Thank you very much.
Distinguished members of the committee and staff, thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing. It's an honour to be here alongside my esteemed colleague.
I am currently a senior fellow at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University. I previously served as a U.S. national counter-intelligence officer for East Asia and have spent most of my career looking at China's S and T development and tech acquisition strategies.
At the committee’s request, my testimony today will focus on S and T collaboration with China. I'll provide a brief overview of China's S and T system, highlight how China's policies and programs challenge the global norms of science and finally discuss research security.
Lastly, I'll offer some lessons learned and put the bluff up front.
This is not just a Canadian or U.S. problem but one of open democracies, because China's system is not the same as ours. It takes a holistic approach to the development of technology and it blurs the lines between public, private, civilian and military. Our policies and mitigation strategies need to reflect that reality.
Regardless of their personal views, Chinese scientists, business people and officials interacting with our universities or companies have to respond to the PRC's government or security services if they are asked for information or data.
China intimidates and harshly silences its critics. This has only grown more prevalent in the past few years, and it increasingly includes its citizens abroad, both in Canada and the U.S.
Our institutions are not designed to counter the threat to academic freedom and the manipulation of public opinion that China's policies and actions pose. Beijing in many ways understands our societal tensions, and its statecraft is directed at them, promoting any changes in policy as ethnic profiling. This is a well-funded effort.
It's because of this last point that I do want to acknowledge how difficult and challenging these issues can be. There's no room for xenophobia or ethnic profiling in open liberal democracies. It goes against everything we stand for. Also, precisely because of these values, we must move forward and find a principled way to mitigate the policies of a nation-state that's ever more authoritarian.
The importance of science and technology is why China targets our universities and our labs. Emerging technologies are increasingly at the centre of global competition, providing the foundational research and developments that underpin future industries and drive economic growth. Future strength will be built on 5G, AI, biotech, new materials, quantum and areas currently researched at our universities, government labs and R and D centres.
Beijing views this technology and the robust S and T infrastructure needed to develop it as a national asset. The way it's structured its system to reach this goal is inherently at odds with the key assumptions of the global norms, which include transparency, reciprocity and sharing. Beijing, especially Xi, looks at this development in a very zero-sum way. My written testimony goes into many more details on the policies, programs and infrastructure that support these efforts.
China’s legal system also complicates collaborations, because its laws compel its citizens to share information and data with Chinese entities if asked, regardless of the restrictions placed on that information. More importantly, who owns that information? I have also provided these points in my written testimony.
Moving forward, we need to consider the following.
We need policies for the China we have and not the China we want. Most policy measures to date have been tactical and not designed to counter an entire system that's structurally different from our own.
It's essential that open liberal democracies such as Canada and the U.S. invest in the future, but we must build research security into these funding programs. Existing policies and laws are insufficient to address the level of influence the Chinese Communist Party exerts in our society, especially in academia. Increased reporting requirements for foreign money at our academic and research institutes and clear reporting requirements are a good start.
We also have to ensure true reciprocity in our collaborations. For too long, we've looked the other way when China doesn't play by the rules and follow through on the details of these S and T collaborations. There have to be repercussions for not sharing data, providing access to facilities and, as my colleague mentioned, obfuscating the true affiliation of Chinese scientists.
In conclusion, what will also make this difficult is that the reality China is presenting is inconvenient to those benefiting in the short term. This includes companies looking for short-term profits, academics who benefit personally from funding or cheap labour in their labs and the many former government officials who cash in as lobbyists for state-owned or state-supported companies in China.
I want to thank the committee again for continuing to discuss this issue.
These are hard conversations that open, democratic societies must have if we are to protect and promote our competitiveness, our future developments and our values. If we do not highlight and address China's policies that violate global norms and our values, we give credence to a system that undermines fairness, openness and human rights. The Chinese people deserve better, and I think that Canadian and American people deserve better. Our future depends on it.
Thank you.
