Public Safety Committee on May 26th, 2026

[Tamir Israel]

Absolutely. I think judicial authorization will be a critical addition here. Having more direct oversight from bodies like NSIRA and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner would also be helpful. This is a very powerful set of tools that are being brought into place.

Also, as a civil liberties organization, we don't appear at many legislative committees to encourage an expansion of police powers. However, I do want to say that we are very selective in when we show up and how aggressively we object. This regime really is on the broader end, which is why we are here and expressing our concerns.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you, Mrs. DeBellefeuille.

Mr. Baber, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

Thank you.

Erik from Apple Inc., welcome to public safety and national security.

I see a comment, which was made by the Apple company, in The Globe and Mail that this legislation could allow the Canadian government “to force companies to break encryption by inserting back doors into their products—something Apple will never do.”

For the record, Conservatives oppose the breaking of encryption. However, I'd like you to follow up on this comment by Apple that breaking encryption by inserting back doors into your products is something you would never do. Let's say that this legislation passes in its current form and the Liberals get their way. What happens then?

[Erik Neuenschwander]

We will remain committed to providing the highest level of security we can for Canadians. We hope that the bill will be amended to provide those explicit protections for encryption so as to avoid putting those things in tension.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

I appreciate that, but what if Conservatives are unsuccessful, and you're forced to insert a back door and break encryption? What will Apple then do? Will that be a first for Apple, or will that mean that Apple will be leaving Canada?

[Erik Neuenschwander]

I can't speculate what would happen in that situation. Through this engagement and the continued dialogue we hope to, again, have positive amendments made to the bill.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

Can you tell us what happened in the U.K. vis-a-vis the same question, when Apple decided that the legislation in the present form was unacceptable to it?

[Erik Neuenschwander]

Apple filed comments in both the initial round of the bill and then as public comments during its amendment phase, more recently.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

Okay.

To Google, I see in your brief a comment that, “Google has never built a back door or any other mechanism to circumvent end-to-end encryption in our products.” Is that limited to Canada, or is that global?

[Jeanette Patell]

That is global.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

In other words, this would be a first. If this legislation is successful and if it passes in its current form, Google would be forced to do something it has never done anywhere in the world.

[Jeanette Patell]

If this legislation passes in its current form, the minister would have the power to order Google or any other electronic service provider to comply with the core obligations that are listed in proposed subsection 5(2).

We're here today to ensure that the committee takes the time to have this conversation and arrive at a piece of legislation that is workable and strikes the right balance in preserving user safety and security while supporting law enforcement efforts.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

Thank you.

You write that the scope of these potential obligations is largely “boundless”. Could you tell us some of the boundaries that may be tested here that have not been tested before, other than the breaking of encryption?

[Jeanette Patell]

There are in fact comprehensive layers of security architecture that are at stake here that go well beyond encryption.

I think my colleague Kate can speak to what that could entail.

[Katherine Charlet]

I'd say the reason that we view these as essentially boundless is that the powers for the ministerial orders as well as the core provider obligations really are essentially boundless in the sense of the notices that could be given to persons; the installation, use, operation, management and testing of any device or equipment; and numerous other enumerated powers that go beyond some of the authorities that are given in other countries around the world.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

If I understand your submission correctly, not only is the scope of those ministerial orders potentially boundless, but the framework for these ministerial orders also immunizes them from any appropriate scrutiny or accountability, because you can't appeal them.

You can't go to a court and say that you're not comfortable doing what the minister orders you to do. There is no judicial oversight. Is that correct?

[Katherine Charlet]

It's correct that this is done entirely in secret.

I do believe that there is an ability to appeal. However, during that appeal period, there is no stay, so if there is an order on the company, the company would be obligated to implement the change before getting a decision on an appeal.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

I want to clarify that the public safety minister, the government, CSIS and the RCMP already have an ability to seek and obtain a search warrant and ask Google to comply with requests for information. Is that correct?

[Katherine Charlet]

That is correct.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

Then I'm not exactly sure why there is the requirement to overbear.

I want to talk for a minute about the electronic—

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Unfortunately, the time is up, MP Baber. I'm sorry for that.

Let me turn to MP Powlowski for five minutes, please.

[Marcus Powlowski, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Rainy River, ON]

Because I'm a boomer, my kids can run circles around me with respect to everything involving computers, and I have to say that I'm still trying to figure out this bill.

The bill pertains to service providers and data providers. Is Apple one or both of those, Erik?

[Erik Neuenschwander]

I might guess so, but it seems unspecified within the bill.

[Marcus Powlowski, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Rainy River, ON]

How would you define a service provider and a data provider?

[Erik Neuenschwander]

I don't count myself as an expert on legislative text, but I would think that it's trying to look at service providers that hold information as part of doing business.