Mr. Miller, in the wake of its analysis, the committee made a highly relevant comment, I think, on how CN operates. It's not without reason that this safety culture prevented the safety management system from being entirely effective. I am astounded to hear you say you don't accept the advisory panel's finding, when it concerns precisely the first problem you should have identified.
The culture has to be changed, as was done at Transat and Via Rail. The only way to do that is to ensure that employees and management work hand in hand. As a first condition, it must be ensured that the one doesn't accuse the other; otherwise, the entire safety management system will never work. I wonder why the safety management system hasn't worked in the past seven years, whereas it should have worked. At CN, I got the beginnings of an answer. There is a culture there in which people look for the guilty parties. It's never the fault of the company or managers, but always that of the employees. That's why it doesn't work.
Today, you say you approve of certain recommendations, but not the finding. So if CN doesn't see its problem, it will be in the same situation in seven years. I'm staggered by your remarks. And yet this is an in-depth analysis, based, among other things, on statements made by Ms. LeBlanc after accidents had occurred.
You deny the finding that such a culture exists at CN, which is tantamount to saying that things won't change. You'll try to change the safety management system, but you'll continue using the stick method rather than show some openness toward employees.
I would really like you to present things to me in a different light.