly said that, within the GTA, there are many different transportation routes from the highways to the airports. This creates some challenges. Accessing that quickly is extremely important because time is of the essence in those cases.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

Thank you very much.

Madame St. Germain, do you want to add anything to that?

[Monique St-Germain]

I will say that, in particular, the provisions in part 1 would be very helpful because a lot of child sexual exploitation investigations involving a tip from a provider, through NCMEC or something similar, have very minimal information. Police can't really do a lot with that information until they can get a bit more. The information demand, coupled with—

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Frank Caputo]

Thank you, Ms. St. Germain. I apologize, but I have to cut you off. I'm really sorry. We are running late here.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

Five minutes is too short.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Frank Caputo]

Witnesses, I encourage all of you, if you wish, to provide supplemental information to the committee. You all play a critical role. On behalf of the committee and all Canadians, we are grateful for your work. Thank you very much.

We will suspend for as short a time as possible, preferably 90 seconds.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Frank Caputo]

We're back.

I apologize if that was a bit aggressive. I want to thank all panellists today. They are excellent, and we have a very distinguished panel. I really don't want to lose any time with them.

I want to introduce them.

We have, from Meta Platforms Inc., Rachel Curran and Robyn Greene. From NSIRA, we have the Honourable Marie Deschamps, Craig Forcese and Lawrence Mangano. Finally, we have the Honourable Simon Noël and Justin Dubois.

We will now have opening statements.

I have to vacate the chair for about three minutes. If anything comes up, Madame DeBellefeuille will deal with it. I will hopefully be back in three or four minutes. If not, please go on to the next opening statement. Thank you.

We will start with the opening statement from Meta.

[Rachel Curran, Head of Public Policy, Meta Platforms Inc.]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good evening, and thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. My name is Rachel Curran. I'm head of public policy for Canada at Meta. Joining me is my colleague Robyn Greene, who is an expert in the subject matter under consideration. Please direct your technical questions to her.

Meta is deeply committed to keeping our Canadian users safe online and off-line. We routinely engage with Canadian law enforcement agencies at all levels of government, including by proactively reporting threats we identify or by responding to valid legal demands and emergency requests from Canadian authorities.

We commend the government for addressing many of the concerns that were raised about part 14 of Bill C-2. With narrowly tailored amendments, we think the current part 1 of Bill C-22 would provide law enforcement with an effective legal framework for obtaining the necessary data in a timely manner. However, part 2 is a different story and could ultimately make Canadians less safe, not more.

First, the technical assistance obligations in part 2 could conscript private companies into service as an arm of the government’s surveillance apparatus. As drafted, the bill could require companies like Meta to build or maintain capabilities that break or undermine encryption and force providers to install government spyware directly on their systems.

The bill purports to protect against risks to encryption by allowing providers to challenge demands that would introduce a “systemic vulnerability”. However the definition of “systemic vulnerability” is unclear. Essential terms like “encryption” are left to be defined in regulation, while ministerial orders can override those same regulations. Moreover, the bill contains no process for challenging a problematic order, or liability protections for companies while a challenge is pending.

The technical community's consensus on this is clear. It is not possible to build back doors to encrypted systems for law enforcement without creating vulnerabilities that will be—not could be, but will be—exploited by malicious actors. Weakening encryption does not just affect the target of an investigation. It affects every Canadian who depends on secure private communications to do banking, access health care, run a business or simply talk to their family.

This is not a hypothetical risk. Governments around the world are still dealing with a fallout from China's state-sponsored Salt Typhoon cyber-attacks, which exploited the U.S.'s far narrower technical assistance laws. Canada's own security agencies understand this and issued guidance that specifically advised adopting encryption to defend against these kinds of cyber-attacks.

Part 2 of Bill C-22 would move Canada in the opposite direction and out of step with our closest allies. Last year, France and Sweden both abandoned similar proposals, and the EU guaranteed robust encryption protections in its agreement on online safety. The U.K.'s use of a similar authority ordering Apple to break its encrypted cloud service drew condemnation from the U.S. government and 200 global civil society organizations, and ultimately resulted in Apple withdrawing its advanced data protection service.

Imposing these obligations would also chill domestic innovation and investment and harm Canadian competitiveness abroad.

In addition, overly broad non-disclosure orders in part 2 risk undermining public trust and transparency. The bill's data retention provisions would create a framework to capture the private information of ordinary Canadians with no connection to any crime, and also grant warrantees the authority to search company premises and seize data.

In light of these significant challenges, we urge policy-makers to separate part 2 from Bill C-22 so that these critically important issues receive the time and attention they deserve.

To avoid the worst privacy and security outcomes, required changes include removing obligations for companies to add government or third party surveillance tools or other software to their systems, and strengthening the definition of “systemic vulnerability” to explicitly rule out any requirement that would weaken or break encryption, and codify the process for companies to challenge requests.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Frank Caputo]

Thank you, Ms. Curran. I apologize, but I have to be ruthless with the time.

Ms. Deschamps, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Marie Deschamps, Chair, National Security and Intelligence Review Agency]

Mr. Chair, members of the committee, good evening.

Thank you for inviting us to participate in your work.

I am chair of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, or NSIRA. I am joined by our vice-chair, Craig Forcese, and our secretariat acting executive director, Lawrence Mangano.

I'm going to use this time to make two points.

Given the scope of the new powers being proposed in this bill, timely and effective independent review is essential.

That's my first point.

Second, this bill, in its current form, falls short of supporting that review.

NSIRA has two core responsibilities. First, it reviews national security and intelligence activities to assess whether they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. This should not be confused with the authorization granted by my colleague Mr. Noël, which he will tell you about a little later.

Second, NSIRA investigates public complaints related to national security and intelligence.

In doing so, we provide independent assurance to Canadians that those activities comply with the law, including with the charter. Bill C-22 introduces significant new powers through the proposed supporting authorized access to information act. Given the breadth of these new powers, NSIRA anticipated a review role that would provide timely and direct visibility into how these authorities are used.

However, as drafted, Bill C‑22 only provides NSIRA with the minister's public annual report. In practice, this could mean delays of more than a year before NSIRA becomes aware of how these authorities are used.

While NSIRA has broad access rights, there is a real benefit in legislation that requires information to be provided proactively to NSIRA in a timely manner. In the context of constrained resources, early awareness would provide a meaningful baseline of what activities are taking place and allow NSIRA to plan and target its reviews more efficiently.

We do welcome the requirement for intelligence commissioner approval of ministerial orders. However, the absence of provisions granting NSIRA access to those orders, or information about how they are implemented, limits our ability to assess their use in practice.

To address this, we recommend two targeted amendments.

The first is to amend proposed section 9 to ensure NSIRA is proactively provided access to classified ministerial orders issued to service providers as well as to information provided to the intelligence commissioner in support of those orders.

The second is to amend proposed section 27 to ensure NSIRA is informed when compliance orders are issued, including information relevant to potential non-compliance. These changes would enable more timely, targeted and effective reviews.

Furthermore, these amendments are consistent with existing Canadian legislation, where NSIRA receives proactive information related to activities conducted under ministerial authorization, and with international practices.

Australia also has provisions of this nature. You can ask questions about that.

In closing, independent review is a cornerstone of public trust in Canada's national security framework. Ensuring that NSIRA has timely access to relevant information will strengthen accountability and support Parliament's intent in establishing these authorities.

Thank you for your attention.

We would be pleased to answer your questions.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Frank Caputo]

Madam Deschamps was on the Supreme Court of Canada when I was a law student. I just can't cut her off.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Frank Caputo]

Mr. Noël, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Simon Noël, Intelligence Commissioner, Office of the Intelligence Commissioner]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members, for the invitation.

I am accompanied today by Justin Dubois, executive director and general counsel at my office.

Bill C‑22 gives my office a new and significant function. I want to explain how this function would fit into my existing duties.

My quasi-judicial function as intelligence commissioner, or IC, is to approve or not approve certain national security and intelligence activities proposed by CSE and CSIS, and authorized, respectively, by the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Public Safety.

My independent approval is necessary because the activities that the ministers authorize may be contrary to the law or breach the reasonable expectation of privacy of all Canadians. I have 30 days to render my decisions, but I adapt to much shorter timelines when urgency calls for it. Only with my approval can the activities be conducted.

When I approve a ministerial authorization, I assess whether the minister's conclusions are reasonable in light of the factors the legislation requires the minister to consider, including the impact on privacy interests and cybersecurity. For most of my decisions, my primary concern is how the proposed activities impact the privacy of Canadians. I apply the legal principles of proportionality and reasonableness, and I ensure compliance with the charter, including section 1.

In this regard, when I look at the factors the minister must consider when issuing an order under this bill, I am confident that these orders are similar to the ministerial decisions I currently oversee, and raise legal issues my office is well versed in.

In my experience as intelligence commissioner, I understand how certain orders could only be effective if they are confidential. Although I operate in a classified environment, my oversight role calls for me to be as transparent as possible with Canadians. I share my decisions with the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, presided over by Ms. Deschamps, for post-facto review purposes. I publish redacted versions of my decisions on my office’s website. Decisions rendered under this bill would likewise be published.

My annual report, which was tabled in Parliament last Friday, also provides information on the impact of the activities that I oversee and on the significant legal issues at stake.

Would my office require additional resources for this new function? I have no control over the number of ministerial orders that I would review, nor how complex or voluminous each file might be. Another consideration is the potential effect of judicial reviews. These considerations could impact the resources my office needs. My role is on a part-time basis, and I adapt my work and my life accordingly. My expectation is that if my office requires additional funding, this will be provided in a timely manner. I would certainly appreciate a firm commitment from the minister to that effect.

One element I would raise for your consideration relates to the minister's extending, or not, the validity period of an order. Currently, there's no limit to the validity period or to the length of any extension. Under my existing jurisdiction, maximum validity periods are specified, and renewals require a new approval by the IC. I suggest a similar approach in this bill.

I will be happy to answer your questions.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Frank Caputo]

Thank you very much, Mr. Noël.

We are running a bit late, so I will propose, at least for this round, that we go to five minutes per round. I hope that's okay. I don't want anybody to lose their round.

With that, we will begin with Mr. Lloyd for five minutes.