Transport Committee on March 31st, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you and good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, meeting number 10.

Pursuant to the order of reference of Wednesday, February 25, 2009, we are dealing with Bill C-3, an act to amend the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.

Joining us today as witnesses in the first hour are Mr. William Adams, Professor Émilien Pelletier, and Chester Reimer. Welcome, and thank you.

Joining us from the University of Calgary is Robert Huebert. Mr. Huebert, because we don't have your notes, I would just ask that when you're making your presentation you speak slowly to give our interpreters a fair chance.

[Dr. Robert Huebert, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary]

Okay.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

All right. Thank you.

Basically, the formal routine is presentations and then questions from the members at the table. I don't know if there's an order or if you guys have had any discussion.

Mr. Adams, do you want to start us off?

[William Adams, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Good afternoon, members of the committee and others.

I'd like to thank the committee for offering me this opportunity to present this brief concerning Bill C-3 and to support the passage of Bill C-3. I think it will have a very important influence on how Canada handles environmental issues in the Arctic in the years to come.

In the 1970s, as a research scientist with Environment Canada I was involved in the series of studies called the Beaufort Sea project, which included extensive research on the potential impact of oil pollution in the Arctic. It seems that again, almost 40 years later, there is a high probability that greatly increased oil and gas exploration will be undertaken in the high Arctic. There is also an increase in shipping due to reduced ice cover, so it appears there is a growing probability of a major oil spill or even of an oil or gas blowout occurring, which would release oil into this Arctic ice and water regime.

I would like to offer a short summary of these very important earlier Canadian studies.

In July 1973, cabinet granted approval in principle for exploratory drilling using drill ships in the Beaufort Sea. However, the drilling authority was subject to two riders in the cabinet decision. These were that the actual drilling would not take place before the summer of 1976, and that the authority would be issued conditionally on constraints that would be determined by the Beaufort Sea project, which was the name given to the group of studies from which the assessment would be made.

A unique feature of this project was its joint government and petroleum industry nature, whereby industry contributed $4.1 million--in 1970 dollars--to support the Beaufort Sea project. By the time the project was completed in late 1976, the total cost was estimated at $12 million.

Included in the project were studies on wildlife, marine life, oceanography, meteorology, sea ice, and oil spill countermeasures. These studies provided ecological baselines for a better understanding of the physical and biological environments and the knowledge related to the consequences of a possible oil spill and methods of oil spill cleanup in ice-infested waters.

Reports on these studies--some 45 detailed technical reports--were published. As well as this technical report series, the reports have been synthesized into six books, which appeared somewhat later. This is an example of one of the books that appeared in the early 1980s. These are very good resources on this massive undertaking.

This particular report was not an impact statement. Its purpose was to present information, not arguments for or against the development of petroleum or other resources in the Arctic. That is, I think, important. It was a baseline study, and it's been a critical Canadian contribution to this very important area of Arctic oil resource exploitation.

The studies undertaken on oil spill countermeasures were the ones that I took part in as an expert on the air, ice, and water interface and what happens to oil when it's released into this regime. We were concerned about the impact of oil on the melting of sea ice in the spring, as well as on the organisms living in, under, and within the ice.

Another major area of concern, which is very interesting in the present day, when we're talking about climate change, was related to the impact of oil on the reflectivity of the ice--in other words, on the albedo of the oil-contaminated sea ice. The concern was whether oil-polluted sea ice from a major blowout could impact the climate by influencing the degree of ice cover from year to year.

The field experiments were conducted by releasing hot crude oil under the two-metre-thick ice in mid-winter near Cape Parry. I can tell the committee from my own experience that should a well blowout occur or a ship release oil under the conditions found in the ice-covered Arctic Ocean, there are very few options even now for the cleanup of such a major environmental disaster.

I've come before the committee to urge them to consider the need for additional and sustainable funding to extend our knowledge of the impact of oil spills and oil cleanup methods in ice-covered waters. It's my great disappointment that after the tremendous efforts by Canada and industry in the 1970s, this excellent work by many diverse scientists across the Arctic in the Beaufort Sea project was not vigorously continued in the following years.

I would also like to suggest that, as in the case of the Beaufort Sea project that was co-funded by the petroleum industry and the federal government, a new long-term project of Arctic research on the impact of oil on sea ice should be undertaken. We now obtain significant data from satellites, including from our own Radarsat system, and more capabilities are being planned. But ground truth is often lacking with regard to sea ice, especially with regard to tracking where the oil goes once it's released into the ice environment.

Finally, I would like to make the point that extending Canadian jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles offshore greatly increases the area requiring monitoring and will greatly increase the cost and difficulty of any remedial action in the case of oil spills.

I am presently chair of the Defence Science Advisory Board that reports to the deputy minister and the Chief of Defence Staff, and we are currently working on a study, sponsored by DND, on infrastructure requirements for increased activity by the Canadian Forces in the Arctic. In fact, we are meeting today, just across the street.

We are also looking at an all-of-government approach, and we are trying to assess the potential for collaborative infrastructure initiatives with the northern communities. I suggest that in the case of environmental disasters in the Arctic, an all-of-government approach will be essential.

Therefore, I hope that Bill C-3 will be just the beginning of a series of actions by the federal government to increase Canadian Arctic research efforts in the critical area of sea ice and oil interactions. If future economic developments occur in the Arctic as projected, then I believe this money would be very well spent.

I have three recommendations. First, provide additional and sustainable funding to extend our knowledge of the impact of oil spills and oil cleanup methods in ice-covered waters. Second, such a new long-term project of Arctic research on the impact of oil on sea ice should be co-funded by the petroleum industry and the federal government. Third is that a proposed Arctic research program such as this should be an all-of-government initiative and must include the residents of the Arctic.

I'd like to thank the committee again for their attention to my brief, and I'm willing to entertain any questions.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

We'll go to Monsieur Pelletier.

[Émilien Pelletier, Professor, Institut des sciences de la mer de Rimouski, Université du Québec à Rimouski]

I would first like to thank the committee for kindly inviting me to appear today.

The Arctic environment is extremely important. We have long known that it is a fragile environment, as is evident from programs such as AMOP that have been mentioned and the many studies carried out at the other end of the world, in the Arctic.

We acquired our experience as chemists and toxicologists largely by studying environmental problems in the Antarctic. That is why we have some knowledge of how hydrocarbons behave in the soils, sediments and waters of the Antarctic. Obviously, the environment there is very similar to the Arctic environment.

It is hard to imagine a major spill of 5,000 tonnes or more of crude oil or refined hydrocarbons in Canada's Arctic waters, including the extended zone proposed by Bill C-3. Weather conditions in the whole southern part of these waters up to the M'Clure Strait, with the Beaufort Sea to the west and the Baffin Sea to the east, are increasingly like the conditions in Prince William Sound, where the Exxon Valdez accident occurred. It is reasonable to think that if an accident were to occur in the summer, when there is no ice along the coast, thousands of kilometres of shoreline would be severely contaminated, depending on the location and the prevailing atmospheric conditions in the days following the accident.

Given the area's immense size, low population density and relative inaccessibility, it is unlikely that a rescue and mitigation plan could be implemented within a few days. In cold water, after just 48 to 56 hours, oil turns into a sort of pudding that is difficult to pick up. It then becomes impossible to recover. We believe that the consequences of a spill in the southern zone would be devastating and almost unimaginable. The same is true of the northern zone, where there is a lot of ice. It is virtually impossible to recover oil through and under the ice.

In summary, I would like to make a number of recommendations that I believe could help not only protect the Arctic environment, but also, I hope, support Canada's sovereignty in its Arctic waters and the extended zone proposed by Bill C-3.

We feel that this bill is a small step forward, but an absolutely essential first step. We believe that, as soon as possible, Canada must acquire vessels to enforce its environmental legislation. The environmental impact of an oil spill in Arctic waters is such that Canada must adopt an approach that calls for absolute or extreme protection of its Arctic waters. To develop such an approach, Canada must take the initiative of organizing an international conference to negotiate a protocol to protect Arctic environments and ecosystems.

The protocol could be modelled, for example, on the Madrid Protocol, which protects the Antarctic waters. To protect certain especially fragile marine areas, Canada must develop an environmental zoning plan that identifies restricted zones or sectors where no access for tourism, commercial or industrial purposes is allowed. Lastly, federal departments and agencies should work together to protect the Arctic environment through a formal structure created for that specific purpose, rather than through interdepartmental committees, which are often heavy and too likely to lead to jurisdictional disputes.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Merci.

Mr. Reimer.

[Chester Reimer, Senior Strategic Advisor, Inuit Circumpolar Council]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the committee members for giving me the opportunity to appear.

Mr. Chair, your very helpful staff suggested that we keep our comments to five or ten minutes.

I had asked the chair if I played hockey with him way back in my teenage years in Manitoba. He said no, we probably didn't, but we should maybe talk later. I played for the Selkirk Steelers, and we were really lenient with him.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the invitation to appear here.

I am appearing here on behalf of Duane Smith, the president of the Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada office, who sends his regrets from Inuvik, in the Beaufort Sea area. He would definitely be willing to respond to any questions that you may have shortly after this intervention on my behalf.

I'm an adviser to the ICC, not only here, but also in Greenland, Canada, and Russia. He asked me to stress the fact that the Inuit don't only live in Canada. Some of the concerns we're presenting here are also the concerns of the one people living across four countries, from Greenland right to Russia.

Let me begin by saying that ICC Canada welcomes the general intent of Bill C-3, which is to protect the Arctic environment. There will be several recommendations that you'll find embedded in my intervention. But as Mr. Adams said in one of his recommendations, it's important to involve the residents of the Arctic.

I would add that it's especially important to involve the Inuit, given the land claim settlements and obligations and the international commitments that the Canadian government has, not only in the implementation and in giving us the opportunity to speak here, but if the bill is passed, in analyzing it and monitoring it to see how it works in the future.

One year ago, as part of an Arctic Council project under the Arctic marine shipping assessment, ICC Canada interviewed Inuit hunters and elders from numerous communities across the Canadian Arctic. In a sense, for some of you who know of the 1970s land use and occupancy studies, these were comprehensive studies that were done across the then-called Northwest Territories and parts of Labrador, which laid the foundation for a lot of things, including the land claim settlements. There were a lot of interviews then. We and the ICC updated those interviews.

We found that despite the effects of climate change and changes that occurred in the Inuit communities within the past years, the Inuit continue to rely heavily on a traditional diet. Some call it “country food”. The diet in large part consists of sea mammals and fish, as you are well aware. This traditional diet is based on extensive travel over sea and ice in order to harvest the resources required for subsistence. We'd be happy to supply our report, which is entitled “The Sea Ice is Our Highway”, to those who want it.

Inuit continue to rely heavily on the subsistence economy because it is central to who they are as a people. As you know, the store-bought food that ends up in many parts of the Arctic has leap-frogged through airports along the way and a freeze-thaw cycle. The cash that's required and the nutritional value are often not that great when it gets there.

At its core, Inuit life in Canada and across the circumpolar Arctic is connected to what we still call the pristine Arctic ecosystem. As you know, it's perhaps the most fragile ecosystem on the planet. Therefore, any effort to protect the Arctic ecosystem, as this bill intends to do, is a step in the right direction.

As the committee considers this bill to enlarge the area defined as Arctic waters, at the same time, ICC urges you to strengthen the regulations that are enforced within Canada's Arctic waters. ICC Canada also urges the Government of Canada to apply more stringent pollution prevention standards prior to approving any further resource exploitation and development under the current national and international standards, which the Inuit consider to be highly inadequate.

As Mr. Adams said earlier, because there is currently no way to properly clean up pollution in the Arctic waters, the penalties for pollution must be high. There should also be a lot of cooperation with the local people on identifying spots where pollution may be especially problematic for the community. We also have to convince the exploration and development companies that they cannot afford to be careless or allow for any mistakes.

ICC Canada urges the Department of Transport, together with other departments responsible for environmental protection and economic development in the Arctic, to take a coordinated approach, and to do this in cooperation with Inuit in order to ensure the highest possible standards of environmental protection.

Finally, Mr. Chair, we also urge the government to look at all matters in the Arctic from a position of circumpolar and international cooperation, and this bill should do the same. ICC is itself a model in this regard, as Inuit got together in 1977 across what they sometimes look at as artificial boundaries back in Alaska, when they were facing the oil companies moving up and coming in without consultation. That's what happened. Again, I keep referring to Mr. Adams, but he talked about the Beaufort Sea project as well. It's important to include the federal government and the petroleum industry, but if you include the Inuit people, you will also have greater success.

I'd like to take that a step further, though, to make sure we look at the international cooperation that the Canadian government is part of. As all of you know, the Arctic Council is another model that doesn't only include Inuit, but also states. Then there are other international instruments that provide guidance in developing and monitoring this bill.

Arctic sovereignty is a hot topic these days. ICC Canada would caution that the focus on this bill should be on environmental protection, yet it should be located in the larger discussion of international cooperation, sovereignty talks, and the like, which are taking place beyond this bill. These include rights of free, prior, and informed consent of Inuit.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you very much.

We'll now go out to Calgary and welcome Robert Huebert.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Thank you very much. I almost feel like there's a little bit of an old Manitoba mafia here, finding out you're from Selkirk and Brandon, being a good Birds Hill boy myself.

In the context of my comments overall, I have four comments in regard to the bill. But let me begin, first of all, by clearly expressing my support. This is an action that we've needed to take for a long time. I'm very happy to see that it is being brought forward, and particularly in conjunction with the mandatory element of the NORDREG reporting aspect. This is something that is of critical importance to our sovereignty concerns in the Arctic and our environmental protection of the Arctic. Having said that, I have four comments that I want to focus on. They deal with the institutions of the protection of our sovereignty, the enforcement that we need for our sovereignty, the surveillance that will flow from this particular act, and, lastly, the diplomatic effort that in my view will be necessary.

Now let me start talking about institutions. As several of the preceding speakers have made clear, Arctic sovereignty is indeed a hot topic, but it has of course been an issue that has been with us since the 1940s, picking up steam in the late 1960s and into 1970s. One of the things I think this bill illustrates is that we need better institutional formats to coordinate our overall Arctic policy. If we look at the history leading up to the creation of this law, we've already had two periods of time that in my view were lost opportunities when we could have strengthened our claims of Arctic sovereignty even more so. Both the Conservative and Liberal preceding governments have missed opportunities, and once again it comes back to the fact that I don't think we have the proper institutional oversight that addresses it as a pan-Canadian issue.

In 1986 the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney brought in the very strong act closing the Arctic with straight base lines. In my view, and in the view of others, there was the opportunity to have extended the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act at that point. Then in 1996, under the government of Jean Chrétien, the Canada Oceans Act was brought forward. Once again we did not see people quite thinking of extending the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. I don't offer these comments as criticisms, but rather to suggest that as a result of the lack of an overall pan-Canadian bipartisan approach to the needs of Arctic sovereignty we often have found ourselves historically creating legislation such as Bill C-3 that is absolutely necessary but something that probably should have been and could have been done at least 20 years earlier.

Moving on to the bill itself, there are three major follow-throughs that absolutely have to be monitored and prepared for. The first one is the diplomatic requirement. There will, in all probability, be push-back from both the Americans and the Europeans. The Americans, in January this year, released an Arctic policy where they clearly stated that they view the Northwest Passage as an international strait, and ultimately, when push comes to shove, what we are doing with this act and it do not fit together. By the same token, in the fall of 2008 the European Commission issued a policy paper that also restated their position that the Northwest Passage is an international strait.

Now, we have, on the other hand, the fact that the Russian government is about to release a law very similar to what Bill C-3 is actually doing. We do have a country, Russia in this particular instance, that in fact is very much copying our efforts to increase our control of Arctic shipping. What this ultimately means, in my view, is that we need to launch a diplomatic effort to address those countries that may see this particular act as confrontational to their particular policies. I think it's necessary to push the environmental side to make it clear that perhaps under article 234 of the Law of the Sea we are in fact not going against their interests in this context. But that requires a very strong diplomatic effort.

We also should be looking, with our Russian neighbours, to coordinate the policy so that the world does not necessarily see this as a land grab, as it may be portrayed, but rather as proper environmental stewardship.

The two other aspects I'd just like to briefly touch on, which I note that some of the other commenters have raised already, are the issues of surveillance and enforcement. There is no question in my mind that this act, as necessary as it is, will require significantly more surveillance capabilities.

Once again, the coordination, I would argue, needs to be strengthened. When we're getting ready to put in such things as Radarsat-2, we may be looking at ways of having ship identification systems. There is already comment about the DND project to improve our surveillance, specifically Northern Watch. It is imperative when we have this type of legislation coming forward that efforts such as Northern Watch be strengthened and actually applied.

The last issue I'd like to raise is enforcement. I've taken the time to go through the Hansard comments in terms of the speeches made when this bill was introduced and also to see the comments of some of the other witnesses. I think the one theme the committee is probably very aware of is that if we are indeed serious about this legislation, we do need to be prepared to ensure that everybody is in fact following it. Also, when we indeed do face a country, company, or ship that may wish to challenge this particular legislation, we need to have the ability to ensure that the particular actor follows our legislation. That requires an enforcement capability that at this point in time we probably do not have in full.

We see this among the Russians, the Norwegians, and the Danes. In fact, they are thinking very similarly in terms of improving their enforcement. The promise of the Arctic offshore patrol vessels and the new large icebreaker will all be essential. I suspect we will find that when shipping comes forward, we will need even more than those particular infrastructures.

Ultimately, we need a pan-Canadian approach to ensure that we are we are taking action such as Bill C-3 in a timely fashion. We need to prepare for the diplomatic push-back that will be coming. We need to improve our surveillance and enforcement.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Volpe.

Just for the committee's sake, I know that Mr. Volpe has an issue at the end of this hour, so I am going to keep this tight to the seven minutes.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The point I wanted to raise at the end of the hour is really one that has been raised by every one of the witnesses. I'm torn between supporting the bill, as all witnesses have said they want to, and looking closely at how the bill is going to actually be implemented. Mr. Huebert talked about an environmental bill. This is a transport bill. Those of us on this side of the table are looking for some sense of accountability. That accountability has to be shouldered by at least one representative of the government.

Last week I read in Hansard that a representative from INAC suggested that the minister responsible for INAC is the one in charge of what will happen in this area. Recently, we had the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence issue statements that suggest they are going to take the measures necessary to do what Mr. Huebert, Mr. Pelletier, Mr. Reimer, and Mr. Adams have proposed in respect of the question of surveillance and enforcement. Every one of you has said, directly or indirectly, that we need more diplomatic efforts in order to impose our will in an area that's already being contested.

One of the issues not raised in this bill is how much it will cost to conduct this surveillance and ensure enforcement. I'm wondering whether any of you are prepared to say what that amount will be. Will it be the cost of icebreakers, patrol boats, cruisers? I don't want to say Dash-8s, because I suspect that they probably wouldn't be sufficient in monitoring a territory the size of Manitoba. I'm wondering, Mr. Reimer and Mr. Huebert, in particular, what you think would be required to have sufficient enforcement and surveillance.

[Chester Reimer]

You're asking for an actual figure, and I didn't come prepared to answer that question. I would say to take a look at the budget of the Inuit Rangers. They are already helping Canada monitor the north. That could be a starting point for what the Inuit could contribute. The Inuit would like to have adequate funding to help Canada monitor and train. There could be funds for training that the Inuit would welcome. This could be used in a partnership manner. But I can't give you any exact figures.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Both Mr. Adams and Mr. Pelletier talked about the environmental and economic impact. They addressed the environmental impact of increased economic activity, commerce going back and forth through the passage.

Nobody mentioned the Chinese, although they're the biggest exporters of product in the world. Monsieur Pelletier's brief points out that for the Chinese there is a 7,000 kilometre gain to be had by using the Northwest Passage to get from Shanghai to New Jersey. Others have suggested that there is a net benefit of an additional 4,000 kilometres, going from Shanghai to the European market. That would tell me that the Chinese would be a major factor. Apparently, they are already better equipped than we are to patrol or lead their ships through.

Last week one of my colleagues, maybe Monsieur Laframboise or Monsieur Gaudet, asked for an indication of how many vessels are actually in those waters today. If we can't keep track of them today, what are we going to do when they actually start coming in numbers that we won't be able to control?

I don't know whether Mr. Adams or Monsieur Pelletier has thought that one through.

[Émilien Pelletier]

First, concerning vessels such as icebreakers, Canada is certainly not able to navigate all of its own internal waters at present because it does not have icebreakers that are large enough and powerful enough to, for example, follow the dividing line that Bill C-3 will draw in the north. That line runs nearly as far north as the polar ice cap, where the ice is so thick that none of our icebreakers can get through it, at least not in winter. They might be able to get through some if it in summer.

Therefore, Canada will certainly have to think about a large icebreaker that will cost hundreds of millions of dollars. I do not have any exact figures, but we are talking about quite a lot of money.

But how can we exercise our sovereignty over an area we cannot even get to ourselves? It makes no sense if we cannot even get around our own territory. Sovereignty and the environment are closely linked. As a result, we need vessels, first to operate the Northwest Passage and keep it open, once we decide it is open. Then, we have to be able to get around our territory, which will obviously cost hundreds of millions of dollars.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Mr. Adams, would you like a brief comment, or would anyone else?

[William Adams]

I'd like to make a brief comment on the surveillance issue.

We're actually tasked at the Defence Science Advisory Board right now to look at the all-of-government issues associated with Arctic surveillance or Canadian surveillance. I believe there are committees in place now among the different government departments that have an interest in knowing what's going on throughout Canada. The environment department is one, as are the coast guard and DND, of course.

I believe that what is emerging is a rather complex and layered surveillance system that will involve satellites, unmanned vehicles, manned aircraft patrolling, and a response capability. This is actually being planned out now, and the assets are in some cases already being procured. The required infrastructure is in the planning stage and should probably be in place within the next three or four years.

I think that in some ways the issue is more related to how one cleans up an environmental disaster, should it occur, than to how one locates it. If you can't locate it, obviously you can't even start. As well, we have to think about what we're going to do when we find a problem. What we're already doing is, I think, along the right tracks, though, in terms of surveillance.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Go ahead, Monsieur Laframboise.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My question is for you, Mr. Pelletier.

You would like to see an international protocol to protect the environment and ecosystems. You would like Canada to take the lead on this, because it is the country with the most to lose because it has so much shoreline. How do you see that?

[Émilien Pelletier]

Canada should really take the initiative on an international protocol. In my opinion, it is the only country that can take the initiative, because it is directly affected when the European Union, Asian countries and the United States use the Northwest Passage.

If Canada wants to defend its sovereignty in that passage, if it wants to protect its environment up to 200 nautical miles, as Bill C-3 proposes, then an international protocol to protect the environment is absolutely essential. This sort of protocol already exists to protect the Antarctic. It was negotiated at length and ratified. The Madrid Protocol protects the Antarctic ecosystems extremely effectively, and nearly all the countries in the world signed this protocol, after much hesitating and lengthy negotiations. If there is a protocol to protect the Antarctic that is called the Madrid Protocol, why could there not be a protocol to protect the Arctic that would be known as the Ottawa Protocol or something like that.

I do not see what country other than Canada could take the lead on this, because Canada is the country that would suffer the most in the event of an oil spill. As the other witnesses mentioned, an oil spill is hard to imagine, just as a nuclear accident is hard to imagine, and so we must do everything we can to prevent it from happening.

We have to find ways to prevent a major spill from happening, because we do not have the means to protect ourselves or clean up after such a spill.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

My next question is for Mr. Huebert.

Obviously, it would be ideal to have an agreement on environmental protection and ecosystems, but you, Mr. Huebert, seem to be saying that other more political negotiations have to take place with the Russians, the Americans...

Am I correct in saying that we are far from ready to discuss an environmental protocol, because other more complicated situations are arising at the international level?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Unfortunately, you're absolutely right. If you look back to the history of the creation of the Arctic Council, which was a Canadian initiative, our hope was that we could create the council as a means of having a political body that would deal with all these issues on a circumpolar basis. The focus was environmental protection. This was very specific. Because of the Americans' concern in terms of their disagreements with us and their disagreements with the Russians, at the time, on the Bering Strait, which continues to be a boundary issue for them, the Americans refused to participate on anything that would give political power to creating the type of cooperative effort that we were going to be seeing.

We're now having new actors. One of your colleagues made reference to China. The Chinese recently have made several statements that they see the Arctic as a common heritage, and in fact, they are starting to give signs that they will, in fact, be taking the American and European position on the status of the Northwest Passage.

We talk about the requirement for surveillance. Another issue that no one has brought up is that we also have to have surveillance of where the industry, particularly the shipping industry, is now going. Most Canadians will be very surprised to find out that it is the South Koreans, Samsung and Daewoo in particular, that have become the world leaders in commercial vessels in Arctic waters. We need to ensure that we are also negotiating with these countries so that as they are building both the oil and liquefied natural gas carriers that are being designed for Arctic operation, they are, in fact, building them to standards that fit our requirements. This is also a means of forward surveillance, in my view.

We are doing what is necessary with the passage of this law, but I think the committee needs to be very aware that we will be creating a series of political issues. Hopefully they can be kept relatively low key, but my suspicions are that we probably will not be able to contain each and every one of them. But we should be prepared and not let that veer us from this course.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

My next question is for Mr. Adams.

You seem to be saying that we need money and resources to conduct research and consolidate all this work.

[William Adams]

Yes, the Beaufort Sea project cost $12 million and took a couple of years. I believe that efforts, in 2009 dollars, of the same order of magnitude have to be undertaken. But even more important, I think there has to be a commitment to long-term support of some level of effort, which can lead to real results.

I mean, there are a number of meetings that have taken place, some of them regularly, every year, on oil pollution and so on. But what I see in reviewing the documentation, since I actively worked in this field, is that there are really no solutions except burning, and burning has to be done very quickly or else the oil is in a state that you can't burn, and then it just enters the environment. So I think we do need to have that level of research activity, and I believe that it should be co-funded by industry, probably, like the Beaufort Sea project.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

My last question is for Mr. Reimer.

Surveillance seems to be important. Do we need equipment? What do we have to do to guarantee overall security?