Science and Research Committee on June 20th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Welcome to meeting number 51 of the Standing Committee on Science and Research.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of June 23, 2022. Members are attending in person in the room, and we do have a member on Zoom as well.

I'll make a few comments for the benefit of the witnesses. Thank you to the witnesses for getting teed up.

I'll recognize you by name before speaking. If you're participating in the video conference, just click on your microphone icon to activate your mike. When speaking, please speak slowly and clearly. When you're not speaking, please mute your mike. If you need the interpretation on Zoom, there's a globe icon at the bottom of your screen where you can choose floor, English or French. For those in the room, you know about the earpieces.

Although this room is equipped with a powerful audio system, feedback events can occur. These can be extremely harmful to the interpreters and can cause serious injuries. The most common cause of sound feedback is the earpiece being worn too close to a microphone. Therefore, we ask all participants to exercise a high degree of caution when handling the earpieces, especially when your microphone is on.

In accordance with the committee's routine motion concerning connection tests, I've been informed that those have been done. I will remind you that all comments should come through the chair.

To get us started, pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(i) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, June 6, 2023, the committee commences its study on the use of federal government research and development grants, funds and contributions by Canadian universities and research institutes in partnership with entities connected to the People's Republic of China.

It's my pleasure now to welcome Christian Leuprecht, a professor from the Royal Military College of Canada, by video conference; and Jim Hinton, intellectual property lawyer, also by video conference.

You'll each have five minutes for your opening remarks, and then we'll go to our rounds of questions. We'll start with Mr. Leuprecht.

The floor is yours for five minutes. Thank you.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht, Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair, thank you for the invitation.

I will deliver my remarks in English, but will be happy to answer your questions in the two official languages.

I will skip over an introduction that lays out the infiltration and co-optation of Canadian research by Chinese defence intelligence, national security and dual-use technology entities, but rest assured that the public record shows that it is deep and vast. In some cases, Canadian institutions and researchers know full well that their Chinese interlocutors are highly problematic, while in others they are unwitting participants.

Tax dollars, public research funding and public universities have for years been leveraged systematically to support and enable research and to use technology that benefits hostile authoritarian states that seem to undermine Canada's democratic institutions, electoral processes, economic prosperity, national security and fundamental values, as well as international multilateral institutions and so forth.

The government purports to have a values-based foreign policy, yet, for over 17 years, its own research dollars and institutions have been used by hostile states to advance nefarious purposes that run counter to those very values. This is not a random distribution problem. The problematic research partners and methods of infiltration and co-optation have been a matter of public record for at least five years, as have key areas of sensitive research.

At the same time, dithering by the federal government on a coherent and systematic approach and framework to contain this problem is anecdotally causing some scholars to be excluded from opportunities merely by virtue of having a Chinese surname. Contrary to the Prime Minister's claims that government action might have racist consequences or overtones, it is precisely the government's inaction that is having racist consequences by creating widespread uncertainty.

Conversely, any scholar who has family in China, who works with former colleagues in the PRC or who visits China would be vulnerable, as is naturally the case with most scholars with relations to China. Although the committee's focus is on the federal government's role, this domain requires close and extensive collaboration among the federal government, the provinces and research institutions, with robust and resolute federal leadership to ensure certainty and national coherence. To this end, the federal government must not succumb to the temptation to take the easy way out by taking a narrow approach. This would be a serious mistake. Only a comprehensive approach to research security will be effective and meaningful.

First, on sensitive research areas, the government needs to flag high-risk research areas, notably those that could give rise to dual-use technology. Conspicuously absent from the motion that informs the committee's hearings, for instance, is computing or advanced materials manufacturing and critical minerals, which would capture research on electric vehicles.

Two, it needs to be country-agnostic. Once sensitive research areas have been identified, the approach should be country-agnostic and encompass not just China but hostile authoritarian regimes more broadly, including Russia and Iran.

Three is listed entities. The government must muster the courage to list problematic entities, which includes about 200 Chinese institutions and companies, but also entities in Russia and Iran, for instance. Researchers must have clarity about which affiliations are problematic.

Four, identifying sensitive research areas, problematic countries and actual entities shifts some of the burden for research security to the researcher, who should be required to certify in good faith that either none of these apply to the PI and application, or if they do, the researcher should be required to submit a comprehensive research security plan that explains in detail the risks and the mitigation strategies. Inadequate risk mitigation plans should be grounds for rejection. Research security plans must exercise due diligence to ensure that research does not end up in the wrong hands and to provide additional safeguards, including annual audits and possibly withholding funds to researchers and institutions.

Five is having a broad, comprehensive vetting process. Instead of looking only at direct or indirect—that is, in-kind—financial support for a project, a proper vetting process must look at the principal investigator's collaborations holistically, notably that PI's record of co-authored publications and other grants. Looking only at financial support on an application for a project will miss key problematic relationships. Arguments that the charter somehow works against a comprehensive vetting process are false and merely an excuse to avoid doing the right thing.

Six, the federal government has started to fund research security at Canadian universities, but there are two problems. One is that the formula used to calculate support under the Government of Canada's research support fund is problematic. Aurora College gets $256 a year, Trent gets $25,000, and the University of Toronto gets $4.3 million. This is insufficient funding for Trent to hire research officers, on the one hand, but way too much money for the University of Toronto. Second, that effort looks largely performative. The new university research officers have thus far received little guidance and are largely performing an administrative function. They require clear guidance.

Seven, universities should be allowed and encouraged to put this new research funding towards research, best practices and awareness in support of research security.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you very much for your comments.

Now we'll go to Mr. Hinton, please, for five minutes.

[Jim Hinton, Intellectual Property Lawyer, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair and honourable members of the Standing Committee on Science and Research. I had the opportunity to speak with you earlier this year, and it is again an honour to present to you today.

I'm an IP lawyer, patent agent and trademark agent with my firm, Own Innovation. I'm also a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, where I study innovation and intellectual property policy. I also teach innovation and IP commercialization strategies at Western University in London, Ontario.

I express gratitude to the committee for studying this important topic. Security and control of Canadian research is a matter of national security as well as national economic prosperity. The value of Canadian research is controlled by intellectual property and physical restriction. Whether we protect our research or not, countries are using it to advance their national agendas.

Today, we are talking about what happens when foreign actors use our technology and IP to put our national security at risk. Canadian research institutions—our universities—are some of Canada's most sacrosanct institutions; however, these institutions have been compromised. According to public reports, 50 Canadian universities have conducted extensive research with China's military since 2005.

Huawei has partnered with over 20 of Canada's research institutions. Huawei has received intellectual property from the University of Waterloo, the University of Toronto, McGill University, the University of British Columbia, the University of Calgary, the University of Ottawa, Université Laval, Institut national de la recherche scientifique, Carleton University, Polytechnique Montréal, Western University, the University of Regina and McMaster University. I am naming these names so that there is no longer a veil of secrecy in these deals.

This is just the tip of the iceberg. Significant public funding, millions of dollars and resources are being used. Hundreds of patents have been generated for Huawei through these deals. The commercial rights go to Huawei, and they can use this technology in any manner they want. Canadians are legally prohibited from practising these technologies. These are not one-off instances. This is a systematic exfiltration of Canadian publicly funded assets to an organization that now isn't even allowed in Canada's telecommunications systems.

The federal government, through programs like the National Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada, NSERC, not only has been complicit in these arrangements but has been incentivizing this behaviour. While there has been a recent shift in the approach because of the increasing public outcry, it has been entirely reactionary. NSERC has been funding Huawei research projects since at least 2010, and despite some changes, Canadian universities and researchers can still work with Huawei. They just may no longer be incentivized to do so.

I propose the following recommendations, modelled from global best practices in the United States, Australia and other jurisdictions.

The first is transparency. We need to know who is working with Canadian research institutions and how much they have been benefiting. We really don't know the extent of the relationship or its impacts. We also need to know what this technology has been used for, particularly for dual-use technologies that may have commercial uses as well as nefarious purposes. Universities receiving public funding must track and report the flow of research and development efforts with annual and concrete disclosure, including how much and whom they are working with.

The second is proactive and not reactive policy. The fox is in charge of the henhouse. The universities and researchers themselves are in many cases tasked to self-report potential national security issues, but they are in an inherent conflict of interest. We must properly resource and incentivize universities to work with Canada's intelligence community to be up to date on the latest intelligence and understand challenges to proactively manage relationships for Canadian benefit. Consider legislation like what Australia has adopted to review and, if necessary, to cancel international agreements made by universities.

Finally, we need to retain strategic Canadian intellectual property and data assets. We need to stop doing these terrible deals, end them now and make sure we don't get into the same problem again. Also, we need to continuously update technologies of strategic importance. Economic and security risks are not separate issues. Intellectual property and data assets for artificial intelligence, quantum, photonics, biotech and aerospace are dual-use technologies that have both economic and national security value. Any assessment of risk and net benefit needs to include both the economic value and the security risks.

China sees our universities as strategic IP generators for its military and its firms, but it's not just China. It's also the Americans. It may also be Russia or Iran. The federal government needs to take control of the situation and ensure that publicly funded intellectual property and data assets benefit Canadians, not foreign militaries.

Thank you, and I look forward to the discussion.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you. You're right on time with your comments.

Thanks to both witnesses.

Now we'll go into a six-minute round of questions, starting with Mr. Mazier.

The floor is yours.

[Dan Mazier, Conservative, Dauphin—Swan River—Neepawa, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here today.

Mr. Hinton, thank you for being here again.

I expect that, during the study, we're going to hear about the 2021 national security guidelines for research partnerships and the ministers' 2023 announcement on funding research partnerships. I expect the universities will say there's nothing to see here because the guidelines have changed. Also, I expect the government will say the ministers have addressed the national security concerns with the new directive.

Therefore, as a committee, what should we keep in mind when we hear the universities testify on this?

[Jim Hinton]

Thank you. It's good to see the group again.

This is just the tip of the iceberg. There's a lot more going on under the surface. Fundamentally, there's a failure of governance out of Canadian universities. This has been a problem for years, and it's only with public scrutiny that we've seen any reaction. It's clear they're not able to govern themselves.

Yes, some universities appear to have ended their partnerships with Huawei, but what about the next issue?

[Dan Mazier, Conservative, Dauphin—Swan River—Neepawa, MB]

Can you expand a bit on that? You made some comments about foxes around the henhouse. Is there something lurking underneath? You talked about transparency and secrecy, as well. Is there something we should be asking particular questions on?

[Jim Hinton]

Yes. Fundamentally, I would ask whom the universities have been partnering with, to what extent, where this technology has gone and who has benefited from that. Importantly, have these technologies been used for nefarious purposes? We don't know the extent of it—what or where this has gone. This is all confidential. We've seen media reports on what's happened, but it's only because there have been media reports.

Back in 2018, The Globe and Mail reported on this issue. Only with mounting public pressure has there been reorientation. That means the universities themselves are complicit in this funnelling of IP to Huawei. They get a bit of money and they're happy about it, but it's clear to me that it's only after they've been put under the public microscope that they have had the wherewithal to remove themselves from such a bad situation. We can't trust them to make sure this doesn't happen again.

Huawei is one example, but, again, there are Russia and Iran. There are all of these others, as well as Chinese state actors. We really don't know. The 50 universities.... There are a lot of Canadian universities that are working or have worked with Chinese military researchers. That's extensive. This is only the tip of the iceberg—what we can see publicly. The universities themselves know this information and have not been sharing this information.

[Dan Mazier, Conservative, Dauphin—Swan River—Neepawa, MB]

Thank you.

Some researchers have claimed that scrutinizing national security threats in research funding is a threat to academic freedom. What do you say to this argument?

[Jim Hinton]

I teach at Western. I know academic freedom well. Academic freedom requires an environment of enabled autonomy with researchers free from undue external influence. State military actors are undue influencers, whether academics like to admit it or not.

There are limitations on what can and should be done in the name of academic freedom. Just as a researcher is not permitted to falsify research or plagiarise, they should not be able to aid and abet foreign military actors at the risk of Canada's national security.

[Dan Mazier, Conservative, Dauphin—Swan River—Neepawa, MB]

Do you believe universities are capable of screening national security threats before engaging in research partnerships, and if not, why?

[Jim Hinton]

I don't think universities are capable of screening national security issues. They're not resourced. They don't have the wherewithal and they're not experts. They have experts in photonics and quantum computing. They graduate up through the ranks and become administrators of these institutions, but they're not experts on national security. We even saw the University of Waterloo issuing guidelines to researchers to slow down, advising them they don't have to work with CSIS.

We should be collaborating and working together. The universities themselves benefit. They take a bit of money, and then they do whatever they want. Yes, there are new rules and some additional scrutiny, but it doesn't correct the dereliction of their duty to the public interest in the past. They made a mistake and they continue to make mistakes. It hasn't been corrected and I wouldn't trust them to correct it themselves.

[Dan Mazier, Conservative, Dauphin—Swan River—Neepawa, MB]

So there needs to be some clear direction by either Parliament, I guess, or CSIS. There needs to be more done. Some clear direction needs to be given to the universities, by all means.

[Jim Hinton]

Yes. Absolutely.

[Dan Mazier, Conservative, Dauphin—Swan River—Neepawa, MB]

This study would probably go a long way in starting that path forward, I guess.

Mr. Leuprecht, I have one question. You mentioned something about “five years ago” and about how this issue seemed to be accelerating since then. What was the key thing that happened so that all of a sudden this became a huge issue in our research community?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

Aside from the known malfeasance by Chinese intelligence actors with regard to institutions, such as the complete data exfiltration of the Australian National University, we also had the really comprehensive report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, which was the first report to flag these problematic collaborations and which at the time, of 2,500 problematic collaborations over 10 years, flagged 300 of them in Canada. In particular, three Canadian universities were in the global top 10 of these problematic collaborations—

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you. If we could get the rest in writing, that would be terrific.

It's over to Mr. Sousa for six minutes, please.

[Charles Sousa, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your presentations.

You know, this committee was formed with the priority to try to protect IP, the sovereignty issue of Canada's presence with respect to technology, as well as national security. We all have the shared concern to ensure that our Canadian innovators are protected and that we retain some of that IP and monetization and scaling of that technology here in Canada. We all have a sense of wariness about some foreign entities being involved. Notwithstanding some of the academic excellence and independence that's required in the scientific community for international engagement, we want to make certain that Canada is protected throughout. Certainly, we see Russia and China and some of their institutions excelling in certain applications. We want to take advantage of that as well, but we want to protect Canada. We want to protect our businesses and our economy throughout.

I appreciate, Mr. Hinton, your mention of some of the concerns about compromise and certainly some of the developments that have occurred long before five years prior. This has been going on for some time. My question is this: Do you believe the Trudeau government was correct in its move to ban Huawei in Canada?

[Jim Hinton]

I'll leave the question of banning Huawei to the national security experts, but from the information I have, that makes a lot of sense. Banning Huawei from the communications infrastructure was one thing, and then waiting a period of time, a significant amount of time, to turn to Canadian universities and say, wait, there's more to what's going on here.

This is really just through the front door. A lot of things are happening in the background that—

[Charles Sousa, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Yes. That's a good point.

I also recognize some of the jurisdictional constraints between the federal government and the provincial governments in regard to the universities. Provinces support some of the policies and engagements by universities.

Mr. Leuprecht, in March of this year, you testified at a parliamentary committee and said, “Recent unclassified versions of CSIS annual reports repeatedly warned about the state capture and elite capture of Canadian political, business, financial, educational and societal elites and institutions.” You waved a concern.

How recently would you say that this threat has been present in Canada?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

Well, I would say that we are recently aware of public debate about a certain individual whose report became quite prominent, who has had a least a dozen trips to China and who has referred to a major Chinese university as that individual's second home. Some of that individual's children have studied in China.

There are many other examples that we could cite. I would say that problematic relationships run deep and wide in Canada, with potential pecuniary interests.

[Charles Sousa, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you.

I know there have been reports by CSIS back in 2010 and 2011 that were made public—I think I can count eight of them—showing concern to the previous government, and Harper in particular, who was in retention of some of these activities and being cautioned not to engage and not to provide some of this support that is being provided to the universities today.

I'll cite this from one report:

While the vast majority of foreign investment in Canada is carried out in an open and transparent manner, certain state-owned enterprises...and private firms with close ties to their home governments have pursued opaque agendas or received clandestine intelligence support for their pursuits here.

This is from the 2010-11 CSIS public report. The following year, Harper signed a deal with Huawei to participate in major Canadian telecommunications projects.

Now, that hardly seems like a recent threat. It's fair to say, then, that the economic espionage has been a threat for well over 10 years. Some unclassified versions of these reports are sent directly to the PM before being tabled in Parliament. It is fair to say that then PM Harper would have known of the security risks and proceeded anyway.

We know these threats. We've taken some steps to try to unwind them. Your cautionary tale—both of you—is important here. It's critically important to ensure that we proceed appropriately and effectively.

Would you agree that this was going on for some time, long before this government?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

Yes, but I would also say that in 2017 we had a qualitative and quantitative paradigm shift in the aggressive posture by China and the systematic leveraging of technology to undermine our way of life, which now poses an existential threat to Canada in a way that we did not have before. I would say the current government has been rather slow in picking up on this paradigmatic shift.

[Charles Sousa, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

I would tend to agree that China and Russia, for that matter, have been pretty aggressive across the world, across western countries, and not just Canada. It is very concerning to all of us and, with our allies, we must take the proper steps to correct those measures.

Do you think Harper's government was correct to allow Huawei to expand in Canada, despite warnings from allies and its own public safety officials?