Science and Research Committee on Nov. 20th, 2023

[Francis Bilodeau]

Again, that would be housed within Public Safety and research security, but not within ISED. We don't have a direct role in reviewing the applications.

Under the new process, there would be a combination list of potential research-sensitive areas and institutions that would serve as a basis for rejection.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

Couldn't we have a list that isn't publicly known, but would exist behind the scenes? That would save thousands of taxpayers' dollars of bureaucratic waste when the application comes in. It can be flagged; it can be declined, and they can appeal it if they like—it doesn't have to be reported publicly why we declined it—and we can move on, versus setting up an application structure that is going to cost millions of dollars.

Let's have that list, say no and have an appeal process to potentially rule out some false, negative people being on that list.

[Francis Bilodeau]

It's a valid point.

Part of what we're trying to achieve, when we signal that there would eventually be a list of sensitive technologies and sensitive researchers would be exactly that. It's creating signals in the institutions.

I don't think we want to be a blunt instrument in saying “in all instances”, but I think there is a signal to the community around institutions and sensitive technologies that will be refreshed and, therefore, create that signal to the system.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

I believe the Four Eyes have now looked at Canada and want us to be blunt.

[Francis Bilodeau]

I think we want to be direct and transparent and yet still try to maximize the objective of open and—

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

Was it being blunt—and this is probably above the scale—when the Four Eyes banned Huawei and Canada didn't? It is bluntness that is needed when we are dealing with the PRC and foreign entities. Would you agree with that?

[Francis Bilodeau]

I think we are striving to have an approach that is transparent and that creates clear signals and balances a number of approaches.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

Could you provide a detailed list—we're talking about a lot of lists here—of which ministers would have fingerprints on developing this list? Which ministers would be tasked with that?

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you. That answer could either be a list or the reason why we can or can't do that, but we have asked the question.

Now we're going—and I'm not trying to give the answer—to Mr. Turnbull for six minutes.

Go ahead, please.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Thanks, witnesses, for being here. I appreciate the work you do, and this is an important conversation.

I think we've heard questions from colleagues here today that sort of imply that we should just ban research very broadly in a sweeping way, and there's this magical list they're talking about and referring to as if that would make things crystal clear and easy. This work seems to be more nuanced than that.

Can you explain how it's a lot more nuanced and how we have to really treat each research project on a case-by-case basis and do a thorough review and analysis of what security risks there may be attached to those specific projects?

[Francis Bilodeau]

Maybe a starting point for that is that within the national research guidelines we've identified some of our guiding principles, some of the things we're trying to weigh. Those include, obviously, academic freedom, institutional autonomy, freedom of expression, research in the public interest, integrity and collaboration but also securing the research to build that trust. In our approach as we attempt to build a system, we try to balance these elements with protecting the research and the researchers.

Nipun, would you like to add to that?

[Dr. Nipun Vats]

Yes.

Those are important signals, because as the minister said, you want to be as open as possible and as secure as necessary to be able to actually benefit from the exchange of ideas that enhance Canadian research.

You also have to be mindful of the signals that are being sent to certain communities within the country. This is not about Chinese Canadians. This is not about different groups. This is about the risks of specific research activities, and if you proceed in a way that isn't sensitive to those nuances, you're potentially risking some unintended consequences with respect to—

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Maybe I'll follow up on that.

What would those unintended consequences look like? To me, this is research that could be highly beneficial to Canadian interests that would not move forward and that would inhibit our ability to get the most value out of those research projects. Would you generally agree with that?

[Dr. Nipun Vats]

I think to the extent possible, you want to provide clear and transparent guidance, which I think is what we've been trying to do through the activities we've been doing through the working group, through the guidelines and ultimately through these lists.

You also want to be able to provide advice to the universities so they can actually identify risk. Any list you develop is not going to cover the full range of risks, so you need to have an ongoing dialogue with the research community and build that kind of trust with them in order to enable them to pursue those research partnerships that are going to be beneficial to Canada.

You do have to be careful how you proceed on these kinds of things.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Yes. I heard from the minister, which I was really happy to hear, that Canada, as it moves forward with its research security initiatives, will be building a robust research security ecosystem. The word “ecosystem” seems to me to be particularly important in this conversation.

I did work on the procedure and House affairs committee on foreign interference for many, many months, and we heard just how important it is to have an all-of-government approach and an ecosystem approach that covers not only government but actually other actors that are out there. This is needed in order to make sure the security system is sufficiently robust. I think that's really significant. Can you speak to how that plays into this work we're talking about today?

[Dr. Nipun Vats]

As the minister mentioned, there are many layers that need to be aligned in terms of how you move forward on this kind of work. The federal government, of course, provincial governments, institutions, researchers, they all need to understand the why, the what and the how of it all. You do need all those actors. That requires a certain degree of engagement.

We've been in multiple fora talking to researchers directly. We've been talking to institutions directly so that they have a better sense of the threat environment but also to build trust. We rely for our future prosperity on the research and the talent that comes out of the research, so you have to look at both sides of the coin when you look at these things.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

We heard that out of 1,743 applications, I believe, 36 were rejected due to security risks. Obviously, those applications include only the tri-council, I would think, because they're applications within federal jurisdiction. Out of the 36 that were rejected, can you give me any sense of what kinds of things were rejected? Are there any sorts of patterns, conclusions or generalizations—without getting into specifics, because I know that would be sensitive—that you can draw from those 36?

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

You have 30 seconds.

[Francis Bilodeau]

Overall, I can say quickly that the presence of state-owned enterprise was one, and that and the presence of sensitive technology, particularly in the digital space, were patterns that were reoccurring through those.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

I wasn't expecting such a succinct answer.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Can I have more time?

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Well, we're at 10 seconds, so thank you for your questions.

We'll go to Mr. Blanchette-Joncas for six minutes.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses who stayed on for the second hour.

The government mentioned the famous list we've been talking about for over an hour now. We've come to realize two things: we won't get that list today and we don't know when we'll get it.

That said, the government indicated that it was going to provide clarity around sensitive research areas. That, too, was supposed to happen this year.

Can the witnesses here today tell the committee whether that has been clarified and communicated to the people concerned?

[Francis Bilodeau]

The initial guidelines provided some information regarding areas of research that were determined to be sensitive. The next version of the list is being fine-tuned as we speak. It will be communicated at the same time as the policy.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

I want to be sure I understand. The famous guidelines have been in place since February. As of today, do they specifically lay out the sensitive areas of research?