Evidence of meeting #17 for Transport, Infrastructure and Communities in the 39th Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was transport.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Douglas Lewis  Chair, Advisory Panel for the Railway Safety Act Review, Department of Transport
Tim Meisner  Executive Director, Railway Safety Act Review Secretariat, Department of Transport

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair (Mr. Mervin Tweed (Brandon—Souris, CPC)) Conservative Merv Tweed

Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, meeting number 17. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), this is the study on rail safety in Canada.

Joining us today we have the Honourable Doug Lewis, chair of the advisory panel for the Railway Safety Act review; Tim Meisner, executive director, Railway Safety Act Review Secretariat; and Sheila Smith, director of planning and liaison, Railway Safety Act Review Secretariat. Thank you for joining us today.

I know there's a lot of information to be shared today, so I think we'll get right at it.

I will advise the committee that I have set aside the last 10 minutes of this meeting to confirm where we're going when we come back from the break.

I would ask that you keep your questions as short and concise as possible so everyone can participate.

Mr. Volpe.

11:05 a.m.

Liberal

Joe Volpe Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

Mr. Chair, given the length of this report, the stories associated with it, and the presentation, are you going to allow some flexibility of time, or are you going to go strictly to the 10-minute presentation and then off to questions?

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Merv Tweed

Mr. Lewis has requested a bit of time beyond the 10 minutes, and I'm going to try to keep him close to that. I do know there are a lot of questions.

11:05 a.m.

Liberal

Joe Volpe Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

If it's all right with the other members, I wouldn't mind hearing what the experience of the panel was, and I don't think a few minutes is adequate. I don't know what the rest think, but 20 minutes sounds a bit more reasonable, although that might be a bit excessive.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Merv Tweed

I'll keep a close eye on the clock and advise Mr. Lewis when he's running out of time, if that's suitable. I think we definitely want to hear from the chairman, so if that's okay....

11:05 a.m.

Liberal

Joe Volpe Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

Are you okay?

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Merv Tweed

Mr. Jean.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

Brian Jean Conservative Fort McMurray—Athabasca, AB

Mr. Chair, you're in charge of the time. The extra time that Mr. Lewis wants is fine with the government.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Merv Tweed

Mr. Lewis, I'll ask you to begin. Welcome.

11:05 a.m.

Douglas Lewis Chair, Advisory Panel for the Railway Safety Act Review, Department of Transport

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the committee for asking me to appear so quickly after the release of the report by Minister Cannon. I take this as a signal that the committee, in a non-partisan way, wants to focus on improvements to railway safety, and I think that's an important signal to send to the people of Canada, the Government of Canada, the regulator--Transport Canada--and the railway industry.

I don't believe in long remarks, either as an opposition member of Parliament or as a member of government or as a minister. I prepared these remarks myself, and I guess I spent a little more time on preparing them than I did on measuring the time. So if you'll bear with me, I'll scoot through them.

I want to point out that we submitted an advance copy of our report to the minister on November 30. Once the report was submitted, I turned to other things that I had put aside in order to complete the report, such as my law practice and my responsibilities as a bencher. Three months later, I came back to take a fresh look at the report and to say what I think is the most important theme that we came upon. I think the most important theme for everybody is how we improve the safety culture of the Canadian railway industry from the standpoint of the regulator, the industry, and the public.

I used the old formula of who, what, where, when, why, how. I switched it around a little bit, and I dealt with the “what” first: an improved safety culture in the Canadian railway system from the standpoint of the regulator, the industry, and the public. Then I deal with why, when, where, and who, and I'll take you through the report with the how.

First of all, there's no question the Canadian railway industry is vital to the Canadian economy. In a country as vast as ours we have to export product to international markets and import product to consumers in Canada and the U.S. as quickly and as efficiently as possible. At the same time, we have to do it safely. Why safely? Because we care about the people running our railway operations and the people affected by accidents; because we care about environmental problems that can occur when things go wrong; and lastly, for purely business reasons, because a safe operation, as everyone knows, is an efficient, effective, and more profitable operation.

Building a railway safety culture is something that involves everybody--the regulator, the industry, the public. We should want it to happen as soon as possible, but it doesn't happen overnight. We're fortunate that we're building on a solid base that the regulator and the industry have worked at for several years. We're not starting from scratch and we're not dealing with a disaster. We sought the figures out. The Canadian railway safety record compares favourably with comparable railways in the United States. That's of comfort today, but we want to lead the U.S. tomorrow. What do we have to do to lead them? It's not good enough to just say that we lead them today, so let's just sit still.

Railways in Canada operate in all sorts of places, from ports to mountains to prairies to forests, in urban and rural settings. Terrain and weather conditions are always changing. These are the factors that challenge the maintenance and improvement of the Canadian railway safety culture.

As well, we have multi-jurisdictional issues that you don't have in a place like the United Kingdom, for example. We have a federally regulated railway, and we have the provinces and municipalities with responsibilities with respect to proximity issues. They can't advocate those responsibilities by simply saying it's the feds who run the railways.

Improving the Canadian railway safety culture involves the Canadian people as interested observers, Transport Canada and related government agencies, the industry, and the Government of Canada as the source of the resources for the regulator. Everybody has a role to play.

Now I'm going to deal with the “how”, and I'm going to refer to the chapters in the report, if I may.

The first is the state of railway safety in Canada. As we stated in the report, both CN and CP have lower accidents than comparable U.S.-based operators. We're pleased to learn that crossing accidents in Canada have shown a clear downward trend since 1989. We attributed that to outreach programs undertaken by Transport Canada, the railways, their employees, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, and other interested parties.

But main track derailments and non-main track accidents—yards and spurs—are of concern to us. While everybody relates to the transport of dangerous goods, and the actual transportation of dangerous goods has risen 60%, accidents and incidents have declined considerably, according to TSB statistics. Furthermore—and this is really interesting—only 12% of the accidents occur when the dangerous goods are moving. To us, that said we have to pay a little more attention to what's happening when the dangerous goods are stationary.

Governance issues, whether or not they are labeled as such, are at the heart of many of the concerns and frustrations brought to our attention as a panel. Concern was expressed about inconsistencies from region to region in Canada, both in Transport Canada's oversight and in railway operations. This must be addressed if we are to have a seamless safety culture throughout the country. A rigorous, structured consultation process is an effective tool that would provide transparency and build confidence among all participants. You will note that the report addresses consultation issues extensively.

On the regulatory framework, the basic principle that has evolved over the last 20 to 30 years is that the railway companies must be responsible and accountable for the safety of their own operations, and the regulator, Transport Canada, must retain the power to protect people, property, and the environment, by assuring that the railways operate safely within a national framework.

Regulations that are produced and promulgated by the Government of Canada have a role to play, but the railway industry has regulations and rules. The rules are developed for an individual railway or railway companies and are approved by the minister, but we found there has to be a more clear, transparent method of developing the rules in order to avoid confusion and frustration. We suggested a regulation that governs the way rules are developed.

There's a term out there called a “certificate of fitness”. We feel it's a misnomer. The panel doesn't feel that simply by demonstrating financial stability and presenting an insurance policy and an SMS system for Transport Canada to review should qualify a railway to operate. We feel we should dealing with a rail operating certificate. We described it in the report. What it would mean is that the railway companies would have to meet baseline safety requirements in advance of operating, and that would be a condition of receiving a certificate of fitness.

Safety management systems, as you can imagine, took up a great bit of time of the panel. We support the SMS system and concept. We heard from companies with strong functional SMS, such as Air Transat, and we are convinced that this is the right approach.

Nobody has done a perfect job either of explaining to employees how safety management systems are supposed to work or making the SMS work for those involved. The whole concept of safety management systems was meant to shift management thinking to hazard identification, risk assessment, mitigation and monitoring, and away from a rules-driven approach. They were not intended to replace any existing regulations, rules, or standards, but to develop a more comprehensive way of managing safety. They didn't mean deregulation or industry self-regulation.

The railway industry has failed to achieve the maximum buy-in from the people most directly concerned about the safety of the industry, namely the employees on the front line. Similarly, Transport Canada has failed to maximize this new approach due to inconsistent implementation across the various regions and insufficient resources. The cornerstone of an effective SMS system is an effective safety culture.

The media has made reference to the panel's comparison of VIA, CP, and CN. I stand by our comments. We do not believe that you instill a safety culture through a strict, rules-based system that lays blame on employees for errors or failures, but fails to recognize the management influences or organizational situations that may be contributing to those errors or failures.

The most important person involved in an SMS is not the person who looks at it after it's been devised. The most important person involved in an SMS is the person who is at risk and participates in the risk assessment and mitigation measures. Everybody in a company then makes it work. Both functions go hand in hand, but it all has to start at the base level.

At the same time, Transport Canada has to shift its emphasis to monitoring the railway's performance rather than inspecting. The railways need to implement effective SMS systems and demonstrate to Transport Canada that they are effective. Effective SMS systems monitored effectively by Transport Canada will contribute considerably to an improved safety culture.

Reliable information is central to risk management and planning effective regulatory oversight. In this way, safety advancement becomes possible. I'm going to boil this down quickly. We want Transport Canada to be in a position to collect and use the information necessary to improve safety in a proactive manner as soon as possible. That means they control what information is collected, analyze it, and disseminate it.

This is in no way a criticism of the Transportation Safety Board. We didn't hear any indication throughout the piece that their investigations are anything but first class. But their focus is on collecting information after accidents, and in that case it's reactionary. We want Transport Canada to have more information faster. Our suggested approach would also provide a single reporting window for industry. Information should be used to prevent accidents rather than simply report on them.

Proximity issues are dealt with in the report. Everybody has a role to play in contributing to a better safety culture with respect to railway crossing accidents. Public education by Transport Canada, the railways, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, and others have reduced accidents and fatalities. Funding safety improvements at crossings has also had a positive impact on safety. Whether stakeholder initiated or funded through Transport Canada's grade-crossing improvement program, continual safety improvements at crossings are important. The split jurisdiction between municipal-provincial land use planning and railway operations has led to problems that must be addressed.

On environmental protection and response, the public has a heightened interest in environmental concerns. They're more apt to view the effectiveness of the safety culture surrounding the railway system with how effectively it protects the environment. That's an important point of view.

We're satisfied that efforts have been made to improve response to environmental disasters. However, we should learn from those disasters, such as at Lake Wabamun. That disaster didn't involve a dangerous good, but it did considerable damage to Lake Wabamun.

We suggest we look beyond dangerous goods and take a look at environmentally hazardous goods. One of our recommendations is to develop a standard emergency response protocol. We're also concerned about environmental problems on the horizon with spills over a long time in rail yards.

Concerning operational Issues, I have to tell you there would be nothing worse than a panel comprised of two lawyers and a management consultant and one guy who knew something about railways coming back to you and saying, here are the following operational issues that we've solved. So we didn't get into that, but we touched on some of them with a view to identifying problems.

We are convinced that the operational issue that affects an effective Canadian safety culture the most is fatigue management. The issue cries out for an effective solution or for addressing solutions fast. It's been around far too long. There are new and innovative ways of assessing the factors surrounding the issue, such as rules, fatigue plans, and collective agreements. Finding and working on more effective solutions is crucial, and we would urge the regulator, the industry, and the unions to work collectively on this issue.

We looked at scientific and technological innovation. The railway industry has made great strides in adopting new and innovative technologies, focusing on infrastructure and equipment to improve safety, but there's room for more innovation. If our safety culture is to keep pace with the times and improve, the government must create an environment that is conducive to assessing and implementing new policies.

The government, under resources, also has to provide more financial support to the regulator. In our opinion, the regulator is doing an incredible job with the resources provided, but over the years has not been given sufficient jobs to advance railway safety.

I say this as a former member of Parliament and a former Minister of Transport: I think we have to zero in on the Minister of Finance. He probably won't be pleased to hear that, but I mean it; it has to be in the ministry. We have to demonstrate the importance of the railway industry to the Canadian economy and of the government revenues, direct and indirect, that are flowing from the railways, and give Transport Canada the funds.

The most important element that the panel dealt with that affects the safety culture is relationships. Railways are responsible for the safety of their operations; Transport Canada is responsible for a safe national transportation system. This requires a recognition of the roles and a collaborative approach.

The regulator and the industry simply have to try harder to build a better working relationship to improve the safety culture. Openness, transparency, and accountability are key elements in building that better working relationship.

Let me conclude.

Our panel spent six months travelling across Canada, listening, watching, asking, and probing people in the Canadian railway system. We started out with a common purpose: none of us wanted to spend a lot of time compiling a report that was put on a shelf; we wanted to produce something that was meaningful and useful.

So we did something different. After we decided on our recommendations and grouped them in a manner in which they appear in the report, we set up a validation exercise. Shortly after Labour Day, we fanned out across the country and sat down with the major stakeholders: Transport Canada, the TSB, provincial officials, the railways, the unions, and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities. We gave them a copy of our recommendations—just the recommendations, as they appear at the back of the report. We said, read them. We sat there and they read them. Then we retrieved the copy. We asked them if there were any recommendations that they thought were over the top or that wouldn't fly.

We then reconvened in Ottawa and discussed what we had heard as a panel. There were no recommendations that were abandoned because they were over the top or wouldn't fly; a few were tweaked.

That validation process assisted us in directing a narrative that explained the recommendations and how we came to them. We were able to submit the report on the deadline of the end of the fall. We put it in on November 30.

I have to say that I've been involved with the committee process for several years in various venues. I feel I was fortunate to have been involved in what I think is such a productive report.

Someone in Transport Canada or the Prime Minister's Office found four individuals from different backgrounds who got along famously. We had Sheila, and Tim Meisner, our executive director, who put together a terrific staff. We had cooperation from everyone. It was clear that improving safety was a common goal. We were well received and briefed, and we had fulsome discussions. As a result, I think we have come up with a report that will enhance the safety culture of the Canadian railway system.

Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, for your patience.

I am ready to take any questions.

11:25 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Merv Tweed

Thank you, Mr. Lewis.

I will open the floor. Again, because I know there are going to be a lot of questions, I'm going to try to keep it as tight as I can to the seven minutes. If you see me give you the one-minute sign, please be as brief as you can.

Mr. Bell.

11:25 a.m.

Liberal

Don Bell Liberal North Vancouver, BC

Thank you, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Meisner, and Ms. Smith.

I'd like to compliment you on your committee. I sat in on one of your sessions. I'm very impressed with the work you've done.

There's a lot to cover here. In the beginning of your comments I think the priority you established is one that I heard during the hearings we had. The priority has to be the people, both the people who run the railway, who work it--the employees--and the people who are affected by it, the people who live in the communities through which the railways run. Second is the environment, and third is the profit or the operation of the railways. At times it seems it's the opposite of that. We were told that seemed to be a perception rather than a reality.

To get into the questions, on page 215 of your report you talk about resources for Transport Canada being inadequate, and you suggest as well that Transport Canada needs to rethink its approach. They're understaffed. You're suggesting the renewal of staff and experience in the rail safety directorate, and that the department rethink its approach to inspection and audit so that the skills and time of the inspectors can be more effectively used.

I'm wondering if you would care to expand on that.

11:30 a.m.

Chair, Advisory Panel for the Railway Safety Act Review, Department of Transport

Douglas Lewis

Thank you.

The shift to the safety management system involved a shift from inspecting to auditing. The theory was that the companies are responsible for their operations and Transport Canada is responsible for a national safety system. The companies have to develop the systems and come to Transport Canada to show that the systems for safety work. The company has to audit them and Transport Canada has to audit them. That involved a shift in the skills of the people who did the job. There's a difference between being an inspector and being an auditor. You're looking for different things. If you go out and inspect rail lines, you're putting a lot of Transport Canada's resources into inspecting the rails.

The theory in shifting to safety management systems was that companies should do the inspecting and have the systems to audit where things are going right with the rails and where they're going wrong. Transport Canada should then oversee that function of the companies. That involved having people who understand that they're auditing.

As it happens, my first career was as a chartered accountant. I learned something about auditing, and it came up time and again. Quite frankly, there are differences across this country in the attitude of Transport Canada inspectors towards the whole issue of SMS and auditing. That's what we found.

11:30 a.m.

Liberal

Don Bell Liberal North Vancouver, BC

You made a comment, and I think you say it in your report, that the SMS is not perfect. Do you think it's adequate?

11:30 a.m.

Chair, Advisory Panel for the Railway Safety Act Review, Department of Transport

Douglas Lewis

I refer you to page....

11:30 a.m.

Liberal

Don Bell Liberal North Vancouver, BC

While you're looking at that, I'll ask a second question, so it can be working in the back of your mind. You commented that dangerous goods incidents have declined, while in other categories the incidents and accidents had not. Do you think luck or action explains why serious incidents involving trains didn't occur as often with hazardous goods?

11:30 a.m.

Chair, Advisory Panel for the Railway Safety Act Review, Department of Transport

Douglas Lewis

Let me answer the last question first. I don't think it's attributable to luck. A great deal of effort has been put into the whole issue of dangerous goods. We met with the Canadian Chemical Producers and talked to them about their procedures. They had a great deal of pride in what they were doing to reduce problems. We were impressed by the effort being put into the transportation of dangerous goods.

To go back to your first question, if you go to page 69, there's a quote in there from Faye Ackermans, of CP. The first sentence says it all: “[Changing culture] is a journey; the progress we have made is still fragile.” I don't think you ever achieve perfection in trying to create a safety culture.

There's also, in this particular section, an effort made by an individual to define what happens. On page 73, there's an interesting evaluation tool for measuring safety culture. There are five types of safety cultures that companies have. That particular example tries to describe what this culture is made up of in the various companies.

11:35 a.m.

Liberal

Don Bell Liberal North Vancouver, BC

I noticed that you talked about the importance of fatigue, which was reported by the employees. They also raised the question of employee training, training for crews, which they felt was inadequate.

I'm wondering if you can comment on both a little more. On the fatigue issue, some of the U.S. accidents and the serious one outside Hinton were the result of fatigue. That was a concern we heard strongly. The other issue is the experience and training of the crews.

11:35 a.m.

Chair, Advisory Panel for the Railway Safety Act Review, Department of Transport

Douglas Lewis

Let me answer the fatigue question first. If you go to page 154, you'll see the countermeasures that the CANALERT ’95 study suggested to deal with fatigue. The more I read this, the more I come back to a phrase on page 157 that says “sleep is the important element, not just time 'off duty'”. There are a whole lot of factors involved in fatigue.

As for training, the response may contain a measure of what happens when management steps in and starts running trains when there's a strike. I'm just saying “a measure”.

The companies are in charge of training their own employees. As for how much Transport Canada's oversight is related to company training of personnel, we didn't get into that in much depth. I still think the sticking point is the fatigue management issue.

11:35 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Merv Tweed

Monsieur Laframboise.

11:35 a.m.

Bloc

Mario Laframboise Bloc Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I would like to congratulate you for the work that you have done. Your recommendations zero in on the real problems. This is a significant achievement. You were elected yourself, so you know that we have to be able to propose appropriate solutions once the problems are identified. I am proud of your assessment. On page 15 of your report, you say the following about accidents:

While it would seem that the recent upward trend (1998-2005) reversed somewhat in 2006, TSB data to July 2007 shows that main track derailments are higher than in 2006 and near the five-year average (2002-06).

As we have already noted, these are the accidents whose consequences are more severe in terms of material and environmental damage. You underlined the fact that, in the case of these more dangerous and more environmentally-hazardous accidents, there has not been an improvement. The trend is apparent. It is true that our average may be better than in the United States, but the fact is that things are not improving. That, more or less, is what I gathered about accidents.

Is my interpretation correct?

11:40 a.m.

Chair, Advisory Panel for the Railway Safety Act Review, Department of Transport

Douglas Lewis

Thank you very much, Monsieur Laframboise.

You are correct. We had to figure out what the state was, and we didn't want railways to tell us. We commissioned a specific study on the state of railway safety and asked someone who dealt with statistics to present us with those statistics. So I'm reasonably confident, despite the difficulties we referred to in other places in the report as to the reliability of the statistics, in what they tell us. Naturally we want to see the trends. It does appear that they went down in 2006, but unfortunately they're back up in 2007. That's a hard fact that we must deal with. That, I think, ties in with the whole issue of the collecting of statistics.

When you spend six months travelling across the country, there are things that really jump out at you. We were in Washington talking to the FRA, and they had the same statistics we had. Their statistical line went like this, but then it went sharply down about two years before us. I said to the individual, “What happened there? I'm interested in what caused that.” He said, “Well, we noticed that it was going like this, and we called a meeting to deal with it.” Their statistical line for derailments, either main line or non-main line, was going down.

That is why we say we want Transport Canada to be in a position to decide with the railways what statistics will work for them: to provide them with the information to come up with better solutions faster.

11:40 a.m.

Bloc

Mario Laframboise Bloc Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC

I understand. That leads me to my second question. The committee had an opportunity to take a close look at the safety management system for air transportation. I see that you used Air Transat as an example. Representatives from ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, told us during their testimony that a safety management system must not replace Transport Canada's inspection and oversight. That coincides with the recommendations you make in your report. The objective is to create a culture of safety.

Of course, the situation for air transportation is not the same as it is for rail. After all, once an aircraft has taken off, its highway is the air, whereas a train travels on thousands of kilometres of track. On page 67 of your report, you say:

It has been nearly seven years since railways have been required to implement SMS. While progress has certainly been made, in the Panel’s opinion, the implementation of SMS across the rail transportation system and by the regulator has been inconsistent. The Panel expected that, after so many years, both the regulator and the industry would have made more progress.

Your observation is blunt: after seven years of SMS, you expected more progress than has actually been made. That concerned us with air transportation and it also concerns us with rail. We do not feel, in fact, that there is enough staff to oversee the SMS and to do the required inspections.

In your report, you say that Transport Canada should attach more importance to overseeing performance than to inspections. The fact remains that thousands of kilometres of track have to be inspected. If Transport Canada is not capable of taking on this oversight through inspections on the ground, how are we to be sure that the safety management system is operating perfectly on every stretch of track?

11:45 a.m.

Chair, Advisory Panel for the Railway Safety Act Review, Department of Transport

Douglas Lewis

I think your reaction is a natural one. I guess the way I would approach the answer is this. We are not suggesting that you completely eliminate inspections, but we are suggesting that by auditing SMS systems and combining that with an effective program of inspections, you can get at the problems. The companies are inspecting the rails. That's a given; they do their rail inspections.

The question is, should we duplicate the company's efforts, or should we turn Transport Canada's mind to where the problems are occurring, zero in on what's breaking down in those areas, and then do our follow-up inspections? That, I think, is what we were driving at.

It's a whole change of culture to sit down with audits and to take what the company says they have done to develop their SMS system and say, all right, we're having problems with this type of rail or in this type of terrain; that's what our audit shows us, and we're going to turn our inspections to that.

In other words, I think the SMS system is a tool for better targeting the efforts of inspectors if it's used properly.

11:45 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Merv Tweed

Mr. Julian.