Science and Research Committee on Oct. 4th, 2023

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thanks, Chair.

Thanks to the witnesses for being here for this important study and for their testimony today.

My understanding is that our government, unlike the Harper government, took research security very seriously. In June 2021 we put in place the pilot research security guidelines. We created a mechanism to assess applications through the Alliance program to protect Canadian researchers or institutions from risky partnerships. I believe it's working. Last year a series of decisions were made, in partnership with Public Safety Canada, to categorically reject all applications involving Huawei. We also now know that we're working to expand on these guidelines and to capture the risks with any military entities.

From my perspective, our government has been very clear. I think many of the post-secondary institutions are following suit or have taken that signal. That's just a statement.

Mr. Gamache, I want to get back to you. You mentioned the importance of research security officers, or the office that you suggested was playing a central role. I note that our government in budget 2022 made a budget commitment to a research security centre, standing that up through the Department of Public Safety, and that's forthcoming. That would be providing central support for researchers across the country.

Could you share a couple of best practices from your RSO that we might take into account when standing up that research security centre?

[Dr. Kevin Gamache]

I'd like to say first that I understand the strides the Canadian government has made over the last two years in particular. Some of the products you developed at the national level are very impressive, because we haven't seen that same kind of activity here in the United States. In fact, we've taken some of the documents that you developed and used them as models here. I've also been very impressed with some of my colleagues at Canadian universities, particularly my colleague at the University of Toronto.

Ultimately, I think the best practices come down to what kind of due diligence program a university has. As I mentioned, we spend a lot of time trying to understand who we're collaborating with so that our administration has the knowledge it needs to make an informed, risk-based decision. Everything is going to be based on the quality of the due diligence that we do on individual collaborations and individual projects, and we devote a lot of time to that.

I think the other thing that is very important is that ultimately universities are going to have to solve this problem. Some universities are farther along on the progression than others. We've been very successful here in the United States, especially with our academic security and counter-exploitation program and having universities with great experience help those that don't have that much experience.

Ultimately, the problem is going to be solved by faculty buy-in, so we spend a lot of time developing individual relationships with faculty, helping them understand the risk to their intellectual capital and getting them to become part of the team.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thank you. That's a really great and thorough response.

I'll go to Ms. Karaskova. You mentioned an actor-agnostic approach and talked about the risks and challenges, and you mentioned an actor-specific approach. I wanted to clarify with you that you're not advocating, as I understand it, to ban research entirely with certain countries.

Are you, or did I misunderstand what you were saying?

[Dr. Ivana Karaskova]

No, not at all. I didn't mean it the way it probably came out.

The problem here is that if you have actor-agnostic recommendations, most of the universities simply do not comprehend them. You are talking about some countries, some risks and some non-democratic actors, and the initial response from universities and research centres is, “Who and what should we safeguard, exactly?”

If you can't make the discussion about China—and most of the time it is about China—then we pretend it's not about China. Most of the time, if it is really about China, we have to say China is going after 15 critical technologies, and China is not shy about it. It's basically in all of the documents. All of the technologies that are listed for import are actually there. It's not just quantum computing; it's a specific type of quantum that is sought by China.

I think we probably have to go with the balanced way and have an actor-agnostic approach whereby we are talking about risks, no matter what kind of actor is posing them, but also job risk that is specifically about China as an actor that has very unique characteristics within the STI system, the science, technology and innovation system.

No, I'm not an advocate for vetting all of the co-operation with China, for the simple reason that in some areas, such as artificial intelligence, we are actually losing out. If we want to have access to Chinese data, we will have to be smarter about how to get this data and how to co-operate and collaborate with China, but under our terms, to make sure that the research is protected from our side.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thank you for that.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Corey Tochor]

As a reminder to some of our new committee members, when I am the chair, I don't like cutting off anybody, especially witnesses, so I will give them a bit of leeway to go a bit long, but I will cut off members if they purposely use my generosity in that regard.

Moving on to the next MP, we have Maxime Blanchette-Joncas from the Bloc for six minutes.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome to the witnesses joining us for this study.

Ms. Karaskova, you made recommendations to the European Union and European countries, including creating an independent national point of contact to provide advice to research institutions and set up training.

You said the Netherlands already had such a system in place. Can you provide more detail on how it went? How did research security improve as a result, and what benefits did the system provide?

[Dr. Ivana Karaskova]

Certainly.

The system is relatively new—it was set up a couple of months ago—so it's still gathering the primary data. However, there is obviously a learning pattern, so the first questions that came from scholars and also from universities and higher education institutions were kind of basic questions. The majority of them were still about China. Now there is a learning curve, so they ask very specific questions, especially about the due diligence to very specific matters.

How it differs from other systems is that in some countries, such as the Czech Republic, we decided to appoint a security manager in each and every university, which is financially kind of costly.

The Netherlands went the other way. It created just one national contact point under the government. It has a link towards all the ministries that may be affected. Also, it has a direct link to security services. In this regard, if an individual or an institution has a question, it can basically reach an answer, including an answer from security services, on whether it's a good idea or not. The problematic point here is that the recommendations from the national contact point are still voluntary, so the university can decide that despite all the odds, it still wants to proceed with the co-operation.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you, Ms. Karaskova.

As you pointed out, even when a country establishes a national point of contact, as the Netherlands did, universities can proceed voluntarily.

Conversely, Australia automatically requires that any collaboration with a foreign country be reported directly to the government. Where do you stand on that?

[Dr. Ivana Karaskova]

I'm not sure whether my response would be adequate, because I'm not that familiar with the Australian system. However, I don't think that it's probably feasible because of the sheer size of the co-operation, especially when it comes to some of the countries that are technologically advanced in those, let's say, 15 critical areas. Reporting each and every research co-operation to the government seems to be a disproportionate measure, basically, to take.

What is probably a better way to do it is to focus on those crown jewels that should be protected. However, once again, the question is this: Who is to define the crown jewels? Here we often breach the autonomy of the universities. Any system has to be balanced between the needs of the universities and how they don't want academic freedom to be taken away from them and the needs of national security. That's a very delicate matter.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you very much.

In 2016, you launched two projects, MapInfluenCE and China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe, which focus on examining Chinese influence in central Europe.

How has China's influence in the region changed in recent years?

[Dr. Ivana Karaskova]

That's my favourite question. Thank you very much. I can spend hours on that.

Just very briefly, while China entered central and eastern Europe with the 16+1 initiative in 2012, over the period of the past 10 or 11 years we have seen China be much more skilful, I would say, in influencing the response of society.

It started originally with just reaching out to the governing party; then to the opposition parties; then to the opinion-makers; then to journalists, for example; then to academia; and now to the general public. We do see China, then, actually reaching all the levels of society.

One thing that is the most worrisome, probably, is that it's no longer messaging to the local populations just the positive news about China, that China is a wonderful country. It's not just trying to spread so-called “positive energy”. Now it actively works with those anti-government forces, the fringe political parties, the extreme right and the extreme left. That's something that we have seen Russia doing in our particular region for quite some time, so I also see a pattern of learning from one another. In this case, China is learning from Russia how to influence more.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you, Ms. Karaskova.

I don't have much time left, so I'd appreciate it if you could get straight to the point for this next question.

Do you think universities and other educational institutions are paying more attention to security issues around research and intellectual property?

[Dr. Ivana Karaskova]

I just want to make sure that I understand the question. Are you asking me whether the universities are taking up some measures against the influence?

Yes, you are.

It varies in different countries. In my region, central and eastern Europe, I would say that the Czech Republic is a front-runner in this effort, but it started only with a huge scandal that we had with one of the oldest and most prestigious universities. This university had some of its activities funded by the Chinese embassy here in Prague, including classes on belt and road initiatives and the profiling of students who later on were invited to China on fully funded trips. After the scandal, the country started to move towards the right direction, but it's still very slow and nascent, I would say.

[The Vice-Chair, Conservative, Corey Tochor]

Thank you so much for that.

Now, for the final round of questions, we have Gord Johns for the NDP. The floor is yours, Gord, for six minutes.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

Thank you.

I'll start with Mr. Gamache.

Benjamin Fung, on behalf of Alliance Canada Hong Kong, appeared before the committee on September 20, 2023, and he described China's recruitment strategy as “feed, trap and kill”. It involves attracting targets by making lucrative offers and then making unreasonable requests, such as “transferring IP rights, getting sensitive data or asking the professor to say something that may not be true.”

Mr. Gamache, can you speak about how familiar you are with this strategy and maybe about how we can combat these types of recruitment strategies? If not, are researchers sufficiently aware of this type of threat? How could we increase their awareness?

[Dr. Kevin Gamache]

I'd like to say that in my experience, there is a lot of naïveté amongst the faculty. I have seen numerous cases of substantial amounts of funding being used to lure research from the U.S. to China in particular. That would be the attract and capture part.

I have not seen the “kill” portion of that analogy, but I do still see very, very active recruitment across the board, particularly in the hard sciences, engineering and agriculture.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

How do we combat these kinds of recruitment strategies? How can we increase awareness?

[Dr. Kevin Gamache]

Once again, I think it's through engagement among our federal partners, our research security office and the faculty. This is a problem that is ripe for more effort in awareness, and I think that we're just breaking the surface right now in that area.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

Should we establish a list of organizations that Canadian research institutions should avoid forming research partnerships with? Making such partnerships ineligible for federal funding could be a way forward. Do you think that that's a good approach? Should such a list be made public or be shared with universities, since there's a risk that the organizations listed will adopt concealment strategies?

[Dr. Kevin Gamache]

The adoption of concealment strategies is certainly an issue. It becomes very much a case of whack-a-mole.

Various lists, as you described, do exist in the United States. We have consolidated those lists here within the A&M system and we have used that as a tool and an integral part of our due diligence process. Certainly, I think that those kinds of lists, while they potentially can lead to concealment, are also very valuable to guiding researchers to proper relationships.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

Which do you think is better: a China-specific approach or a more broad approach of being aware of all the different threats?

[Dr. Kevin Gamache]

I think the most effective approach is to focus on behaviour. I think when you do that, ultimately one country is going to rise to the top. Really, I think what we need to be focusing on are those kinds of behaviours that really compromise research relationships.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

Ms. Karaskova, in your report, “How to Do Trusted Research”, you describe the findings of an online questionnaire of the experiences of researchers who have been funded at least in part by China. I quote:

The survey revealed these researchers did not report any negative experience connected to cooperation with China which also correlates with the positive perception of Chinese funding. Unsurprisingly therefore, the research cooperation with Chinese counterparts was not perceived as a potential risk by 65 percent of the respondents who filled in the questionnaires.

You also cited the following:

Respondents predominantly underlined the importance of previous positive experience with a Chinese partner and personal contacts or experience gained in China. They also highlighted that it has mainly been Chinese partners who initiated the research cooperation.

Is this the main problem—that our researchers are unaware of the threat posed by China? How do we change this perception?

[Dr. Ivana Karaskova]

It's not just one of the problems; I think it starts at home.

What the researchers actually cite is that they have quick access to money, to funding, while in the European Union they have to apply constantly for grants, with a very uncertain ending as to whether or not they will get the grant. In China, it's relatively easy. The paperwork is even easier. That's one of the reasons they said that it has over-bureaucratized science applications, basically discouraging them from even applying, or preferring Chinese funding to other sources of funding.

The second point is that China has all the infrastructure. They said it's easy. It's convenient. It's very fast to receive basically everything they need.

Third, they also cited as one of the reasons that they don't have to deal with ethical issues or ethical standards in science in China, though they covered it up, I would just say bluntly. If they want to co-operate with Chinese partners, they will get very quick results without actually needing to have ethics boards consulted for various kind of experiments. These are things that make China attractive for different collaborations.

Last but not least, there's also a great deal of naïveté, as Kevin said. They do focus just on their single science area, be it experimental physics, or.... They basically do not see all of the geopolitical implications. Once again, we will have to go individual by individual—not necessarily to directors and vice-directors and deans, but actually to the heads of laboratories and individual researchers to raise their awareness, and perhaps coupling carrots with the sticks from our side. It's not just about levelling the playing field in terms of providing better access to funding; it's also to make them aware that there are consequences of co-operation with China sometimes.