Thank you. I'll try. I don't want to comment directly on the testimony or the evidence that they produced. They're lawyers, we're lawyers: We have opinions.
Our reading of the Spencer decision, as Ms. Gibner has said, leaves space to develop lawful authority by other means. We've talked previously about administrative schemes they could have stood up as lawful authority to access subscriber information. This government decided to go for a more robust judicial oversight. The court didn't stipulate that it must be judicial oversight, but that is what the government decided to put in the bill.
The “reasonable suspicion” standard was chosen because of the type of information it is. As we've explained before, the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard is usually reserved for gross invasions of privacy, like the police coming into your house or looking at the contents of your banking records or everything else.
When you're constructing these tools, you have to put them on a privacy spectrum. This information, in the vast majority of circumstances, will identify only the person involved in criminal activity, or exculpate them, as Sergeant Gilkes said, when we find out that the person is just the pizza delivery boy. This is the reason that this was chosen.
In terms of working on the policy for these things, challenges to their constitutionality are commonplace. It happens all the time. As Ms. Gibner said, it isn't our business to introduce or put together policy that would be unconstitutional on its face. There's a requirement, actually, in the Department of Justice Act, for the Minister of Justice to inform Parliament if that's what he's going to do.