Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for the invitation to appear before the committee today to discuss the important issue of research safety.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide an account of the steps taken by Canadian universities to strengthen research security, and to discuss how the government can support the security of research conducted at institutions.
My name is Philip Landon, and I'm the interim president of Universities Canada, a membership organization representing 97 universities across the country.
While this is my first appearance before the committee, Universities Canada has appeared frequently over the years, and I'll take a moment to thank our former president, Paul Davidson, for his exceptional leadership during that time.
International research collaboration is essential for Canada to remain competitive on the world stage. It fosters the exchange of ideas, talent and resources for the benefit of all concerned.
Research and technology transfers work both ways, and Canadian research benefits greatly from building on progress being made elsewhere in the world; however, universities also recognize that research collaborations can sometimes carry risks or raise national security considerations. As my colleague at U15 will note, Canada's universities have been vigorously expanding their research security capacity.
Universities are taking their own initiatives to limit partnerships with entities at the centre of this study, including building research security offices, increasing their risk assessment due diligence, conducting security workshops and putting in robust travel security measures. They're also faced with the challenge of doing so in a way that protects both the research and the Canadian researchers involved.
I want to focus on how the government can better support universities on these challenges.
Research security measures must be deliberate and must be very targeted. Broad, ambiguous targets create uncertainty rather than clarity and will slow down the system. When asking researchers to cut ties, they're often presented with two options: wind down their research and potentially abandon a project completely, or continue to pursue that research outside of Canada. In either case, you risk driving IP and talent out of Canada.
Currently there are no federal grants designed to make up for the sudden loss of partnership. Research is extremely specialized, making it hard to find an alternative partner. Ph.D. students who discover that they can no longer be supported on a project they just spent years working on are left looking for other options, often outside of Canada. Meanwhile, as highlighted in the government's advisory panel's report, the Bouchard report, graduate scholarships and federal research grants have stagnated over the last two decades. Researchers are increasingly being asked to do more with less.
Peer countries have been very careful in their approach. Earlier this year, Australia published a list of critical technologies. Rather than restrict research in these areas, this list highlights opportunities they want to promote with other aligned nations while developing more robust risk mitigation practices. The American CHIPS and Science Act introduces very targeted restrictions coupled with very significant research investments.
As this committee contemplates recommendations on this important issue, I strongly encourage you to consider how to ensure that Canada is opening new doors, not just closing doors. It's also important to ensure that smaller universities are not left out of initiatives like the research support fund, so that all institutions receive adequate research security support.
I will close by stressing the importance of taking a country-agnostic approach when working on addressing the challenges of research security. This study is very much focused on China, which, by extension, singles out Chinese students who went to public institutions in China. This affects how the issue is portrayed in the media and may unintentionally exacerbate discrimination against students of Chinese origin.
I strongly encourage the committee to evaluate security threats irrespective of country of origin. Tackling research security challenges in this way will help Canada create a more robust research security framework.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak today. I'm happy to take questions.