Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Members of the committee, good afternoon.
It is an honour to join you today and to have the opportunity to contribute to your important discussion on the use of federal funds in partnerships with entities connected to the People's Republic of China.
My goal today is to supplement the testimony given by my colleague a few weeks ago on what we do at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, to ensure the security of Canada's research against foreign threats in Canada.
As this committee is well aware, academia and the research sector are often targeted by foreign threat actors seeking to advance their interests at our expense.
This can take many forms, from covertly influencing research agendas or peer review processes to engaging in funding arrangements in which details about the source of funds are deliberately obscured or misrepresented. Through perceived partnerships and collaborations, vital research and novel intellectual property is stolen. The PRC is by far the greatest perpetrator of these activities.
These examples evidence an evolution of the threat landscape, as they starkly differ from historical attempts at foreign interference, which would exclusively target government officials and institutions.
With private industry and research now holding valuable intellectual property and potential for economic prosperity, threat actors have shifted to include non-government targets in their foreign interference campaigns.
I recently reflected on how we are working collaboratively with universities during a panel discussion at Stanford University, where I recalled my first meeting with universities five years ago.
Going into that first meeting, there was discomfort on openly engaging with CSIS, but we have come a long way from these first meetings, as after continued and genuine engagement, these institutions now proactively reach out to the service for ways to work together to protect research security and to counter foreign interference threats, demonstrating the evolution of our relationship.
CSIS is committed to maintaining these strong lines of communication for the benefit of our partners and Canadian national security interests.
In 2022 alone, CSIS conducted 113 stakeholder engagement activities and met with representatives of academia, community organizations, civil society, advocacy associations, research and innovation institutes and Indigenous leaders, as well as representatives of provincial and municipal governments. CSIS has also presented at a number of academic conferences, and has held various in-person briefings and workshops on university campuses.
These relationships have proven critical to building national security literacy and resiliency in the increasingly complex threat landscape that we are facing here in Canada. CSIS provides non-secret security briefings and mitigation strategies to university officials and faculty on the threat environment, and research institutions share their concerns, which inform our strategies to counter threats.
. I am confident that the strength of these relationships will be our best defence against the aggressive and coercive attempts at foreign interference that we are seeing today, and that we will undoubtedly continue to see in the future.
Unfortunately, this activity only grows in sophistication as states seek to exploit Canada's open and collaborative research ecosystem for their own interests, to the detriment of Canada's.
Needless to say, as state actors become more sophisticated, these threats become harder to counter. It is therefore imperative that Canadians work together. This effort begins with informed and trusted discussions among communities, academia, business and governments at all levels.
In order to remain a committed partner in this effort, CSIS will continue to leverage its authorities under the CSIS Act to investigate, provide advice to the government and, where appropriate, take measures to reduce these threats.
CSIS will also continue to invest in significant efforts in building relationships with individuals, communities and institutions to establish and sustain trust and to offer support and partnership in protecting Canada's national security and future prosperity.
I will conclude by noting that in order to protect the safety and security of Canadians, I cannot publicly comment on operational matters and requirements. Nonetheless, I would welcome this opportunity to have a frank and open discussion and to try to elucidate any of the questions you may have with my colleagues present here.
Thank you.
