Yes, I certainly do. They reflect the situation that happened pre-Dryden. There was a shortage of inspectors. They couldn't carry out their oversight obligations. In the case of Air Ontario, as I mention in my presentation, they were let loose on their own, basically, to set up their own insufficient standards. I could give you a number of examples of deficiencies in what Ontario did, if you are interested.
For example, when they were first applying for certification, they hired an extremely experienced and competent F28 pilot from another airline. He had close to 30,000 hours, most of them on an F28. They brought him in so as to be able to say to Transport Canada, “We have this experienced pilot on our staff who is going to be overseeing our operation.” Of course, they obtained their certification.
Within one month, he was so disgusted with the lack of attention that was being paid to his indication of safety problems that he quit. He quit in disgust. Then, for the next year and a half, Air Ontario had no safety officer in its organization. There was really no safety organization.
Pilots were instructed, for example, to not note aircraft defects in their log books or aircraft manuals, because the entry of some of those defects would have resulted in grounding of the aircraft. What they told them to do was to write these defects down on scraps of paper, which were passed from pilot to pilot, and they were accumulated. And theoretically, I suppose, at some point they intended to look after them.
At one point, two of the pilots, a captain and a first officer, became so concerned with the large number of scraps of paper and defects in these aircraft that they entered them all at once in the operating manual, and the result was the aircraft was grounded. So what happened to them? They were suspended and disciplined for doing so, when they should really have been given a medal.
That's the sort of thing you have to be concerned about.
