Thank you, Madam Chair and honourable members. It's a pleasure to be here with you today.
I'm an associate professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, as well as the vice-president of future economy at the Transition Accelerator. I'm also the founding director of the Centre for Industrial Policy, an initiative we launched this month to bring rigorous analysis to Canadian industrial strategy at a moment when the stakes are extraordinarily high and getting higher almost every day.
My overall remarks have two key messages. One is urgent and one is constructive.
The urgent message is that the condition of Canada's auto sector is more serious than the headline numbers suggest. The trajectory of the Canadian auto sector should be understood as an emergency for Canada's manufacturing as a whole, especially within the context of Prime Minister Carney's drive to create more geopolitical leverage and secure our autonomy in a dangerous world.
The constructive message is that the federal government's February 2026 auto strategy is, in its basic design and set-up, a really excellent piece of strategic work by the government. The task before this committee is to ensure that those tools are deployed within a coherent, strategic framework so that the strategy can actually translate into productive capability on Canadian soil, and so that the industry here in Canada can once again compete at the global technological frontier.
In every major industrial economy, the automotive sector is not just one industry among many. It's the anchor of the manufacturing base, and it's a systems integrator that brings together a country's most advanced production capabilities. Where automotive manufacturing thrives, the surrounding ecosystem thrives, whether it's the upstream steel, aluminum and metal that come in, or electronics, advanced material, engineering services, digital services and now, increasingly, AI. There are also potential linkages to batteries and upstream critical minerals. When those are connected to a strong auto sector, they all thrive. When the auto sector withers, the broader manufacturing economy tends to follow.
This is the context for understanding and evaluating Canada's current situation. According to a recent analysis for the Centre for Industrial Policy by Greig Mordue and James Meadowcroft, Canada's vehicle production-to-sales ratio has fallen from 1.85 produced vehicles to one sold vehicle in the mid-1990s to 0.7 to one in 2024. For the first time in a very long time—many decades—Canada now consumes more vehicles than it assembles. This is a major, long-term contraction that predates the trade turbulence of the last couple of years.
That headline number of 0.7 to one, as troubling as it is, understates the severity of the problem. New analysis from our centre drawing on OECD trade and value-added data shows that the Canadian content embedded in those motor vehicles has actually fallen below 50%. When that is combined with the production-to-sales ratio, we end up getting, in value-added terms, 0.35 of value added to every one car sold in Canada. For every dollar of automotive value that Canadians consume, the Canadian economy is now producing about 35¢ in those vehicles.
This should be understood as an emergency for Canada's manufacturing sector. As a whole, auto sectors anchor industrial economies, as I argued earlier. When that anchor drags, the rest of the manufacturing economy is likely to follow.
Canadian automotive R and D has stagnated alongside that production, with the country now accounting for less than one-third of a per cent of global automotive patents. Pure subsidies or unstructured industry support will not help the situation. Good industrial policy means helping firms move to the global technology frontier while building a more competitive and productive industry. To do that, we need generational investments in the industrial commons for electric vehicles and automotives generally, and a concerted effort to build value added in the upstream value chains by filling out the mines-to-mobility supply chain.
In this context, the auto strategy announced in February represents a meaningful step forward. As my colleague Moe Kabbara and I argued at the time, its most important feature is the explicit integration of climate competitiveness with industrial policy. For too long, Canadian EV policy was structured around sales mandates and emissions reductions—compliance obligations rather than a focused effort to build domestic industrial capability. I think the new framework presents an opportunity to put domestic industrial capability at the heart of Canadian automotive policy and Canadian EV policy.
The remissions framework deserves the particular attention of this committee. As designed and, I think, as intended—and as indicated in the Prime Minister's and Minister of Industry's remarks—it links preferential access to the Canadian market to investment in Canada, or could be used to do this. Companies that build here, like Toyota, GM and Honda, can generate credits. The companies that don't build here would not generate credits.
This is, in its underlying logic, a direct echo of the duty remission scheme Canada used in the 1980s to attract Japanese, Korean and other offshore manufacturers into Canada. This is one of the most successful industrial policy instruments in Canadian economic history and one we can learn from today. Market access is a real source of leverage in a mid-sized economy like Canada's, and using it strategically—
