Public Safety Committee on Oct. 5th, 2026

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

We play a supportive role vis-à-vis the RCMP and CSIS. Treasury Board sets the directive and it is technically responsible for personnel. Staffing, onboarding, issues and complaints, all of that essentially goes through Treasury Board.

I'm open to suggestions if you feel we need to—

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Minister, I've read my documents. Treasury Board provides directives and policies. It does not use any tool to ensure that the departments are doing their jobs.

Mr. Bilodeau is next to you. Since the Delisle case, are you able to compile a list of personnel with secret or top secret security clearances and tell me which clearances are up for review or are not up for review?

I'd like to know if you have that tool, since you're the guardian of national security here.

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

I have that for the department.

I will say that CSIS will have it in certain respects. It would have better visibility on ongoing challenges to someone's security. CSIS has the authority to advise a department on material changes to someone's background that could spark the revocation of the security clearance.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

I understand from what you're telling me that there is no process or “superstructure” that allows you, as minister, to ensure that all departments do their work within the allotted time frames.

Today, we're talking about a person accused of espionage who, in 2023, was accused of fraud by the Public Service Commission and was still given security clearance to do an internship at NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Can you explain to me how someone who was accused of fraud in 2023 could end up at NATO in 2026, only to be arrested as a spy by Belgian authorities? What went wrong, Minister? Who was remiss? How is it that what happened at the Public Service Commission was not passed on to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service? That's what I don't understand. It's such a big mistake.

Is it incompetence, simple laziness or a lack of due diligence? I don't understand how that can happen.

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

This is the matter that's currently being investigated in Belgium, and we're co-operating with the investigation. What I will say is that there will obviously be some serious learnings that come out of that process. Ultimately, the provision of security clearance is up to the specific department. In this case, it's Global Affairs Canada, based on the advice of the Treasury Board Secretariat.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you, Mrs. DeBellefeuille.

MP Morrison, go ahead for five minutes, please.

[Rob Morrison, Conservative, Columbia—Kootenay—Southern Rockies, BC]

Thank you, Chair, for inviting me here today. I don't usually get to come to this committee, so this is a joy for me.

Minister, I liked where we were going with that last comment on the fact that the public service concluded that the individual committed fraud, yet the security clearance was granted. Who's accountable for that, and which department? If it's the public service, they should be here to say, “Yes, we messed up.”

I just want to find out who's accountable at the end of the day. I understand people learn, and we have to learn from mistakes. That's granted, but somebody has to have their head on the block here. Who is it?

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

I appreciate the question. Welcome to the committee.

There are two things happening. One is the actual investigation. I don't want to pre-empt and influence the investigation that's taking place in Belgium. We are providing as much information as we can. Concurrently, we are doing an internal review.

You rightfully asked a question about accountability, and that is something that I will say we need to come back to. Given what's happening, I don't think we can pre-empt the investigation and in any way influence or tarnish that. However, the question you posed is absolutely correct, and we will need to get to the bottom of it. In this particular case, my understanding is that Global Affairs Canada is the ultimate provider of that security clearance based on, obviously, advice from CSIS and the RCMP.

[Rob Morrison, Conservative, Columbia—Kootenay—Southern Rockies, BC]

Okay. That sounds acceptable, for sure, in that you will come back to this committee and say, “Here's who made this mistake, and this person is being terminated,” or whatever you decide is going to happen to the individual who approved this. If the deputy head is the one who's responsible, they should be removed. Is Treasury Board the right place to have the centre of security clearances, or should it be your national security person?

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

The current interplay among national security, RCMP and CSIS to advise the respective departments has worked for the most part. It's imperfect, and I think we can see some gaps there. For the most part, it works because issues around personnel are strictly subject to Treasury Board rules and Treasury Board guidance on hiring, on firing, on promotion and on a range of things, including security clearance. That's why I think TBS plays a central role in that.

When we come to, for example, Public Safety Canada, the deputy minister and Richard and his team have a security review function for every single person who's onboarded to the department. It is based on the Treasury Board guidelines, but our department goes beyond that and implements that in the review of new and existing staff, again, with advice from the RCMP and CSIS.

[Rob Morrison, Conservative, Columbia—Kootenay—Southern Rockies, BC]

Yes. I mean, there are lessons learned here, obviously. We've gone through several of these over the years where security clearances, especially top secret security clearances, have been granted to individuals who should never, ever have been given them, but we don't seem to be learning about it. We seem to be reading about it in the paper when someone's arrested for espionage.

For the RCMP, what's the entry level for a constable joining the RCMP? Is it top secret, is it secret or is it nothing?

[A/Commr Josianne Phénix]

It's enhanced secret for our cadets.

[Rob Morrison, Conservative, Columbia—Kootenay—Southern Rockies, BC]

Is that a high enough level?

[A/Commr Josianne Phénix]

It's when they get hired until the time they graduate Depot. Then depending on the function they will occupy, it could be top secret, but as a constable with general duties at first.... It's based on position.

[Rob Morrison, Conservative, Columbia—Kootenay—Southern Rockies, BC]

Years ago, you were hired as top secret right out of the gate. Then they changed that to very little.

I would be remiss if I didn't bring this up. An individual came forward through the RCMP and went to visit her husband who's in the graveyard at Depot. She had a terrible time there. The people at Depot treated her horribly. They wouldn't let her in to see the graves. Several ex-members were treated the same way. This is about the third time I've heard about this happening in Regina. I need somebody to get to the bottom of this.

Minister, could you follow through with the commissioner? I didn't know whether he was going to be here today. Something has to be fixed with Depot, especially for retired members and those who are going to visit their lost ones in the gravesite at Regina.

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

I will—

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you, MP Morrison. I'm sorry to interrupt. Welcome again to committee. Hopefully, there will be other opportunities.

Ms. Dandurand, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Marianne Dandurand, Liberal, Compton—Stanstead, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all the witnesses for being here today.

As you said, Minister, this is an important issue that you and the entire team are working on. I think it's also the committee's role, beyond what went wrong, to look into this and find a way to improve the situation. Thank you for being here to talk about all this.

First, I would like some clarification from the Treasury Board Secretariat. Minister, you can probably answer as well. It says that the secretariat is responsible for setting the rules, but, as I understand it, it is not responsible for enforcing them afterwards.

Whose responsibility is it to verify or assign security clearances?

[Adam Hatfield]

Thank you for the question, madam.

As you said, it is Treasury Board Secretariat that sets government-wide policy on how security screening is done, but it is individual departments and deputy heads who implement that policy. The security environment of a Coast Guard facility on the east coast, a repository for Library and Archives Canada here in the national capital region or a national park in Nunavut are radically different security environments. It is a feature of the system today that deputy heads have the flexibility to set security screening requirements for their positions and also to make those security screening decisions.

As with all Treasury Board policies, it is deputy heads who are accountable for ensuring that those policies are followed within their departments.

[Marianne Dandurand, Liberal, Compton—Stanstead, QC]

Thank you.

Given the constantly evolving threats, which are something we regularly examine here at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, how is the framework evolving? We talked about some things that have evolved since last year, but how is the framework evolving and being applied on an ongoing basis in the various departments?

[Adam Hatfield]

Security screening is an evolving discipline across Canada and across our allies internationally. The previous policy was set in 2014. After significant analytical and research work, as the minister said, in January of 2025 a significant new update to that policy was done. We're still in the implementation window of that policy. We're working extensively across the security community to provide guidance to ensure that government departments are implementing it consistently and to find lessons learned from that implementation.

A lot of the focus right now, actually, is on security screening data and systems. There's significant room for improvement in how information about public servants and security screening is managed and significant room for improvement in terms of data interoperability and the speed of such systems. All of that improvement is ongoing, regardless of any specific case or incident.

[Marianne Dandurand, Liberal, Compton—Stanstead, QC]

Since the incident last summer, what do you think has been put in place? How is enforcement coming along? Are you satisfied? What could be sped up? What could the committee help improve to support you?

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

If I may, I will ask Vanessa Lloyd to give you a response on that.

[Vanessa Lloyd, Deputy Director, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you for the question.

I'll start by saying that in situations where a security incident arises, it is natural for each department to look at what happened in that particular case. As the minister said, because this case is ongoing, I'm limited in what I can say in respect to that case. As I referenced earlier in the discussion, the minister asked each of the departments involved in this particular case to do a review. We have done that. Opportunities for improvements were identified and are with the minister for consideration.

That being said, as my colleague from Treasury Board Secretariat referenced, we have an ongoing dialogue as a high-security organization, being CSIS—and the RCMP as well—in community discussions about whether the current processes and the standards can be improved. Then, inside each department, we look at our own practices.

CSIS is constantly looking at whether we can improve the efficacy and efficiency of our security screening efforts. As my colleagues referenced, that includes both processes and how we are adhering to the processes and requirements of the directive on security screening and improvements to systems and technology.

[Marianne Dandurand, Liberal, Compton—Stanstead, QC]

In the case—