Science and Research Committee on Nov. 22nd, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

I call the meeting to order.

Thank you, everyone, for being here—especially our witnesses.

Welcome to meeting 66 of the Standing Committee on Science and Research.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and also remotely on Zoom.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of the witnesses and members.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mike, and when speaking, please speak slowly and clearly.

When you're not speaking in the room or on Zoom, your microphone should be turned off or on mute, and for the benefit of the interpreters, please keep your earpieces away from the microphone, because that can cause injury through feedback, and we certainly don't want to do that. We want to make sure our interpreters are as healthy as they were when they came here.

I remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(i) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, June 6, 2023, the committee resumes its study on the use of federal government research and development grants, funds and contributions by Canadian universities and research institutions in partnerships with entities connected to the People's Republic of China.

It's now my pleasure to welcome, from the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, David Vigneault, the director of CSIS, and Nicole Giles, senior assistant deputy minister, policy and strategic partnerships. Welcome back.

From the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we have Shawn Tupper, deputy minister, and Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère, associate assistant deputy minister, national and cyber security. You're in a supporting role for Director Vigneault.

Director Vigneault, you have six minutes for your opening remarks, after which we will proceed to our rounds of questioning.

The floor is yours for six minutes, please.

[David Vigneault, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Members of the committee, good afternoon.

It is an honour to join you today and to have the opportunity to contribute to your important discussion on the use of federal funds in partnerships with entities connected to the People's Republic of China.

My goal today is to supplement the testimony given by my colleague a few weeks ago on what we do at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, to ensure the security of Canada's research against foreign threats in Canada.

As this committee is well aware, academia and the research sector are often targeted by foreign threat actors seeking to advance their interests at our expense.

This can take many forms, from covertly influencing research agendas or peer review processes to engaging in funding arrangements in which details about the source of funds are deliberately obscured or misrepresented. Through perceived partnerships and collaborations, vital research and novel intellectual property is stolen. The PRC is by far the greatest perpetrator of these activities.

These examples evidence an evolution of the threat landscape, as they starkly differ from historical attempts at foreign interference, which would exclusively target government officials and institutions.

With private industry and research now holding valuable intellectual property and potential for economic prosperity, threat actors have shifted to include non-government targets in their foreign interference campaigns.

I recently reflected on how we are working collaboratively with universities during a panel discussion at Stanford University, where I recalled my first meeting with universities five years ago.

Going into that first meeting, there was discomfort on openly engaging with CSIS, but we have come a long way from these first meetings, as after continued and genuine engagement, these institutions now proactively reach out to the service for ways to work together to protect research security and to counter foreign interference threats, demonstrating the evolution of our relationship.

CSIS is committed to maintaining these strong lines of communication for the benefit of our partners and Canadian national security interests.

In 2022 alone, CSIS conducted 113 stakeholder engagement activities and met with representatives of academia, community organizations, civil society, advocacy associations, research and innovation institutes and Indigenous leaders, as well as representatives of provincial and municipal governments. CSIS has also presented at a number of academic conferences, and has held various in-person briefings and workshops on university campuses.

These relationships have proven critical to building national security literacy and resiliency in the increasingly complex threat landscape that we are facing here in Canada. CSIS provides non-secret security briefings and mitigation strategies to university officials and faculty on the threat environment, and research institutions share their concerns, which inform our strategies to counter threats.

. I am confident that the strength of these relationships will be our best defence against the aggressive and coercive attempts at foreign interference that we are seeing today, and that we will undoubtedly continue to see in the future.

Unfortunately, this activity only grows in sophistication as states seek to exploit Canada's open and collaborative research ecosystem for their own interests, to the detriment of Canada's.

Needless to say, as state actors become more sophisticated, these threats become harder to counter. It is therefore imperative that Canadians work together. This effort begins with informed and trusted discussions among communities, academia, business and governments at all levels.

In order to remain a committed partner in this effort, CSIS will continue to leverage its authorities under the CSIS Act to investigate, provide advice to the government and, where appropriate, take measures to reduce these threats.

CSIS will also continue to invest in significant efforts in building relationships with individuals, communities and institutions to establish and sustain trust and to offer support and partnership in protecting Canada's national security and future prosperity.

I will conclude by noting that in order to protect the safety and security of Canadians, I cannot publicly comment on operational matters and requirements. Nonetheless, I would welcome this opportunity to have a frank and open discussion and to try to elucidate any of the questions you may have with my colleagues present here.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you, Director Vigneault, for coming, especially given the circumstances we're facing today. It's great to have you here.

I hope we can get full rounds of questions in on this, because we've all been very anxiously waiting for you to come here.

We will move over to Mr. Tochor for the first six minutes, please.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

Thank you, Director Vigneault.

On Monday I asked Minister Champagne if he agreed with the expert witnesses we heard at this committee who said that since 2017 the PRC's activities in the sector have come to represent an existential threat to Canada, but the minister, unfortunately, would not accept this position. Do you view the PRC's activities as an existential threat to Canada, yes or no?

[David Vigneault]

The role of CSIS is to advise government on threats to national security. We look at all vectors of how these threats can manifest themselves. We have been more open publicly, specifically about the PRC's activities, but also about other threat actors in terms of the impact on our sovereignty and our security and future prosperity.

From that point of view, I think the People's Republic of China has been very clear in their intent, and their actions have demonstrated the level of their capability to be a threat to our national security as well. I would say that indeed the PRC is one actor that represents a threat to the country.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

By definition, then, would that be a threat or an existential threat?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, I understand the member's question. In my position I don't make the distinction between a threat or an existential threat. I have said publicly, and I repeat it here, that the PRC, in the context of a threat to our economic security and research security, is by far the most sophisticated actor that we're dealing with.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

Mr. Vigneault, that's deeply troubling. You've recently made unprecedented appearances, along with other Five Eyes allies, that have been characterized by the media as “because they're alarmed by China which they say is the greatest espionage threat democracy has ever faced”. Those were your words or your signature on a Five Eyes document—if I'm speaking correctly on that—specifically referring to the theft of our technology and secrets.

If you're willing to say with the other Five Eyes that this is an existential threat, I'm concerned that you're not sharing that view domestically, versus the international statement that you guys put out—

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair—

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

—or should it be the role of the minister to say whether, with the briefings you would have provided, this is an existential threat or not?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, I think that's a very valid a point. I would not want to leave the impression that I would have messages in Canada that were different from messages abroad. I think the context of the Five Eyes message, which was unprecedented—it was the first time in history that we appeared in public together—was to essentially send that signal. Those words were chosen carefully to say that, so I do fully endorse, of course, what I'm saying.

In the context of the work that we do in Canada, in the context of what CSIS's role is in advising government, and to complement what the minister said in his appearance on Monday, I do not see a distinction. I understand that these are not necessarily the same words, but I do stand by the statement that I've made with my colleagues about the threat that China represents.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

Have you personally briefed the minister on the activities of the PRC?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, I'll be careful about the nature of the briefings I'm giving, but I do believe that it has been said publicly that I have personally briefed Minister Champagne. I have briefed a number of other ministers. I'm saying that with the caveat that I cannot confirm or deny all of the briefings I've given. However, in the context here, it's been said that, yes, I have briefed Minister Champagne directly in the past.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

If both you and Minister Champagne won't pronounce this as an existential threat, who will? Obviously the minister also has all the information that you have on the activities of the PRC. Would that be a rough generalization?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, the minister is receiving a lot of information, of course, mostly from his department. He's also receiving information through his participation in different committees, and that includes receiving intelligence from CSIS.

I do understand the member's question. Again, I just want to reiterate that I think the words I've used in this committee in my opening remarks and the words we've used in our public report and in previous public appearances here in Canada have spoken very clearly about the magnitude.

I may not have used the term “existential threat”, but I can tell you that we are seeing it from that point of view. If the chair is indulgent, I would say that one of the issues we have to be very clear about is that the PRC, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has essentially created an environment in which all of the resources of the state have been combined under the leadership of the chairman to essentially create the tools for the PRC to succeed. That, indeed, includes—

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

I'm going to run out of time here shortly.

I have one last question that I do want to get the answer to: Do you believe that all entities associated with the PRC should be banned from receiving taxpayers' money through research grants at universities in Canada? Give me a yes or no.

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, I think what is important is to look at the threat specifically. I would say that there is a gradation in terms of the different activities and the institutions that are engaged in these activities.

[Corey Tochor, Conservative, Saskatoon—University, SK]

To clarify, then, they could be associated with the PRC and still get funding—

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

We're out of time now. Thank you for your answers.

We'll go over to Ms. Bradford, please.

[Valerie Bradford, Liberal, Kitchener South—Hespeler, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for coming on such a very busy day.

I am wondering if you can tell us what improvements you've seen in Canada's ability to identify national security threats in research.

[David Vigneault]

Yes, I will, and I'm sure my colleague will also have some others.

I think what we have seen over the last number of years are changes, both in terms of tools and in terms of how the government is looking at these issues. If you look at the Investment Canada Act, you will see that there have been changes over the years. I believe that the House sent a bill to that effect to the other chamber earlier this week. I think this is a good example that shows that there is a realization that the threat is evolving and that therefore the need to have different tools has evolved.

I think there have also been a number of other innovations under the leadership of the public safety department.

I don't know, Shawn, if you want to jump in on this.

[Shawn Tupper, Deputy Minister, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Indeed, I think part of the massive improvement is just increased transparency. The increased work that we're doing with stakeholders and with universities in particular and the creation of a research security organization within my department allow us to make a concentrated effort, do concentrated work and develop frameworks that have allowed us, over the last four or five years, to progressively address these issues, identify where there are threats, have resources dedicated to making sure that people have awareness of those threats, and then engage with industry and academia around how we can collectively address the threats we have.

[Valerie Bradford, Liberal, Kitchener South—Hespeler, ON]

Thank you.

How has Canada's approach to research security evolved over the last years as the technology becomes more sophisticated?

[Shawn Tupper]

I think part of that comes from paying more and more attention to the technologies. The government hasn't yet released, but is intending to release, a list of sensitive technologies that we want to focus on. We want to make our partners in those areas aware that they need to secure the work they're doing against espionage and against foreign interference.

As soon as the government is able, I know that it intends to release a list that will identify those areas of work that we think industry and academia should be concerned about and pay attention to. We also want to release a list of institutions that we identify as having close affiliations with the military and the national security and government agencies in regimes that we consider threats to our national security.

[Valerie Bradford, Liberal, Kitchener South—Hespeler, ON]

What methods do malicious foreign governments or entities associated with them use to gain access to Canada's research ecosystem?