Mr. Bevington, you're right: the basic fundamentals of risk management. We find that what the airline experience has been, especially since September 11, is that emergency rules and emergency orders that are written in the heat of the moment wind up becoming national policy, and that winds up becoming the worst security policy.
So we think there's an order that needs to be taken when you look at emergency response. The first is that you do your preplanning. You do your government-to-government coordination. You do your intra-government coordination. And you plan for these bad things to happen, because they will happen again.
So after you do that and get that coordination in place, get your game plans in place, then what you need to do is work with your intelligence agencies to identify the threat. After the threat is over, after you know there are no more conspirators out there, and after you know there are no more devices, I think you have to draw down, and you have to analyze what has just happened. Then, if you need to make long-term changes, you have to do that.
Frankly, many governments that IATA has seen don't take that second step. We have layer after layer after layer of security that has been put onto the industry right now, and quite frankly, there's overlap, there's duplication, and there are a lot of security measures that probably aren't relevant anymore.
So we would ask Transport Canada and we would ask CATSA, and we would propose to other governments, to please stop and take a look at what they're doing and understand that a short-term emergency requires a short-term response, not long-term policies.