Exactly.
As you said, the court went on to say that the subscriber information is not really a person's name and address. When linked to an IP address, it views who was using the Internet connections and, therefore, provides the key to uncovering a person's online activities and so on.
I think the court's ruling said that, instead of lowering the threshold, perhaps it's just the opposite: It should be better protected. The case established subscriber information and just the conditions of privacy protection. I think that's the first case.
Then, of course, I found another case from 2024. I'm not sure if I'm pronouncing it correctly, but it's the Bykovets case. I think, again, you know about that case, and I think the court, 10 years after the Spencer case, went on to ask another question related to the new technology. The question asked was this: Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address itself? Again, the Supreme Court's ruling was yes.
The court also went on to say that modern Internet use leaves detailed digital traces. Once an IP address is linked to other information, it can reveal a lengthy, detailed picture of any individual's activities. Accordingly, the court mentioned that technological developments have greatly increased the amount of personal information that can be inferred from digital identifiers. Then, rather than reducing privacy protection because technology makes surveillance easier, the court held that constitutional protections must adapt to preserve meaningful privacy in the digital age.
Putting all this together, my question is this: Now that the Supreme Court has made it clear that subscribers' information and IP addresses reveal far more than technical data.... It's not just phone-book information anymore—they can expose a detailed portrayal of a person's private life. If the court has recognized increasing privacy interests in digital information, what evidence do you have to conclude that reducing the legal threshold from “reasonable grounds to believe” to “reasonable grounds to suspect” is consistent with section 8 of the charter?