Science and Research Committee on Oct. 23rd, 2023

[Sami Khoury]

Thanks for the question.

The comment I'll add is that our priority is to raise the resilience of those universities and those research labs. There is at times, in some academic circles, a bit of a conflict between “open and collaborative” and security. Our role is to be out there and to say that it's not one or the other—it's both. You can still have a collaborative and open environment for research, but security also has to be factored in.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you.

To try to get us close to being on time, we'll go with three and a half, three and a half, one and a half, and one and a half minutes. Let's keep the questions tight and the answers tight. Let's see how much we can get done.

We're starting with Mr. Soroka for three and a half minutes, please.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses.

Before I get to the witnesses, I would like to ask the clerk if Director Vigneault was invited to appear and what the response was.

[The Clerk of the Committee, Ms. Hilary Smyth]

Mr. Vigneault was invited. There was a series of dates that were provided. He was not available on those dates. After discussion with the chair, we agreed on the witnesses that Public Safety via CSIS had provided.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Okay. Thank you for that.

I'll start off with Ms. Giles, then.

Does the Liberal government listen to CSIS intelligence and implement the information in a timely manner?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

There are a variety of mechanisms through which CSIS provides intelligence and information to the federal government, including elected officials. We work very closely together with our elected officials, as well as with other government departments, to ensure that information is fed into the broader decision-making mechanisms within the government, including in the research security area.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Is that information then acted upon, though?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

The information provided is included in decision-making and policy-making where appropriate, and it's very much on a case-by-case basis. It's difficult to generalize.

For example, in the study before us, the intelligence and threat assessments that CSIS provides are but one input into a broader decision-making process about what projects are funded.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

I'm curious. We allegedly have information leaked, helplessly due to the lack of action from this government. Any CSIS official would see this as a serious issue. No one would risk their career, or even possibly jail time, unless they felt they had no other choice.

The government has failed to act on CSIS intelligence. Is that a fact? How are we to respond or believe that the government would act on any CSIS intelligence if they couldn't even respond to foreign interference that poses a risk to the very core of our democracy?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

I'd like to be very clear at the outset that any time classified information is provided illegally outside of the Government of Canada, that is a crime. In no way does that protect Canadian national security; it endangers Canadian national security. I think that's very important to lay out.

In terms of the specific case that you're asking about, investigations are ongoing. It would certainly be inappropriate for me to comment on ongoing investigations. However, I would flag that, as I mentioned earlier, CSIS information or intelligence is provided widely across the government and to many government departments, in order to ensure that it can inform policy-making.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Has the government been facilitating or hindering CSIS's efforts to investigate and act upon issues of foreign interference in Canadian universities?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

CSIS has been working very closely with the government, as well as with our other government department colleagues, in ensuring that universities have the information they need to be aware of the threats and to be able to act upon them.

One thing we've certainly realized is that we need an approach that doesn't operate in silos but that pulls together government, private, academic and public sectors. An approach that's siloed is bound to fail. That's why we're working closely with the government to ensure that we're taking an integrated approach.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you very much for the questions and answers.

Now we will go over to Mr. Lametti, please, for three and a half minutes.

[David Lametti, Liberal, LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I appreciate that you can't speak about methodologies because you're protecting sources of information, whether they be from Five Eyes partners, from human sources or from your own methodologies on the ground.

Can someone—whether it's Public Safety, CSIS or the CSE—give us a reassuring message that you are not only working with universities and university researchers, but also that you are prepared to intervene in order to stop anything that puts the country, the institutions or Canadians in a vulnerable situation?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

Thank you very much for the question.

I can perhaps start on the narrow...and then pass it to my Public Safety colleagues.

One of the things we can certainly assure the committee of is that we use and will continue to use our investigative authorities when warranted and when allowed for under our act. Certainly that's an area where, when we do encounter information that's directly linked to and poses a national security threat as defined by our act, we act upon it and take very specific actions.

More broadly, we have continuous engagement with universities. We have an entire stakeholder program headed by my colleague here, who works on that in close collaboration with Public Safety.

I'll toss the baton.

[Lesley Soper]

I might just add that our research security advisers are in daily contact with universities, which themselves have built really significant capacity. I think they need to be lauded for the amount of investment that's been going on in our major research institutions to really understand where the risks are and how to mitigate those risks.

I think it's important, also, that one of the goals in implementing the guidelines in our outreach to Canadian universities and research facilities is to not over-securitize what is meant to be an open academic environment. People will appreciate that universities are fundamental Canadian institutions. There are specific guardrails around the types of investigations that should go on in those types of spaces. We wanted to create a relationship of confidence that would go on between the academic sector and the Government of Canada so that we could have the most fruitful discussions about the best risk decisions to be made within those institutions.

Again, a carefully calibrated approach has been our operating direction.

[David Lametti, Liberal, LaSalle—Émard—Verdun, QC]

Thank you very much. I appreciate those answers.

I have another general question. A number of you have alluded to this in your comments, but in my view, the biggest resource that we are now generating, in addition to fundamental research, is the data around it. How well are we protecting that data? Is there any more precision that you can give us with respect to the protection of data and—

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

I'm afraid I have to cut you off there, Mr. Lametti.

Now, for one and a half minutes, we have Mr. Blanchette-Joncas, please.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you, Chair. I'll be brief.

Mr. Aubertin-Giguère, in February 2023, the federal government said it was going to publish a list of foreign research institutions that posed a risk. The Quebec government, through the Minister of Higher Education, Pascale Déry, contacted the federal government to request the list. It's now October, eight months later, and we still don't have the list.

I'd like you to explain the purpose of this list. If we decided to create one, it must be important. Can you explain the delay in its publication and what the consequences are for universities today?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

Thank you for the question.

The list of entities is one of two components of the policy statement. The first concerns sensitive research areas and the second deals with problematic entities.

As you can imagine, compiling a list of such complexity isn't straightforward. We need to make sure we talk to our security partners, as well as the universities. We need to develop a tool that is properly adapted to the problem we're trying to address. I can tell you, however, that we're making good progress.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

In your opinion, when will the list be ready?

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère]

I'm not in a position to answer that question.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you.

Mr. Khoury, in an interview with Radio-Canada on October 11, 2023, the head of CSE mentioned that there was a potential staffing crisis. Staff turnover is high at CSE.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

I'm sorry, Mr. Blanchette-Joncas, but we're out of time. We're really almost at time for this session.

We're going to go to Mr. Cannings for a minute and a half.

Go ahead, please.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

I'm going to turn to Mr. Khoury.

The other main intersection between research and security is research on security. I think you touched on that, but I just want to get some details. How much research does your institution carry out on cybersecurity? Does it do that with Canadian universities? What does that landscape look like?