Science and Research Committee on Oct. 4th, 2023

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Corey Tochor]

I call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 56 of the Standing Committee on Science and Research. Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely by using the Zoom application.

I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of witnesses and members. Please wait to be recognized by name before speaking. For those taking part by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mike. When speaking, please speak slowly and clearly. When you are not speaking, your mike should be on mute.

For interpretation on Zoom, you have the choice at the bottom of your screen of either floor, English or French audio. Those in the room can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

In accordance with the committee's routine motions concerning connection tests for witnesses, I am informed that everyone's logged in and tests have been done.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(i) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, June 6, 2023, the committee continues its study of the use of federal government research and development grants, funds and contributions by Canadian universities and research institutes in partnerships with entities connected to the People's Republic of China.

Our witnesses will provide five-minute presentations. Please watch your clock to make sure you're within five minutes. When you're nearing the end of the allotted time, if you're watching the screen, I'll try to get your attention to speed things up.

Starting off, via video conference, we have Jim Hinton, an intellectual property lawyer. Jim, you have five minutes. The floor is yours.

[Jim Hinton, Intellectual Property Lawyer, As an Individual]

Thank you for inviting me to speak with the committee again. I offer my apologies for not being there in person with you today. I have been following the committee’s great work and will share some additional comments that build off the comments I made earlier, in June.

For those I have not met, I'm an IP lawyer, a patent agent and a trademark agent with Own Innovation. I'm a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, where I study innovation and intellectual property policy. I am also an assistant professor at the University of Western Ontario. I am appearing before the committee today as an individual.

It is clear that Canadian universities have had extensive ties with Chinese firms, as well as entities connected with the Chinese government and military. As we know, 50 Canadian universities have conducted extensive research with China's military since 2005, and Huawei has partnered with over 20 of Canada's research institutions.

While some Canadian universities have noted that they will not be working with Huawei in the future, many partnerships continue and are ongoing. In preparation for this meeting, I discovered that as recently as a few weeks ago, there have been new patent applications published, listing Huawei as owner, with Canadian university researchers as inventors, including people from the University of Toronto, UBC, Queen's, Ottawa, McMaster and Western. The filing dates for these patents go back to early 2022, which means that Canadian universities are still very actively building and transferring intellectual property to Huawei. This is despite ISED's “National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships”, which was published in 2021.

While patents are crucial for extracting economic value from research that may be published, that's just the tip of the iceberg. It's not just patents: It's confidential information on new areas of study. It's data—genomic data, health data. It's algorithms, artificial intelligence and software, but the universities are not sharing the information on what exactly has been transferred or to whom.

I previously made three clear recommendations, and I will reiterate them here with additional context.

The first is transparency. We need to know who is working with Canadian research institutions and how much they have been benefiting. We really don't know the extent of the relationships or their impacts. This information needs to be made available on an ongoing basis, and with certain aspects shared with the public. Where is the accountability? Who is responsible?

The second is that we need to have proactive policies that mandate that universities must work with Canada's intelligence community to be up to date on the latest intelligence and understand challenges to proactively manage relationships for Canada's benefit. This is not just a shared responsibility of the federal and provincial governments; the universities themselves must want to be higher-performing, not just to appease public funders but for their own relevance within the country.

The current construct to guide change, a working group of universities and the federal government, is fatally flawed. It is insular. It fails to include domain experts who understand IP, national security, data sovereignty and privacy, to name a few. In addition, the university and government working group does not include innovative Canadian firms. If we create policies that manage only the needs of government and the universities themselves, we can’t expect that the innovative Canadian firms that actually commercialize technologies will be able to drive the economic value of this research for Canada.

Finally, we must retain strategic Canadian intellectual property and data assets. I said in June of this year that we must stop doing these terrible deals to make sure we don't get into the same problem again, but from what I've seen so far, it hasn't been having the necessary impact.

I look forward to continuing the discussion.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Corey Tochor]

Now we move to Ivana Karaskova.

The floor is yours for five minutes.

[Dr. Ivana Karaskova, China Projects Lead, Association for International Affairs (AMO), As an Individual]

I represent the Association for International Affairs, a leading think tank from the Czech Republic. Our focus lies in scrutinizing the PRC’s activities within central and eastern Europe, including in the realms of science, technology and innovation, or STI. My purpose here today is to clarify the stance on trusted research in Europe and to outline some measures undertaken by the EU and several of its member states to enhance their knowledge security.

It's well within the purview of this esteemed committee to note that collaborative research efforts with China pose several challenges.

First, in STI, China focuses on, among others, artificial intelligence, quantum, deep space exploration, new materials, neuroscience and biotechnology. Given China's limitations in domestic production, despite its advancement in key technologies, it still seeks these technologies abroad, utilizing both legitimate and grey zone means to acquire them.

Second, as China strategically uses foreign technologies to boost its own technological base and enable domestic innovation, it increases the competitiveness of its industry and research sectors vis-à-vis foreign counterparts.

Third, China has been clear that its ultimate goal is to substitute foreign technology with indigenous development and to achieve dominance in key sectors across the board. This ambition has been coupled with a lack of reciprocity in allowing foreign institutions access to the Chinese STI sector.

Last, Chinese technology acquisition abroad is tied to the modernization of its military, as many of the technologies are of a dual-use nature. By engaging in technology co-operation and transfer with Chinese counterparts, foreign research institutions may indirectly be supporting the growth of Chinese military prowess.

The EU has gradually become aware of these challenges. Yesterday the European Commission revealed a list of 10 critical technologies, with four of them seen as more sensitive: advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum and biotechnologies. These technologies were singled out based on criteria of their enabling and transformative nature, the risk of civil and military fusion, and the risk of misuse of the technology for human rights violations.

The European Commission recommends a collective risk assessment by the end of this year. Though the legislation is in the form of a recommendation only and China is not specifically mentioned, it sends a strong signal that in the current geopolitical competition, the EU intends to actively participate rather than be a bystander.

Despite the new push by the European Commission, the sense of urgency and the efficacy of measures adopted to mitigate risks of research collaboration with China differ substantially among EU member states. In central and eastern Europe, the awareness of the issue is still in a nascent phase. Our research conducted in central Europe revealed that more than 800 research outputs received exclusive funding from Chinese sources—including from the thousand talents program and the central military commission, a body overseeing the People’s Liberation Army—and the co-operation has been constantly growing. In light of the interconnected global research landscape and the prevalence of international project consortia, safeguarding knowledge in individual countries and collaborating with allied nations assume paramount significance.

I would like to conclude with five recommendations that may also be applicable in the Canadian context.

First, it's important to address the elephant in the room. Most of the recommendations and guidelines published by various institutions globally adopt an actor-agnostic approach. However, China’s global reach and far-reaching goals, its increasingly revisionist agenda and the nature of its political regime make it a risk and a challenge like no other. Moreover, it would help universities to comprehend the challenge more if the recommendations were actor-specific regarding the nature of the risks and the areas that should be safeguarded.

Second, drawing red lines may give universities and research centres clearer indications of potentially risky areas.

Third, measures targeting universities and research centres have to be designed with the aim of bringing them on board as collaborative partners. In all processes, they should be supported by national administrations financially and also legally.

Fourth, instead of appointing a security manager at each research centre and university, one national contact point may be created, which would provide advice and issue recommendations. This system already works in the Netherlands, where it helps universities with due diligence.

Last, Europe as well as Canada and other like-minded countries would have to ensure they stay competitive. Especially in the field of emerging technologies, research funding needs to ensure that the most promising activities stay domestic.

Thank you. I appreciate your esteemed committee's attention to this pressing matter, and I'm looking forward to your questions.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Corey Tochor]

Thank you so much for that.

Now for our final witness on this panel, we'll have Kevin Gamache for five minutes.

Kevin, the floor is yours.

[Dr. Kevin Gamache, Associate Vice Chancellor and Chief Research Security Officer, Texas A and M University System Research Security Office]

Thank you, and I appreciate this invitation to appear before the committee.

I'm the associate vice-chancellor and chief research security officer for the Texas A&M University System. I'll discuss the unique challenges of protecting cutting-edge technology and maintaining national security in academia's research environment.

The Texas A&M University System is one of the United States' largest higher education systems, with an annual budget of $7.8 billion. Through a statewide network of 11 universities and eight state agencies, the A&M system employs more than 26,000 faculty and staff members, and educates more than 153,000 students annually. System-wide research and development expenditures exceed $1.1 billion, significantly driving our state's economy.

One of the primary roles of academic institutions is the free and open generation and dissemination of knowledge. The U.S. research enterprise provides the foundation for a diverse and driven workforce and fosters discovery and innovation. International collaboration is critical to scientific advancement and the success of research institutions in the United States.

American universities have become a magnet for students and researchers worldwide to join forces in solving our most pressing problems and promoting scientific advancement. Unfortunately, our technological leadership is under siege by governments of countries such as Russia, China, Iran and others whose rules for information sharing and research integrity differ from ours. These governments are extracting intellectual capital, cutting-edge data and specialized expertise at an unprecedented rate and risking our technological leadership. Academic sector entities must work closely with our federal partners to protect information and research with national security implications.

In 2016 the A&M system's chancellor, John Sharp, recognized this growing threat and established the Research Security Office, or RSO, at the A&M system level. The RSO provides program management and oversight of all A&M system classified research, controlled unclassified programs and export-controlled research.

Understanding our collaborators is one of the most important aspects of any research security program. With whom are we collaborating? Who's funding these collaborators? Is there a foreign government nexus? What are the risks to the institution? Can these risks be mitigated? To answer these questions, the RSO has established a robust due diligence program through which we review all visiting scholars and post-doctoral researchers from countries of concern. In addition, we vet all personnel engaging in our most sensitive research programs.

Our policies require mandatory disclosure of all foreign collaborations and approval of foreign travel. We conduct continuous network monitoring and have included keywords and signatures in our data-loss prevention systems explicitly focused on identifying malign foreign influence in our research enterprise. We've updated system-wide conflict of interest and commitment policies, and established processes for reviewing and approving foreign collaborations and agreements. We established a NIST 800-171-compliant secure computing enclave that is available to all members of the A&M system to protect our sensitive research funded by the federal government.

Underpinning all of this work is a robust relationship with our federal partners, including the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other members of the intelligence community. Collaborations between academia and the federal government are critical to addressing these threats. FBI Director Wray has stated that we can't arrest our way out of this problem. As the single point of contact within the A&M system, the RSO interacts daily with our DCSA and FBI partners. My office also maintains proper clearances, information-sharing and collaboration capabilities, and secure facilities for meaningful engagement with our federal partners.

Soon after the RSO was established, we created the academic security and counter-exploitation working group, an association of university research professionals and their federal counterparts. ASCE exists to leverage the expertise of universities that have demonstrated excellence in research security programs to help address the threat foreign adversaries pose to U.S. academic institutions and conducts international outreach to build a global dialogue and robust community of practice. We're actively engaged with the Canadian U15, in particular.

The first academic security and counter-exploitation training seminar was held in 2017 to provide a forum for universities to benchmark and share best practices from their respective programs. The seminar has grown since that first year to include the broader academic community and increased federal engagement.

While the ASCE training seminar allows academic security—

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Corey Tochor]

I'm sorry. We are over our time allotment. There will be an opportunity in the answers and the questions to hopefully bring out what you were about to say.

I'd also like to remind all witnesses that you can always do a written brief, once you've done your testimony, on any matter on the subject that you think is relevant.

Starting off our first six-minute round of questioning, we have Gerald Soroka. Gerald, the floor is yours for six minutes.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, witnesses, for coming today.

I'll start off with Mr. Hinton.

If the People's Republic of China infringed on Canadian intellectual property, do you know of any remedies that those impacted could pursue? Does the federal government support pursuing remedies for international infringement on Canadian intellectual property?

[Jim Hinton]

That's a very good question.

To reiterate, the question is what would happen if a Canadian company had its IP infringed upon in China—

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Exactly.

[Jim Hinton]

—or by a Chinese firm.

There are no resources within the country. The company would be left to its own devices to manage that. I work with Canadian companies that have to manage that on an ongoing basis.

Really, the expectation is that if you're working in a manufacturing perspective in China, you will be copied, so try not to give away so much information that you would lose your economic advantage if it was copied.

There are no resources. There are things that are coming on, like the Innovation Asset Collective, the patent collective and IP Assist, but really, these are not from an infringement perspective or for preventing foreign companies in China from copying or infringing IP.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Does the government recommend trying to go after them, or not at all?

[Jim Hinton]

There are no recommendations. It is up to the company to determine whether it's in their financial interest to do that. The Chinese patent and IP systems continue to evolve.

There have been some successes, but it is a very challenging task to enforce IP within China.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

When we're dealing with international collaboration in research or with academic institutions, does Canada have any laws to protect IP or not?

[Jim Hinton]

We have our domestic laws. We have the Patent Act and the Trademarks Act. When it comes to international actors, they would apply, so if somebody's infringing the patent within the country, we have those laws. They are generally parallel to or harmonized with global rules.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

You mentioned Huawei partnering with 20 different Canadian research institutions. What are the repercussions of that in terms of our allies, such as the Five Eyes partners? How do you think they view us?

[Jim Hinton]

Not very well.

It was more than five years ago that the U.S. and Australia banned Huawei from the telecom networks. Since then, we've continued to feed the Huawei machine with intellectual property, with hundreds of patents. It's not a very savvy move from a business perspective. When you layer on the national security issues that are presented, it's even more foolish.

We have a lot of catching up to do. This is not something that should surprise anybody. It was in May 2018 that Huawei was revealed by The Globe and Mail to be systematically moving IP out of Canada. It's been ongoing.

To me, it's only the public outcry that has reoriented the universities from continuing to do these deals. It's not their own understanding of the economic impacts or the national security impacts.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

You gave recommendations, but I want to know about the steps we need to take to show our allies that Canada's taking this issue seriously. Could you give some advice on that as well?

[Jim Hinton]

Well, it's action. We have to do what we say we're going to do. When we say we're going to ban organizations like Huawei from our telecom infrastructure, we also need to be consistent. Are we going to fund and incentivize these same organizations, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars, to work with our universities and pull out the IP? We have to stop—simply, we have to stop—doing what we've been doing.

As I mentioned, I did a quick search, and there were patents filed and published on September 21, 2023—just weeks ago—coming out of institutions that I work with. I'm an alumnus of U of T. I teach at Western. I was at Osgoode at York University teaching this term as well. I know these institutions well. They're not reorienting, or they're not reorienting fast enough. We have to both do that and signal that we're reorienting and prioritizing economic activity as well as national security activity.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

I know that the minister was here on a different issue a few months ago, saying how they're really going to take steps, but are they actually doing enough? Are they just dragging their heels, or are they allowing universities to have their own policies in place?

[Jim Hinton]

What concerns me is that we think “no one told us not to do this” is any way to manage billions of dollars in publicly funded research. This is Canada's economic future. Ivana said it best—that the most promising opportunities need to remain domestic. We're letting this go. It's not happening. The universities are not governing themselves properly. This is a governance failure at the university level. It's also a provincial and federal responsibility.

Everybody has to step up and say that we need to do better and we need to reorient.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

In February the government announced that they're going to be doing all this. They're really not responding as quickly as they need to, are they, given how quickly technology is evolving?

[Jim Hinton]

With technology, the geopolitics continue to shift. We see this with different countries. It's China, it's Russia, it's Iran and it's other countries. We need to be very dynamic, and universities move slowly. Government moves slowly.

That's why I suggested that domain experts who move quickly and understand how things have dynamically changed should be involved. There are the groups you've had as witnesses, but there are also the innovators themselves. People on the ground who are commercializing technology understand how things change and how things shift, especially when it comes to things like artificial intelligence and data. They need to be a very close ally and a resource when setting these policies and in moving quickly to implement them.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

It looks like I don't have any more time. Thank you.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Corey Tochor]

Thank you so much for that, Gerald.

Ryan Turnbull, you have six minutes.