Thank you, Madam Chair and committee, for inviting me.
I'm with the Transition Accelerator. We are an independent, non-partisan organization focused on helping Canada win economically and geopolitically within the energy transition.
I'm going to start with a simple statistic that I actually found really difficult to believe at first. In 2020, China exported one million vehicles, and not just EVs but everything. Last year, they exported more than seven million vehicles. One-third of these were electric. That is the fastest automotive expansion in history. At that scale, I think the question is not whether Chinese autos reach North American consumers. It's a question of when and how they do it, how much Canada can control that direction and outcome, and how much it benefits us.
The auto sector has lost more than half of its production since 1999. We peaked at around three million vehicles. Last year, it was about 1.3 million vehicles, and the EV transition is the opportunity, I believe, to potentially reverse that trend. We probably won't make three million cars again, but we can capture value that's potentially equivalent to that economic activity because Canada has the assets to help us win and compete in this EV transition. We have the critical minerals. We have access to talent when it comes to battery technology and battery innovation. We also have access to trade agreements that go beyond the U.S., even though the U.S. has been an anchor for the auto sector.
When the tariff question on EVs came up in 2024, we generally wrestled with this question because, given how deeply integrated the Canadian and the American auto production has been for decades, Canada couldn't afford to diverge too far from the U.S. position. However, we were actually very clear. We released a paper on this, in September 2024, in which we said that staying behind tariff walls indefinitely wasn't a strategy either. Tariffs can buy you time, but they don't build competitive advantage. Something like the agreement we are here to discuss today was going to happen eventually, and the question that we now face is how to maximize the benefits and manage the risks.
Earlier this year, the CEO of Ford in the U.S. was in discussion with the Trump administration about joint ventures with Chinese manufacturers. This is the world's most protectionist automotive market, and it is also exploring its options. Canada's engaging now on this is a head start, and I think it's a smart thing to do because, otherwise, we're going to be left out of the conversation.
The model of a structured joint venture is not new. It's actually how China built its own auto sector. It went from producing almost no vehicles to now having the capacity to produce half of the world's total vehicle demand. China used that model deliberately to absorb that manufacturing knowledge and to build its own capability. That is how you go from almost nothing to where they are today. We're seeing that logic used by global automakers. We're seeing it from Volkswagen, Toyota, General Motors, Ford and Stellantis. They are partnering and doing joint ventures with the Chinese automakers.
The question for Canada is whether we use that same arrangement, the same way China did, not just to let vehicles in but to actually get something durable in return. That is what we call “selective exposure”. It means that you don't just let the floodgates open, but you have selective exposure so that you can actually build and control. You have to admit that—as Daniel was saying—they are the world-leading manufacturers of EVs. With conditions that ensure that learning and investment can stay here, Canada can actually benefit as well.
We've seen this with Thailand as well, where they opened their markets, they removed tariffs on Chinese EVs and they're now building vehicles and battery plants on their soil.
Preferential market access is potentially a way to have that real investment happen in Canada. However, we should be careful about what we are defining as “investment”, because it's not just the assembly of the vehicle that can add value but also the batteries and the processing. Therefore, those joint ventures don't necessarily need to be at the assembly plant. They can be more upstream from that.
The second piece is that we're hearing a lot about the security concerns when it comes to Chinese vehicles. I don't think we should be completely dismissive. However, we should be really careful. It's not like you're going to plug a Chinese vehicle into the grid, and now China has access to a Canadian grid. Some of the things we were hearing are laughable, but we really should be careful as well.
There are solutions. There are models that the Europeans are using. Access to Canadian software on Chinese hardware made in Canada.... There are creative ways we can do this to make sure we're dealing with legitimate concerns because, obviously, China is not necessarily the best-faith actor or a good-faith actor, such that we shouldn't be careful on this.
Right now, with this opportunity, I think we can get the design of this agreement and the conditionality of the investment right. This is not just a trade concession, which is why I think this is very important for this committee to consider.
Thank you.
