Transport Committee on March 1st, 2011

[Joram Bobasch]

May I answer, Mr. Chairman? We will keep order.

I read through the remarks of Dr. Salter and Rafi Sela, and I believe there is a little bit of a confusion in the understanding of the system, which is the risk-based assessment on what happens in Israeli airports versus other airports.

In Israel the risk assessment by the authorities is basically very simple. One fact is that Tel Aviv has 11 million passengers. You know how many you have in Pearson, so the number of passengers to deal with is completely different. Out of those 11 million, any passenger who is Jewish, serves in the Israeli Army, and has been there represents less of a threat than the others.

So the first step or the first action of their conduct is to verify. Are you one of those? Are you okay? Because if you are okay, they don't need to waste time on you. They need to waste time on the guy with the kaffiyeh on his head and so on and so on, because this is the riskier group. If they have a group of tourists on a bus, they say, “Let's verify that these are very positively oriented tourists and they did not go to visit the Palestinian Authority in order to support the training of the bad guys”.

This is exactly the process that happened to you. The assumption that a member of Parliament in Canada is responsible, with a group of honest-looking people, is a very positive understanding. The process that happened is that they said, “Okay, let's concentrate on the rest”.

[Brian Jean, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Athabasca, AB]

And that's my question. In Canada we have RCMP officers, obviously, who carry weapons, and they can wander the streets with weapons, and yet when they get to an airport they go through the first primary screening, the secondary screening...they go through everything that everybody else does.

How do we exclude those people? What would your recommendations be to the Government of Canada to exclude people, to work on productivity and efficiency, and at the same time at least maintain that level of security and make sure that the people in that area believe they're secure?

[Joram Bobasch]

It's a political decision, not a service-provider decision. If an RCMP officer has been 30 years with the force and is capable of doing everything and is very loyal to the Canadian flag, and if you decide that he is like that, you give the instruction to the authority, to the regulator. You would say, “We would exclude those people because we believe in their integrity in the Canadian society”.

I was a good soldier;I know how to salute. Just give me the instruction and I will do the compliance. It is your decision. You had the wonderful example of NEXUS. NEXUS is an example of this: “Let's verify that you are who you say you are in order to exclude you from the waiting lines, because we don't need to verify that you are good”.

[Brian Jean, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Athabasca, AB]

Israel, I understand, has a test they apply every year. It's just a self-done test in a computer kiosk. They ask 10 or 20 questions. That's my understanding. Would that be a recommendation as well? To continue monitoring those individuals on a yearly basis...? Obviously we have other cases where there have been military officers, for instance, in the United States, who have caused terrorist activities. So it's not that it can be an exclusive group once you're within that group; you have to continue to monitor those people. Isn't that fair?

[Joram Bobasch]

There are two things. First of all, I think the American officers who did killing are individuals that are extraordinary. You cannot say there is a group of people who are officers and let's identify them as individuals so that we could put them under a group--

[Brian Jean, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Athabasca, AB]

So no matter what happens, you can't eliminate that risk completely. That's what you're saying, because--

[Joram Bobasch]

There is no 100% security or 100% risk mitigation anyhow. On the other hand, what Israel developed is similar to the NEXUS card for Israeli citizens entering and leaving the country and bypassing the lines of the border control—these are the lines that you have in the entry—with a fingerprint identification.

The verification is not a 10-question questionnaire; it is actually the renewing of the passport. It goes under the assumption that the administration would allocate and integrate the required information, saying that if you reapply for a passport and you have been behaving badly in between, then we will not authorize you with the easier way to bypass the lines. But this is again increasing the level of service. The moment you have positively identified somebody, he doesn't have to stay in line in order to meet an officer who verifies the same again.

[Brian Jean, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Athabasca, AB]

Israel also, I understand, has behavioural analysis teams. They train their people in relation to that, so when you get to the airport, if you're sweating or you do something silly, they'll put you in a secondary screening line and give you a little extra attention.

[Joram Bobasch]

I have to make a statement, Mr. Chair. I'm not a representative of the Israeli security regime. I'm an executive director in a privately held company.

[Brian Jean, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Athabasca, AB]

I understand that, sir. It's just that we have world practices to look at and to understand.

[Joram Bobasch]

You're referring to the behavioural recognition that exists not only in Israel but also in other countries around the world. Actually, it is a very logical and typical way to do it. If you see somebody sweating, it could be a result of his outrage about whatever, or it could be that it's warm. You want to identify it. In Israel it's very warm all the time. Why is he sweating? Is it the air conditioning or that he's very thrilled with the idea of flying? The same thing applies to any customs controls or any extraordinary situation.

ICTS has been serving American carriers for almost quarter of a century by doing similar observations—I know there is a “p” word I shouldn't use—on all the American carriers' flights from Europe to the United States. One of those observations led to our flagging the shoe bomber.

Do you remember Richard Reid in December 2001? Richard Reid, from his appearance, was looking a little weird. He came with a very small rucksack for a flight from Paris to the States. He was holding a British passport. While being questioned by an ICTS employee and asked why he was using France as an embarkation point, he gave the answer that he used the probability of buying a cheaper ticket.

The reason he was asked was that he was the holder of a British passport. Normally, with all due respect to the love of those two countries in Europe, those who do not speak French do not come and fly from France. I'm trying to be politically correct, as I'm not a politician. He raised the suspicion that he was lying, especially through his appearance, and he was not sweating.

The young lady took the guy to the French authorities, to the gendarmerie, to verify if the British passport he was holding was a genuine passport or a forged passport. As I told you, we're catching a lot of forgeries in Europe. In the time it took the French police to verify the identity and existence of this passport, the flight left. The airline, our client, was very upset that we had kept a passenger who was obviously a holder of a British passport and they rebooked him on the next day's flight.

This was the luck of the story. He got a ticket for the next day's flight and a voucher for the airport hotel. He walked over to the hotel and stayed there. Overnight it rained. When he walked in the next morning on the wet floor at the airport, his soles soaked up water. The procedure with the same lady happened again. He was verified. His passport was checked. We gave the recommendation to the airline not to take him as a passenger because we had a bad feeling, but they made a commercial decision to take the passenger. Due to the fact that his soles were wet, he was unable to set off the bomb. It was luck.

This is the outcome of such a process. Not always are such processes right. Not always do such processes end in success. Not always do you get those wonderful results, but if such a process didn't happen, we would be in a different position.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Mr. Byrne.

[Gerry Byrne, Liberal, Humber—St. Barbe—Baie Verte, NL]

ICTS Europe is a company that, if you look at it in its magnitude, is approximately twice the size of the entire department of Transport Canada and it's almost a little better than half the size of the entire Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It's a sizable operation, with operations all over.

I'm curious how you categorize it. It answers to shareholders. You've entered the Canadian market, preliminarily in Burlington. I understand you have a subsidiary in Burlington. I'm assuming that as a private enterprise with expansion interests you have used that sizable force you have to analyze the Canadian security system, in an effort, I would assume, to increase your business profile within Canada. Is that a fair statement to make?

[Joram Bobasch]

It is a fair statement to make, but the Canadian market presents an interesting market.

[Gerry Byrne, Liberal, Humber—St. Barbe—Baie Verte, NL]

Based on the analysis you've done of the Canadian system, in looking to seek business in the Canadian market, do you have any perspective to offer this committee on what the Canadian system is doing inefficiently or ineffectively that your company would be better able to provide?

[Joram Bobasch]

I would divide my answer into two.

As I said before, I believe the Canadian market is undergoing a process that we saw starting in Europe 20 years ago. The reason that it started here was an event that nobody wanted to happen, but sometimes those kinds of events happen and a response is not planned. So you have the recovery phase, which takes several years. Then you have the phase that you're in now, in which you see what you did and how you can do it better.

During the last quarter of a century in Europe, we have gained a lot of experience in managing operational compliance. We have learned to work together with the regulators and to add value in commerce through better service or a better perception of service. In these areas, the Canadian market still has potential in comparison with what we've seen in Europe.

The compliance level stated by the regulator is something that changes on a daily basis, like the policy on liquids and gels, which came into effect overnight, or the decision on February 3 to allow or not to allow additional items on airplanes. It has to be implemented overnight. I believe that ICTS's experience in managing this kind of compliance allows us to say that we have something to contribute on that level by creating or adding value in service.

[Gerry Byrne, Liberal, Humber—St. Barbe—Baie Verte, NL]

What I'm hearing is that you really do not have any advice to give us on improving regulations or the regulatory environment. You are basically a service provider and you do as you are asked, so there is no information that you can provide on how the Canadian regulatory system can be improved.

So what I'll ask now is about the commercial interface. This is a complex, security-based system that's based on intelligence and the garnering of intelligence at airports, on site, and at times off site as well. I want to take the example you just used about the shoe bomber. Why didn't that airline, which is your client, accept your advice?

[Joram Bobasch]

Allow me to give you one remark on the role of the service provider. We are not a regulator. We are not political decision-makers. That is your role. We might have an opinion if we're asked whether we think doing this or that is better or worse. But it's only our opinion. We do not instruct. We receive instructions.

[Gerry Byrne, Liberal, Humber—St. Barbe—Baie Verte, NL]

With all due respect, that's what I've asked you. Do you have an opinion on how the Canadian regulatory system can improve? You did not take advantage of that question to answer and provide us with any opinion. So I'm assuming that you don't have an opinion on the Canadian regulatory system.

[Joram Bobasch]

My basic response would be that it is good that you have a system that has succeeded in harmonizing all the processes of the past. There is a need for a continuous effort to increase the level of verification so that the risk continues to be mitigated with proper protocols. But this is not our role. This is a general remark.

[Gerry Byrne, Liberal, Humber—St. Barbe—Baie Verte, NL]

To get to the question at hand, then, why didn't your client accept the advice of your company when you suggested that the shoe bomber should not be allowed on the flight?

[Joram Bobasch]

I cannot speak for my client, but I can assume that they decided to make this commercial decision to not lose passenger revenue and to take the risk because they got the verification from the French border authorities that the guy was indeed who he was presenting himself to be, which was right. What Richard Reid did was analyze. He did a risk assessment. At that point, after September 11 but before the new legislation, shoes were not taken off and were not screened, apart from the normal screening. He had his bomb installed in his shoe in such a way that he knew that according to the then existing security protocols it would not be found.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Monsieur Gaudet.

[Roger Gaudet, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Could the 9/11 attacks happen again in 2011 with all the security measures we now have?

[Joram Bobasch]

Do you mean could a hijacking like the ones that took place on September 11 happen again?