Evidence of meeting #5 for Public Safety and National Security in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was officers.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

Members speaking

Before the committee

Nohara  President and Chief Executive Officer, Accipiter Radar Technologies Inc.
Cooper  Journalist, The Bureau
Weber  National President, Customs and Immigration Union
Dawson  Executive Director, Future Borders Coalition

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

I call the meeting to order.

Good morning, everyone. Welcome to meeting number five of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on September 18, the committee is meeting to continue its study on the management of the Canada-United States border.

Today’s meeting is being held in a hybrid format, which is permitted under the Standing Orders. To ensure that the meeting runs smoothly, I would like to provide some instructions.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

Rhonda Kirkland Conservative Oshawa, ON

I'm not getting interpretation.

The Clerk of the Committee Andrew Wilson

Is the interpretation working now? Can everyone hear the English interpretation of my words?

It seems not. I can't hear anything on my end either.

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

I'll suspend.

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

We'll start again.

We are beginning meeting number five of the committee. The meeting is focused on the study of Canada-United States border management.

The meeting is being held in a hybrid format. This morning, we have two witnesses joining us by video conference, so I would like to address them in particular. They must wait until I call on them before speaking. If they wish to activate their microphone, they can click on the microphone icon; if they do not wish to speak, they must mute their microphone.

I also have some instructions to share regarding our excellent interpretation service. We would like to thank the interpreters for being here this morning. This committee sends a lot of love to the interpreters, and when they are here in person, we can show them our love and appreciation even more visibly. With regard to interpretation, those participating in the meeting via Zoom can choose between the floor, English or French at the bottom of their screen. Those in the room know how to do this: They can use their earpieces and select the desired channel.

I would now like to say hello and welcome the two speakers for this first hour, Tim Nohara, president and chief executive officer of Accipiter Radar Technologies Inc., and Mr. Samuel Cooper, journalist for The Bureau.

We will begin with your presentation, Dr. Nohara. You have the floor for five minutes.

Tim Nohara President and Chief Executive Officer, Accipiter Radar Technologies Inc.

Good morning. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you to provide witness testimony for your study of Canada-United States border management.

There's a rich history of Canada and the United States working together to secure our land and maritime borders that goes back to 9/11, over 20 years ago. The 2,000 kilometre-long maritime border that runs through the middle of the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway in Ontario and Quebec is the biggest threat for human trafficking and contraband smuggling, including the guns and drugs that are on our streets.

The Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway border is the most challenging to secure because you can't simply assign more border guards to patrol that border in the middle of those big lakes and rivers. You need radar technology, and the ability to assess the shore-to-shore behaviour of the thousands of small pleasure craft in the warmer months and the vehicles on the ice in the coldest months where parts freeze over. The far majority of folks in those vessels and vehicles are law-abiding, of course, enjoying our beautiful outdoors. Those with suspicious behaviour are the ones we're after.

For over a decade, between 2004 and 2016, Accipiter Radar has worked with the RCMP, DRDC, the Canadian Coast Guard, the CBSA and Transport Canada, and, on the U.S. side, with CBP, the U.S. Coast Guard and DHS, as well as various other federal, provincial, state and local law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border.

We've developed the technologies and the methodologies needed. We conducted multi-year operational deployments in several representative hot spots of the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway. We proved that we could affordably secure that border. The radars we deployed at those hot spots are still operational today. As a key Canadian industry player, I have been a direct participant in the pioneering work that I just described, which is why I accepted your invitation to come before you.

One of the key lessons we learned together is that you need persistent radar surveillance across the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway to secure the border. I would note that we began in 2004 using a portable surveillance trailer, not a persistent system, for surge operations at particular locations to monitor and learn what we didn't know about smuggling behaviours. The surveillance data we collected and mined and the arrests we made on both sides of the border quickly showed us that these early successes were the tip of the iceberg.

These lessons learned led to the announcement of RCMP's border integrity technology enhancement project, under former commissioner Mike Cabana and assistant commissioner Joe Oliver, who headed technical operations at the time. Their persistent surveillance network was budgeted in 2014 and was supposed to be operational in 2017-18. For it's part, the United States has continued to expand its persistent radar surveillance capabilities, which is clearly more difficult if Canada is not expanding on its side of the border in order to fully capture the shore-to-shore suspicious activity.

Accipiter continues to provide persistent radar service to U.S. border patrol. The Americans are reminding us today that they value us doing our part. From my perspective, it appears that Canada is once again starting with the idea of using a portable surveillance trailer, as we did back in 2004, along with some helicopters. While useful for sure, unfortunately these will do very little to secure the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway border.

Accipiter is able to turn on persistent radar surveillance in certain areas in a matter of a week. Leveraging those radar sites, which we had previous deployed, would allow Canada to immediately start building the complete border activity picture with the United States. We can expand that radar as a service capability in less than two years to cover all key areas of concern, where vessels, low-flying aircraft and drones are involved with smuggling.

With that, I will turn it back to you, Chair.

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

Thank you, Dr. Nohara.

Go ahead, Mr. Cooper.

Samuel Cooper Journalist, The Bureau

Thank you for inviting a journalist to address lawmakers on a subject of extraordinary national importance. Tens of thousands of lives, our livelihoods and our sovereignty are at stake.

I offer my remarks and recommendations with humility. I'm still learning every day. I speak regularly with numerous law enforcement and security professionals in both the United States and Canada.

For over a decade, I've focused professionally on the threats that transnational crime poses to Canada's borders, institutions and people, alongside deep reporting on our financial and legal vulnerabilities to threat networks that often include ties to hostile state activity.

Canada's recent terror designation of the India-based Bishnoi gang is important, but that particular action recognizes just one facet of the many-sided transnational threats regarding fentanyl, human trafficking, Chinese-supplied chemical precursors, weapons trafficking, terror and extremism, which I will discuss today.

Across hundreds of interviews with Canadian and U.S. experts, I've come to a conclusion: Many Canadians, including citizens, lawmakers and judges, don't yet fully understand the scope and nature of the problem and also seem defensive in engaging it, and if we don't understand it, we can't solve it.

In these politically divisive times, I hope I can add some value by relaying, clearly and fairly, what professionals on both sides of the border are saying about the cultural, legal and political differences that have impeded co-operation between the United States and Canada. My reporting has emphasized Canadian enforcement challenges, not to be unduly critical of my homeland, but because I think we should focus first on the levers we control here in Canada and the reforms that we should have already tackled decades ago.

This isn't my opinion only. As you know, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police president Thomas Carrique recently warned the police are being asked to confront a new wave of lethal transnational threats with “outdated and inadequate” laws “never designed to address today's criminal landscape”. He added that Canada would have been far better positioned to “disrupt” organized crime had Ottawa acted on reforms first recommended in the early 2000s.

RCMP assistant commissioner David Teboul said this year, after the discovery of major fentanyl labs in British Columbia notable for their commercial-grade chemistry and scientific expertise, that there's a “need for legislative reform” around how such equipment and precursor chemicals can be obtained in Canada. More border regulations and technology could and will help, but they won't be sufficient absent foundational legal change.

It has long been my experience in discussions with senior U.S. enforcement experts that American and Australian police can collaborate effectively because the two nations are able to authorize wiretaps on dangerous and well-known transnational suspects in each of those countries within days, and in co-operative ways. In Canada, that speed is impossible. As former RCMP investigator Calvin Chrustie testified before British Columbia's Cullen commission several years ago, due to judicial blockages arising from Charter of Rights rulings, it had become practically impossible to obtain timely wiretaps on Sinaloa cartel targets residing in Vancouver.

In recent years, such delays in sensitive investigations have undermined co-operation between the RCMP and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in major cases of fentanyl trafficking and money laundering. In 2017, I was personally alerted to these long-standing concerns about the breakdown in RCMP-DEA co-operation by a U.S. State Department official, who reached out to me when I was in Vancouver.

These impeded investigations involve the upper echelons of Chinese triads, which maintain deep global leadership in Canada and are aligned with Chinese state interference networks, as well as senior Iranian- and Hezbollah-linked networks operating here in Canada. Both networks are engaged in fentanyl trafficking and money laundering in collaboration with Mexican cartels active in Canada.

My first recommendation is this: There is no low-hanging fruit. I have not spoken to a single knowledgeable Canadian officer, current or former, who believes that simply spending more on personnel, equipment, training or border staffing will solve this. What I hear is that, from 10 to 20 years ago, before the evolution of charter-driven disclosure and delay jurisprudence rulings in Canada, our nations enjoyed a much closer enforcement relationship.

Experts point above all to two Supreme Court rulings, Stinchcombe and Jordan, as the core legal obstacles. Very simply, our Stinchcombe disclosure standards and Jordan time restrictions—

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

Mr. Cooper, you have another 10 to 15 seconds.

11:15 a.m.

Journalist, The Bureau

Samuel Cooper

—disincentivize complex, multi-jurisdictional cases and deter U.S. partners from co-operating with Canada.

Thank you very much, Chair and members.

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

Thank you, Mr. Cooper and Dr. Nohara.

This enables us to turn first to MP Caputo, and then to MP Acan.

You have six minutes.

11:15 a.m.

Conservative

Frank Caputo Conservative Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC

Thank you very much to both of our witnesses.

I'm going to start with Mr. Cooper.

You've written extensively on fentanyl, and I appreciate what you've written. Can I ask, sir, what the biggest hurdle is to addressing what appears to me to be a fentanyl production crisis in Canada?

11:15 a.m.

Journalist, The Bureau

Samuel Cooper

The biggest hurdle at this point, as I indicated, is a lack of co-operation between U.S. and Canadian law enforcement. That stems from what has evolved over the past 10 years, as I said in my opening remarks.

The Charter of Rights is a foundational, amazing set of rules to protect honest, lawful, non-violent Canadians. We all appreciate that, but it has become, as I've said many times in my professional work, a shield for transnational organized crime, consisting of the most dangerous threat networks in the world. That includes precursor suppliers from China and Chinese threat networks laundering money at scale through Canadian banks and cities.

These are networks and typologies well explained by the U.S. Treasury. The U.S. Treasury has discovered some $300 billion in cartel fentanyl money laundering through Chinese money-laundering networks in the United States. These networks are disproportionately active in Canada—

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

Excuse me, Mr. Cooper, but I need to check something.

Is everything working properly, Mrs. DeBellefeuille?

Claude DeBellefeuille Bloc Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC

The interpretation has stopped. Mr. Cooper needs to speak more slowly if we want the interpreters to be able to do their job.

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

Okay. Interpretation has stopped. We'll suspend for a few seconds just to make sure that it's working again.

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

Interpretation is back. I'm sorry for the slight interruption.

I'll mention that the interpreters are amazing, but they sometimes struggle when the flow of speech is too quick. Let's try to find the right equilibrium between density and the speed at which we are speaking. Thank you.

It's back to you, Mr. Cooper.

11:20 a.m.

Conservative

Frank Caputo Conservative Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC

I'm sorry. Perhaps I can zero in on my question a bit more, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Cooper, my impression is that the Americans have a great deal of intelligence when it comes to drug trafficking. Is our government acting when we receive that intelligence?

11:20 a.m.

Journalist, The Bureau

Samuel Cooper

That's the core of the problem. Our government and police agencies have great will to tackle these transnational fentanyl, methamphetamine, ecstasy and ketamine networks that are using Chinese precursors and producing predominantly in labs in western Canada. The Americans have even greater intelligence, I believe, on the international supply networks.

The holdup here and the challenge is mainly that the Stinchcombe law necessitates that our Crown prosecutors disclose almost all or all of the investigation evidence when the RCMP or other agencies try to tackle one of these fentanyl networks and labs. They will be asked to disclose particularly sensitive and potentially damaging national security secrets. That is a real bar to co-operation between Canadian-based intelligence and law enforcement.

We know the evidence of intelligence-disclosure challenges. They're very well heard in Parliament and other fora. It is of course even greater among our Five Eyes partners with intelligence and investigative leads—or the RCMP—sharing back to the Americans. That has caused major problems, including in the Falkland so-called superlab case.

11:20 a.m.

Conservative

Frank Caputo Conservative Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC

Thank you, sir.

I'm just looking at one of your documents here, from February 8, 2025. You write extensively, and I think you're one of the foremost experts on border security and foreign interference. I'm just going to quote you:

Veteran law enforcement officials—both active and retired—from the United States and Canada have come forward with explosive allegations suggesting that Canada's federal government may have systematically obstructed investigations into the highest levels of Asian organized crime

Can you elaborate on that, please?

11:20 a.m.

Journalist, The Bureau

Samuel Cooper

That's reported with great gravity. The people who came forward pointed to specific cases, such as that of Cameron Ortis, the former RCMP intelligence director who was convicted for sharing Five Eyes international enforcement plans with the very networks that this hearing should be concerned about. Mr. Ortis was convicted of sharing plans with the Sinaloa cartel, Hezbollah and Chinese money laundering-connected threat networks in Vancouver, in one case. In Toronto, Mr. Ortis was allegedly reaching out to the highest levels of Iranian-connected transnational money laundering, inclusive of Iranian-Canadian currency traders in Canada, allegedly working with Pakistani threat networks. That is one case where the sources I talked to said they were afraid that corruption had damaged, perhaps irreparably, our relations with America and others.

11:20 a.m.

Conservative

Frank Caputo Conservative Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC

I have about 45 seconds. You talk about corruption. Is that corruption occurring on Canadian soil, and if so, where?

11:20 a.m.

Journalist, The Bureau

Samuel Cooper

The corruption has occurred within the CBSA, according to sourcing. As I said, it has occurred on Canadian soil within the RCMP, where these threat networks we're talking about have, as Mr. Ortis said in court, exquisite visibility on RCMP investigation plans.

I'll end by saying that some sources were very distressed that our former prime minister, as The Globe and Mail reported, stumbled into a surveillance operation that was targeting senior Chinese threat networks in British Columbia.

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

Thank you, Mr. Cooper.

Now we'll go to MP Acan.

Sima Acan Liberal Oakville West, ON

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I would like to welcome our guests today, witnesses Mr. Cooper and Dr. Nohara. Thank you very much for appearing before the committee.

I'm the member of Parliament for Oakville West. I have an electronics engineering background, so I have experience in automation, autonomous tech and robotics. Tech has always been my area of interest, so my questions are going to be about that field.

Welcome again, Dr. Nohara. As you briefly gave an overview in your opening remarks, could you please provide details on the types of radar technologies that your company has implemented along the Canadian border, particularly in collaboration with the CBSA or port authorities? I'm interested in understanding the scope, capabilities and operational impact of these technologies.