Transport Committee on April 18th, 2007

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to meeting 44 of the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities.

The orders of the day are pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), a study of rail safety. Our witnesses are Mr. Jean-Guy Desrosiers, mayor of Montmagny--thank you, and I appreciate the help; Mr. Donald Anderson, the alternate Canadian legislative director of the United Transportation Union; and John Holliday, acting general chairperson of the United Transportation Union.

The normal procedure is to allow you to present for seven minutes or so. Then we'll do some rounds of questioning. I don't know if there's been any discussion as to who will start.

Mr. Anderson, please proceed.

[Donald Anderson, Alternate Canadian Legislative Director, United Transportation Union]

Good afternoon, members.

Objectives of the Railway Safety Act are:

to promote and provide for the safety of the public and personnel, and the protection of property and the environment, in the operation of railways

to encourage the collaboration and participation of interested parties in improving railway safety

to recognize the responsibility of railway companies in ensuring the safety of their operations

to facilitate a modern, flexible and efficient regulatory scheme that will ensure the continuing enhancement of railway safety.

One of the statements from the Foisy report of past:

The government has the responsibility for public safety. They cannot leave such important issues in the hands of the working parties.

Negotiations between the working parties are therefore, for the most part, set on economic goals. Even if safety aspects are addressed in negotiation, the fact remains it could be dealt away with at any time for economic reasons. The UTU Canada's position is that the government can ill afford to allow the issue of employee and public safety to be wrested from government control. To do so is to abrogate the responsibility of public safety. Rail labour representatives participate in a safety regulatory process, but at a diminished level and without much weight being given to them by management. The Railway Safety Act provides for consultation only.

Frequency of inspections, both visual and technological, should have been amalgamated to enhance a fail-safe mechanism. Visual inspections have been reduced due to reductions in regulations, hours of service, workforce, car inspection locations, and certified car inspectors, as well as increases in train length. The average train length currently would be 8,000 feet, although a fair statement might be that an equal number of trains are reaching train lengths of 10,000 to 14,000 feet.

Voluminous reports from previous inquiries and commissions have been submitted to date. Deregulation has let down the employees, the public, and our environment, since we have not learned from our mistakes and adhered to recommendations.

The extent to which track conditions cause significant safety problems appears to be related to the financial health of the carrier, track life cycle, expenditures for track ratio versus rolling stock, differences in accounting mechanisms, government tax structures, depreciation of company equipment, available capital, and six-axel diesel locomotives.

Canada's statutory approach is one that appears to be based both on inspection and on intercompany safety awareness through the use of health and safety committees, but it is not. A Canadian approach should be based on resolution at the company level through joint equal participation of labour and management, with a strong residual enforcement power granted to the government. The current structure is more adversarial right now, pitting the employer against the government and the employee.

There are factors to be considered in why there are so many derailments and why there are so many accidents: possibly geographic conditions in Canada, deferred maintenance and its implications, changes in technology, uses of technology, changes in maintenance procedures and practices, reductions in workforces, and management philosophy. Labour Canada and Occupation Safety and Health are responsible for rail employees who are not involved with train operation. This includes maintenance of way employees, repair shops, tunnels, viaducts, and others.

The employer is to take steps to ensure that there's no reoccurrence. Labour Canada acts in investigating, reporting regulations, placing responsibilities on employers for investigation, and reporting accidents. The railroads seem to have their own accident reporting and investigation systems.

Other factors that need to be considered: employee negligence, equipment failure, train journal failure, track failure, broken rails, switches, lines, rock slides, specific human failure, getting on and off equipment, which would be related to accidents, backhand and foot injuries, slips, falls, and overall compensation costs.

We need a re-examination of the Canadian railroad operating rules. There certainly seems to be a desire to move in that direction.

I'd also like to say that Transport Canada does not rely on fine collection for enforcement. We'd like to see some fair penalties applied for non-compliance.

The adverse effect of deregulation inspection processes is more a case of monitoring than enforcing. On the credibility of the inspection processes, I believe improvements should result from Transport Canada having more field inspectors to do inspections of the condition of the tracks, to evaluate, monitor, and regulate the quality of the track. The railroads right now seem to create their own standards for track integrity and policing. We'd like to see comprehensive track inspections and photography of the main line with increased frequency.

Car inspection processes should include monitoring, evaluation, and regulation of efficiencies, deficiencies, and risk factors. Inspections should be done in receiving yards, in approved certified car inspection locations.

There currently exists a railway safety consultative committee. It's a tripartite committee, with representatives from stakeholders—the railways in Canada—the unions of transportation, and the Railway Association of Canada. Initially the committee was organized into working groups for addressing such matters as public disclosure of accident information, track inspection requirements, maintenance of signal devices, detection of rock slides, and development of standards for rights-of-way. As I stated before, the union's position is only sought on a consultative basis, and not much weight has been given to it.

On railroad safety, employees are our other concern. Safety committees need to be familiar with rehabilitation programs and training programs. Also, training levels for our operating crews have been diminished, and we'd like those expedited. It's probably because of a reduced workforce, and it's important to get them back to work.

I'll pass it over to John.

[John Holliday, Acting General Chairperson, United Transportation Union]

Thank you, Don.

Good afternoon, and thank you for the invitation.

My name is John Holliday. I've worked on the railway part-time since I was 15 years old and full-time since I was 18 years old. I've been in train service for 26 years. My father worked for the Pacific Great Eastern and the BCR for 32 years and on steam engines for the CPR for two years before that. He died of heart failure when he was 53 years old.

When you work a pool freight or a spare board type of job, it is quite the opposite to a Monday to Friday, 9 to 5 type of shift. You work nights, days, late afternoons, or early mornings, and your biological rhythms get quite confused. Working broken shifts disrupts your eating and sleeping patterns. It's like taking a rest/work schedule, putting it in a blender, and pouring it on a plate. Subsequently, it takes a toll on your health. It affects your brain—and pardon me for my industrial language—and you tend to get moody and bitchy. It affects your digestive system, your stomach, and your intestines. Many rail workers have stomach disorders. I have a small hiatus hernia and bad acid reflux for which I am prescribed medication. But it takes its real toll on your heart. You get heart palpitations. Many railroaders have died of heart failure—not heart attacks, simply heart failure.

Sometimes when the clock strikes high noon, I don't know whether to eat, sleep, have a crap, or wind my watch. I know many of you work in Ottawa and you experience jet lag. Multiply that by ten, divide by three, add a two-hour call, and away you go to work. Then you can get some idea of what we deal with on the railway.

The problem with the federal work/rest rules is that they are not comprehensive enough. Currently CNR would like us to work twelve-hour shifts, six days a week. This is part of the labour strife that we're experiencing today.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

On a point of order, Mr. Chair, as you know, we as a committee have agreed that we wouldn't be getting into issues directly related to the union negotiations that are going on.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

I would just caution you that because of the sensitivity, we've agreed that we will not deal with issues around that labour issue.

[John Holliday]

Certainly. Understood. Thank you, sir.

Another problem with the railroad is post-traumatic stress syndrome. I can give you some examples, but maybe we can get into those later.

I have to tell you that I'm from the former BC Rail. Since CN has taken over the operations of the former BC Rail, we've experienced a greatly reduced standard of safety, from operating standards to maintenance standards on the track, as well as in the maintenance of equipment. On the railway, we're entitled to have—and required to have, by law—proper supervision. We're not getting that at CN. You can phone a supervisor, leave a message, and hope to get a call back, but nine times out of ten you will not get a return call.

In my opinion, there's no proper training for new hires. Traditionally, railways have killed a lot of people, often to fatten up the bottom line. This is neither libellous nor scandalous. It is a fact dating back to the days of construction. You can read in textbooks how the CPR murdered groups of Chinese labourers in the Fraser Canyon. They say that for every mile of track on the CPR, there's a body buried. Fatalities are budgeted into any large construction project. I can tell you that when BCR built the Tumbler Ridge branch line, they budgeted for three deaths. Fortunately there were no fatalities.

Recently, on May 14, 2003, two men died when a bridge collapsed at McBride. It went to court, CN pleaded guilty, and they paid the fine. It's the cost of doing business.

Two more men died on June 29, 2006, near Lillooet, on a runaway train disaster. A third was badly injured. All three of the men were friends of mine. The engine involved should have been at a junkyard, not on a main line, let alone on a main line with a steep mountain grade.

My focus is on railway workers. However, since the deregulation of the railway, airline, and trucking industries, some common denominators have been developing. For example, Air Canada is preparing to maintain and repair aircraft in Guatemala. I'm not sure that the maintenance standard in South America is the same as it is in Canada.

I have no axe to grind with CN. I do not begrudge them to make a profit. However, I would like to reiterate that BCR had a higher safety operating standard. It had a higher equipment and track maintenance standard. BCR was proactive rather than reactive. We had a full-time union safety adviser. We had a derailment task force. We had a locomotive cab committee addressing issues of fatigue in the workplace. There have been some very good studies done by NASA and Boeing, and there was a lot of research done in these cab committees.

We had windshield wipers that worked. We joke in CN that the only reason they bring the locomotives to Vancouver is to get the windows washed. And I'm not kidding. The windows are filthy. When the sun shines on you, you can't see out the windows. It's important to see out the windows of a locomotive, and it's important for the windshield wipers to work. I could elaborate on that, but I'm not going to.

At the former BC Rail, we had things called headsets with boom mikes, so that you could talk to your conductor or engineer over the radio.

There were lots of things, and I have some submissions. I apologize that they're not in French, but I didn't understand. Hopefully we can get them translated.

Another thing we had was corner lights on locomotives. Those came as a result of a coroner's inquest in 1981, when we had a train that hit a rock slide just south of Lillooet and the engine plunged into Seton Lake. The body of the brakeman was never found, never recovered.

Since CN took over, we've found more problems with equipment, like unsecured and unstable ladders on the side of railcars. We call them grab irons, and the bottom step is called a stirrup. We find shaky stirrups and shaky grab irons. They're important for safety. When you climb on a moving boxcar, you don't want those stirrups or grab irons to break. You don't want to fall under the railcar.

At the former BC Rail, we feel that proper legislation and regulations are required for railways, airplanes, and trucks, in order to protect workers and the general public, and also the environment.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Monsieur Desrosiers.

[Jean-Guy Desrosiers, Mayor of Montmagny, As an Individual]

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen.

I am here as a witness to events, catastrophes, accidents or incidents. I will leave it up to you to decide what vocabulary should be used in each case.

For the second time in three years, on January 7, 2007, 24 freight cars of which 4 contained sulphuric acid, derailed near the Montmagny station. Even though there was no spill of dangerous substances, a few of the cars ended up very close to residences.

You will see on the cover photo that one of the cars, which derailed during the night, was on the porch of the white house close to the old station, where many Montmagny community sports, leisure and cultural activities take place.

Despite the fact that the worst case scenario was avoided once again and that there were no injuries, neighbourhood residents are seriously concerned. Even if the causes of the derailment still remain unknown, the speed of the trains is being blamed and with good reason because there have been many catastrophes in the history of the railway in Montmagny over the years.

I will give you the history. Given the multiple incidents that have taken place, it is not surprising that the citizens of Montmagny are concerned, and that they expect that their petition tabled with the city asking for a permanent reduction in train speed to 64 km/h will be accepted by CN or imposed on them. It will be more difficult to have them accept it.

On July 6, 1943, two trains collided on the bridge over the Bras Saint-Nicolas. It must be pointed out that the railway crosses over two rivers that go through the city of Montmagny. A freight train engineer lost his life in this accident and three CN employees were seriously injured. Some 10 other employees suffered minor injuries that did not, however, require them to be taken to hospital.

On April 6, 1954, a passenger train hit a faulty switch at full speed, derailed and demolished a warehouse. The accident took place very close to the station and caused four fatalities, including two conductors and two hoboes. Twenty cases of dynamite were onboard, but none of them exploded. We were lucky. The accident, which was described by employees as one of the most serious accidents to take place in the United States and Canada, was caused by a siding shift which had been left open.

In the fall of 1961, a train collided with a car, causing the death of Lionel Paquet. This incident took place at the level crossing on Saint-Pierre Street.

On January 3, 1963, Gaston Cloutier lost his life following a car accident at the level crossing at Saint-David Avenue.

On November 1, 1966, a car accident at the level crossing near the Gérard Collin factory caused the deaths of four people, including three young girls under the age of 13. The reason given for this accident was the fact that there were no signal lights, along with the fact that several trains were parked on the sidings which led to confusion in the mind of the conductor.

On January 9, 1969, a train left the main rails to move on to a siding and smashed into the Edouard Gendreau hardware store, wounding six people.

On March 30, 1972, a CN employee was fatally wounded while working on a train car a few steps from the station.

On March 13, 1983, the axles and wheels of a car broke close to the station. As the train was moving at low speed, this did not cause a derailment.

In February 1986, a defective wheel on the seventh car forced rail traffic to stop, but did not result in a derailment.

In February 1995, at Saint-François very close to Montmagny, a sleeper car at the end of the train derailed.

On December 5, 1996, because of wheel problems, a car derailed across from the Montmagny station.

In 1997, Gino Anctil died at the Saint-Pierre Street level crossing in Montmagny.

On February 7, 2004, a freight train which had left Halifax for Charny, derailed on the iron bridge over the Rivière du Sud. That is the second river one would cross when travelling from the east. The accident was caused by a bogie failure, and 28 of the 94 cars derailed and fell on the frozen river. The train included two pressurized tank cars containing chlorine. Fortunately, there was no leak of poisonous substances nor was there any loss of life or injury. On top of the interruption of rail traffic, the pedestrian walkway alongside the bridge, built in 1938 by the city of Montmagny, was completely destroyed. It was a rather noteworthy catastrophe.

This was the second derailment in Montmagny in less than three years. The people no longer feel safe in the presence of trains moving at over 64 km/h. Apart from the many previous accidents, the two last major derailments to occur in Montmagny in three years, which happened on the same 800-meter stretch, on the same terrain, have seriously worried the residents of the city. Furthermore, they have organized a committee and have taken the initiative of getting a petition signed—which you will find appended to the brief—aimed at having the train speed permanently reduced. Even though CN does not believe that speed is a factor, the people of the city of Montmagny wish, in order to make this residential area safer, to see the train speed permanently reduced to 64 km/h, because it seems obvious that a train moving at low speed will cause less damage in the event of a derailment.

I will give you the facts. In railway inquiry report No. R04Q0006, drafted by the Transportation Safety Board, the TSB, following the 2004 derailment, it is put forward that the NUCARS simulations showed that the train cars were affected by the bogie's bouncing movement at speeds between 80 and 93 km/h. In 2004, the train was going 93 km/h, almost the allowable limit. It should have been going under 80 km/h. It was, furthermore, disclosed that all of the elements that were likely to cause this bouncing movement of the bogie at high speeds were present. It was furthermore a bogie failure that caused the derailment.

At the time of the 2007 derailment, the freight train was moving at 82 km/h, whereas the maximum speed allowed in Montmagny, according to Transport Canada's rail safety regulations, is 96 km/h. It was travelling at a slightly lower speed, but for freight service, that is very fast for an urban area.

Furthermore, the CN train is already moving at a low speed in certain cities for safety reasons, in light of the proximity of homes. For example, the train travels at 56 km/h between Charny and Saint-Apollinaire; it moves at 48 km/h in the city of Drummondville and at 56 km/h between Beloeil and Montreal. Finally, there are at least three level crossings where many people are part of the traffic either in vehicles, on motorcycles, on bicycles, or on foot in the danger area.

I will tell you about the measures that have been taken. On December 30, 2001, the residents of the Saint-Mathieu neighbourhood, who live alongside the railway, sent a letter to municipal authorities following fruitless representations to CN. In their letter, they deplore the greater and greater speeds of trains, their ever-increasing length, as the gentleman was saying earlier, the heavier and heavier loads on the cars and, often, the more and more toxic contents. All of this makes them fearful for their safety.

In 2004 and 2005, following the derailment of February 7, 2004, dozens of letters were sent to CN asking them to reduce the speed of trains travelling through the municipality. No answers were received on the issue.

In 2007, many organizations gave their support to the city of Montmagny in the form of resolutions to ensure that the speed would be permanently reduced. These include the Conférence régionale des élus de Chaudière-Appalaches, the Montmagny MRC, the Conférence des préfets des MRC de la Chaudière-Appalaches, the city of Pohenegamook, the municipality of Rivière-Bleue, the Union of Quebec Municipalities as well as the federal member for Montmagny—L'Islet—Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup.

In summary, citizens within an 800-meter radius of where the last two incidents occurred are concerned. The City of Montmagny speaks for these people who, this time, do not intend to throw in the towel. Too many accidents or major incidents have occurred there over the years for the people to forget the toll of recent years: 13 deaths, 10 people seriously injured, a dozen people with contusions, and 5 derailments. Fortunately, the five derailments did not involve spills, disasters, injuries or deaths. We were lucky, but we would not want there to be a sixth or a seventh incident: that could be the end of it.

For example, in 2007, a railcard stopped about three feet from the window of a house. If it had contained chlorine or another toxic chemical, there could have been a disaster. We have been lucky to have never had a spill. In fact, we would have needed to evacuate everyone within the area because it is in the middle of town. Last time, the incident occurred in the middle of the night, at a time when it is very difficult to evacuate people. No one knows what situation or state residents are in. Some take pills to sleep, and it is difficult to wake them up, others do not want to leave home. We prefer not thinking about the possibility of having to manage a disaster like that.

That is why the City of Montmagny is repeating its request to reduce the speed of trains within the city to 64km/h. The agreement dealing with the amendment to the act recommends imposing harsh penalties such as speed reduction on CN in cases where accidents frequently occur in the same municipality. This is the second time in three years that such incidents have occurred. That is quite disastrous. There were 5 in just under 50 years, without counting the other incidents. If a committee were to issue a decision on the events and impose penalties on CN, that would force CN to be a little bit more careful and vigilant in terms of maintenance.

I am convinced that the people at CN would prefer not to see these accidents occur, but these accidents are often directly linked to work that was not necessarily done adequately on the lines. In the past, CN could use herbicides, pesticides and other toxic chemicals along the rail beds, but it can no longer do so. As a result, vegetation is accumulating there, water levels are increasing, and the water is reaching into the ballast under the tracks. When the temperature goes up and down for example in January and February, the rail bed expands and contracts. I am not a specialist, but I am trying to analyze the situation. It ends up causing accidents like the one that occurred recently.

The people at CN have told us that the last accident was due to switching. A part was apparently not detected by the ultrasound system, went up, and was ripped off by the train. They have also told us that they are obliged to conduct ultrasound verifications each year, but that they are currently doing 8 and they plan to do 10. But even if they did one in December, there was a derailment in February. In no way does that reassure us.

I will now move on to my second recommendation. Since freight is now transported from one large centre to another, because local distribution no longer exists, we recommend that consideration be given to the possibility of building bypasses for this type of train. That would be consistent with what was done for road transportation with the arrival of highways. Highway 132 or 138—and here I am talking about Quebec—are no longer used because freight volumes increased. Highways are now used.

I have one page left to read, but it deals primarily with the history of the arrival of the train and the railway in Montmagny, as well as the Grand Trunk. You will be able to read it when you have the document. The annexes include a map of the houses located along the railway. You will be able to see how many there are. You will also find letters of support and the citizens' petition. That completes my submission. If you have any questions for me, I'm prepared to answer them.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Bell.

[Don Bell, Liberal, North Vancouver, BC]

Thank you, gentlemen, for coming.

I'll direct this to Mayor Desrosiers.

I previously was mayor of a community that had a railway running through it and I can share many of your concerns. We had industry there dealing with hazardous chemicals as well. The safety of the community is foremost, but I'll leave that questioning to the rest of my colleagues on the committee.

I want to focus on the gentleman from British Columbia and his associate from Ontario.

One of the concerns in the two reports we have seems to indicate that CN--in particular in this case, and we're talking about rail safety in all railways--appears to have had a high number over the last few years, certainly in 2005. The auditor's report and safety management assessment that were done concern me in that the inspection rates for the cars were rated at an overall safety defect rate of 20.6%, or 20% to 21%.

That means one car in five has some kind of safety defect. I realize they can vary from loose sills to defective brake beams, and I gather they vary in importance, but it seems like a high percentage. They talk about the weekly rate changing from 13% to 27%. Almost 54% of 232 locomotives inspected had a safety defect record, and the weekly locomotive safety defect rates ranged from 32% to 69% or 70%, which seems very high.

I'm concerned with some of the other recommendations that seem to indicate in some cases with rolling stock—and I'm not presuming locomotives, but more the cars—that American standards are being used to evaluate whether those cars need to be pulled and improved. It reflects on the rate of reporting incidents as well by using, in some cases, the American standards. I don't know if that's related to CN having a predominance of management coming from the States and applying their standards to Canadian operations, and even further to British Columbia, which has some of the most severe terrain grades and curves in North America. I'm curious if as workers there you have noticed that.

I would make reference to the Foisy commission's report after the Hinton disaster, which indicated that the effectiveness and rigour with which the CTC and Transport Canada move to correct identified problems are inadequate. I'm gathering that relates perhaps to staffing levels, or are their standards not adequate?

If you gentlemen could respond to that—

[John Holliday]

First of all, yes, the standards are a little less than they seem to be. A guy who inspects or works on a boxcar is called a car mechanic or a car man, and a CCI is a certified car inspection.

For quite a while at the former BC Rail we had cars that were going between the Gibraltar Mine and north Vancouver. They received no certified car inspections, no CCIs at all. The wheels were not inspected and the brakes were not inspected by a qualified car mechanic.

I'm not sure of the difference in the Association of American Railroads, the AAR, standards. I can't remember what they call it in Canada, but I'm sure they follow the American standards.

Another bad thing is...I heard a story. I tried to get confirmation of this before I came to this committee, but I believe it to be true. The car men were inspecting a train before leaving Prince George. They typically put a red tag on the car that says “bad order”, and they staple it. Then a freight crew or a switching crew will switch the car on to a track to be fixed before it leaves the station. The car men go down one side of the train track and down the other side, and every once in a while they put a red tag, a bad order tag, on the side of this boxcar. Half an hour later a foreman came along and pulled the tags off the side of the boxcar.

I believe that story to be true. I don't have confirmation, but this is one instance. I'm not sure why they did it or why they would do it.

In my submission, I have a couple of letters and a little information on the differences in inspections and maintenance standards from the former BC Rail. Obviously, it's now CN.

[Don Bell, Liberal, North Vancouver, BC]

Mr. Anderson, do you want to respond to that?

[Donald Anderson]

I believe reducing the car inspection locations and a reduced workforce are contributing factors to the inspection processes. They're contributing factors to the increase in the number of deficiencies or the number of defects overall.

In the United States, I believe they have an FRA guideline they go by. A car is inspected and it's tracked every 1,000 miles. There is no such standard in Canada.

[Don Bell, Liberal, North Vancouver, BC]

In the two reports we have, there seem to be two or three themes.

One is the maintenance of the track, the maintenance of the rolling stock. There seem to be inconsistent reporting methods, and follow-up is one of the issues.

The other is the relationship between the employees and the management in terms of conveying. In the reports, they say there's a disconnect between senior management and the line of employees as to following through on safety initiatives or understanding what is meant by them. There are recommendations talking about weak gaps in employee training, with skills and training, poor internal complaint resolution processes, and poor follow-up on accidents.

It says:

While the audit team was able to verify that accident and incident reporting and analysis processes are implemented, it was not able to find recorded implementation details or follow-up data on the effectiveness of corrective actions (safety measures) in all cases.

In other words, when they're not reported, it's one problem. When they are reported but are not followed up on to ensure that what was recommended is actually done, it seems to be another problem.

The corollary to that is this. In your opinion, does Transport Canada or the Transportation Safety Board have adequate teeth to enforce and do follow-up, or are they stuck with making recommendations?

[John Holliday]

Absolutely not.

[Donald Anderson]

I'd have to agree with John.

The lack of reporting, I guess for lack of a better word, would be.... Now it's twofold, from a grassroots perspective. Some of that philosophy comes as a result of the men and women who work there. They are just fed up with nothing being done, no corrective action being taken when they do report things. The whole philosophy of the workforce is they don't care any more. They're getting to a situation where no matter how much they try, they just keep getting whipped more. Everybody is sitting there waiting, counting the days, five more years, or three years two months, or one year, or ten more trips, or whatever. That may have something to do with that, increased work pressures or stresses.

To your point, again, I'm following up on reporting. If you do turn it in, if you start turning stuff in too often, there's a fear of reprisal. Transport Canada is virtually understaffed, or possibly underfunded--that's my particular opinion. I'd like to see the Transportation Safety Board--I've read their inquiries, seen their investigations--have a lot more authority to have those recommendations acted upon and implemented. It seems when Transport Canada or the Transportation Safety Board make rulings or recommendations with respect to safety, because the regulatory bodies allow them an exemption, it's just a matter of time, six months to a year, before that's taken away.

A case in point was the Hinton disaster, where cars rolled out of a track on a hill. Right after that they determined that all those tracks coming on a certain grade and in yards would have derails, which was a mechanism put on the rail so if the car started to roll on its own for whatever reason--wind or other cars were put onto it--it would effectively derail the car so it wouldn't go out onto a main line. Anyway, they put lots of derails all over the place. I guess they went from one extreme to another, and it caused a reduction in productivity; it took time to stop and take these derails off manually. Within a year, all those derails, or a majority of them, were taken away. Those were safety devices put in place for the protection of the main lines.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Monsieur Laframboise.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

My first question is for you, Mr. Desrosiers. Thank you very much for coming. I am going to start with a short introduction. It was important for us that you be here as mayor of Montmagny, because you have experienced certain situations in recent years. First of all, I must tell you that the study this committee is undertaking is non-partisan. All parties believe that there is a problem with railway safety, and we must understand the situation. Transport Canada, above all in the area of railway transportation, particularly over the past five years, has put in place a safety management system. The same is being done for air transportation, and the committee discussed that at other meetings. As part of these safety management systems, the company takes charge. The way things are done has changed. There are fewer visual Transport Canada inspectors, and the company is responsible for the safety of its equipment and its rails. It must establish a management system, and Transport Canada audits it. Transport Canada audits the system, instead of conducting the visual inspections on-site as it did in the past.

I was listening to Mr. Anderson. It is accurate that there are fewer inspections. We would like to see more visual inspections. Everywhere else in the world, when a safety management system is put in place, the visual inspection must not be set aside, as that is what makes it possible to detect problems if the inspections are done systematically.

I want you to tell my colleagues what that can lead to. Over the past five years, you have been through two derailments. So the safety management system... I asked the acting director of the Transportation Safety Board a question on that, and he could not confirm that the famous management systems had reduced the number of accidents. There was some wonderful reduction in the number of accidents, but there was not a reduction for you. More occurred. I would like you to give me an overview about how people are feeling and about the relations you have with the operator who, to my mind, does not always seem to listen to your recommendations.

[Jean-Guy Desrosiers]

The people in the municipality are putting a lot of pressure on the municipal council, because it represents them. For example, courses were given in the train station located close to the rail line, but everyone cancelled their registration in January. After the derailment, nobody wanted to take courses in that place anymore. So the courses had to be reorganized in another building.

The people who live very close to the rail line often exert pressure. These are the people who organized the petition and collected signatures. People are extremely worried. When trains went by at low speeds, people slept well because they felt safe. But when this type of catastrophe happens, the catastrophe must be managed, including teams of firefighters and so on. Some municipal sectors are completely isolated. People feel powerless and are worried, and so they turn to us.

Since this has happened twice in three years, people don't believe that it won't happen again. The last time it did, CN told people not to worry because major repair work was being carried out and there would be no more reason to worry afterwards. But less than three months later, another derailment happened about 500 metres from the first one, but this time it happened on the west-east line. We were lucky because it did not happen at a time when people were coming out of the plant: it was 1:15 in the morning. If the derailment had happened when workers were just coming out of the plant, the death toll would have been huge because that is exactly where they would have been. Next door there is a co-op and houses. The people took pictures. The gentleman who lives in the white house put his house up for sale because he does not want to live there anymore. The value of the homes in that sector has fallen because of what happened.

People want the trains to slow down. Of course, we cannot demand that CN lay down a rail line outside of town, but it should be said that 10 or 15 years ago, south of Montmagny, there was what was called the Monk section. The rail line went through a place which was basically deserted and where there were very few homes. The rail lines was dismantled and transferred lower down; the opposite should have happened. The lower line should have remained in place for the tourist trains, or it should have been converted into a cycling path, instead of building the path 20 kilometres outside of town.

People have developed a railway psychosis. They are depressed and have asked me to fix the problem. We regularly speak with CN representatives. I even spoke with them last week. Today, the trains roll by at 40 miles/h. They used to travel at 30 miles/h and they have just started going at 40 miles/h. When I ask them to stay at 40 miles/h, they tell me that they might do this if no one else in Canada was aware of the situation. Unfortunately, I will not be able to—

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

You said that Drummondville managed to get the trains to slow down when they travelled through the town. Whom did you speak to? Was it with Transport Canada, which is responsible for regulating this sector? I know that Transport Canada said that trains should slow down for a certain period of time, but what is the situation now?

[Jean-Guy Desrosiers]

I couldn't tell you. We're told that the track is tortuous, that the convoys are longer and that it would then be difficult to increase speed. In another case, we're given other reasons. Honestly, I don't know why the speed is reduced in Drummondville. On the Beloeil to Montreal section speed is reduced and we are monitoring the situation. I think that municipal police monitor it to ensure that CN is not in the wrong. Between Charny and Saint-Apollinaire, there is the Chaudière River. CN probably decided to reduce the speed because of the geography there. CN has had to face many catastrophes, and perhaps it decided to reduce the speed wherever it's most difficult.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

You have the impression that they will continue to ask you to increase speed.

[Jean-Guy Desrosiers]

Yes. I spoke to the vice-president who is responsible for the Winnipeg to Halifax sector, and there's absolutely no way they will agree to a permanent speed reduction.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Mr. Julian.

[Peter Julian, NDP, Burnaby—New Westminster, BC]

Thank you to all the witnesses for coming forward today. I'm going to start with Mr. Anderson and Mr. Holliday.

In your testimony today you made reference to deregulation and privatization as being part of the elements, why we're seeing this increase in derailments, this increase in accidents.

We also had testimony this week from Mr. Gordon Rose. I believe you're familiar with him. He spoke to the fact that when he worked for CN when it was Canadian-owned and he worked for BC Rail when it was Canadian-owned, he saw a real contrast when CN became American-owned and BC Rail was transferred over under CN management ownership.

He said when you opened your rules books, when you opened up your time cards, safety was number one when it was Canadian-owned. Now it's not. Now it's number four.

I'm wondering to what extent these factors--deregulation, privatization, and American ownership of CN--have made a difference, in your opinion, in the overall deterioration in safety standards. I'm also wondering to what extent you get a sense that Transport Canada is there tracking violations where there are problems, emerging safety issues. To what extent do you see Transport Canada around, or are they just completely absent?