As I mentioned when I first appeared here on this bill, the first subsection of the clause, without restricting the generality of what follows, sets out what constitutes a service obligation. But courts currently consider that the title covers only the category included in the statements that follow. In the case of this clause, a court of law is going to consider the term “service obligations”, as found in the first paragraph, to be part of the category of the elements listed in paragraphs (a) to (f ), even if it is stated that it should not be limiting.
Clearly, the longer the list—and the case law on this is quite clear—the more the courts tend to think that it must form a similar category, given that Parliament took the time to create the list. Having a long list is a danger in legal terms. This list is quite long. For example, a shipper making a request that does not directly match what is in the list could be told, either by people from the railways or by a court of law, that what he is asking for is not covered by the term “service obligations”, precisely because of the list.
I can see another danger with this list. In paragraph (d), we find a formulation that is universally used elsewhere. It talks about the furnishing of adequate and suitable accommodation for the carriage, unloading and delivering of the traffic. Those terms are used everywhere in the act to refer to the railways' service obligations.
I feel that the legal problem that this provision creates is this. If what is in paragraph (d) is interpreted as a general obligation and what is in paragraphs (a),(b), (c), (e) and (f) is interpreted as a more specific obligation, it is considered that paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) do not include what is otherwise covered by paragraph (d).
If other provisions of the act refer to the overall obligation, a court of law is going to consider that Parliament is not talking for the sake of hearing its own voice and that, if it has put a shade of difference between what is in paragraph (d) and what is in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f), it is because the latter are not reflected in what is listed in paragraph (d). That can cause problems elsewhere in terms of applying the act. I am speaking more specifically about shippers who will transport their goods under the general service obligation set out in section 113 of the act, and not by contract as provided for in those provisions.