Good morning, Mr. Chair, and thank you very much for having me.
For you people who are not from Ottawa, I apologize for our weather.
In light of that terrible tragedy at Lac-Mégantic last July, Transport Canada was taken to task in many quarters regarding its commitment to rail safety in this country. That awful train accident, the worst in the history of our country, took lives, injured others, caused extensive property damage, and basically decimated a proud and vibrant community.
I have been a long-time critic of rail safety in this country, often being severely critical of Transport Canada and the railway companies. There were very serious problems. Between 2003 and 2007, the average number of main-track derailments in this country was 103, or two a week. That did not include the number of non-main track derailments, mainly in yards or terminals. In the year 2007, then Transport Minister Lawrence Cannon stated in the House of Commons that “rail safety in this country has gone down the tube.”
As regulator, Transport Canada, with overall responsibility for railway safety, conducts audits of how a railway company maintains its safety management systems. It does not engage in the inspection of tracks and switches. The companies’ safety responsibilities include day-to-day safety and inspections. However, Lac-Mégantic, Plaster Rock, and other serious rail incidents aside, I sense that there has been a monumental shift, albeit spearheaded by legislation, in how Transport Canada and the industry approach safety, with very encouraging and positive results.
Since 2007, train accidents in this country have decreased by 23%, and passenger train accidents by 19%. In addition, there were 16 main-track derailments for the first quarter of 2012, representing a significant decrease from the 2011 total of 38 and the total five-year average of 34. In addition, from January to March 2012, total accidents by million train miles are 11.33, down from 14.29 in 2011 and the five-year average of 14.3. Why is this happening?
Transport Canada does, indeed, take railway safety very seriously and continues to take action to ensure that rail safety is a high priority. Only a few years ago, the government increased the rail safety directorate’s financial resources by over $72 million in order to enhance railway safety oversight, and an additional 25 inspectors were hired. Additional resources were also assigned to education and awareness, such as the operation lifesaver program, a joint program of the Canada Safety Council, the Railway Association of Canada, and Transport Canada. I won't go into details on this program but it's in my presentation.
Transport Canada also promoted amendments to the Railway Safety Act through Bill S-4, which received royal assent in May, 2012. These amendments will strengthen Transport Canada’s oversight and enforcement powers to ensure compliance with all safety regulations by the railway companies. These important changes can only encourage rail companies to create, maintain, and enhance a culture of safety.
One important category that has also shown significant improvement when it comes to rail freight is the discharge of dangerous goods. Statistics show an ongoing downward trend. The Lac-Mégantic and Plaster Rock incidents aside, most leaks, fortunately, are small. Organizations and individuals attribute this decrease in incidents involving dangerous goods to the proactive stance and leadership over the years by the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Directorate, which falls under the authority of the Minister of Transport.
The TDG General Policy Advisory Council has played and continues to play a large role in this success. This council, which meets twice a year, brings together stakeholders—police, firefighters, industry, including rail, provincial governments, unions, safety interests and others—with very different interests and agendas. But at the end of the day, through consensus and thoughtful discussion, decisions affecting the movement of dangerous goods are made in the best interests of the health and safety of all Canadians.
The next meeting of the council will be held here in Ottawa on May 15. I have represented the Canada Safety Council on that important committee for many, many years. I mention some of the activities here, and I'll bypass them in the interest of time, but they are the objectives or the activities of that directive, and here I think that things are going well.
Regarding SMS and the railway industry, the amendments to the Railway Safety Act in 1999, many years ago, gave railway companies the authority to implement safety management systems, or SMS, defined as a framework for integrating safety into day-to-day railroad operations. SMS includes safety goals and performance targets, risk assessment, responsibilities, rules and procedures, and monitoring and evaluation processes.
With SMS, companies were supposed to identify risks before they became even bigger problems. With SMS, many critics said Transport Canada largely gave up its safety oversight role.
Since its introduction it has been very controversial. The friction it caused between management and employees of railway companies led to an acrimonious work environment, which in and of itself has a very bad effect on safety.
Proponents have long claimed that SMS is not self-regulation or deregulation, and has not fundamentally changed the way the companies operate. Railway company management say that SMS has enhanced both safety and the culture of safety in the industry.
Opponents of SMS claim otherwise. Railway workers feared that allowing the companies to oversee the government’s safety standards and regulations was a conflict of interest. They pointed out that along with SMS came a reduction in the number of inspectors, thereby eroding the authority and function of the regulator. With SMS, spot audits, historically regarded as critical safety checks, came to an end. Workers were also concerned that SMS gave companies the responsibility to evaluate and manage risks, based on the level of risk they were willing to accept. A risk threshold set by the industry may not be as demanding as one set by Transport Canada. The question must be asked, is transferring the determination of risk levels to the industry, in effect, a deregulation of safety?
Concerns have also been expressed that SMS allows companies to regulate themselves, in the process removing the government’s ability to protect Canadians and their environment and making it possible for the industry to hide critical safety information from the government and the public.
I recognize that SMS is not restricted to Canada. But in view of the poor safety record that accompanied its implementation here, going back to 1999, a critical assessment of its impact on rail safety at this time is in order. The government must take firm action with respect to problems, perceived or not, to maximize safety for Canadians and the protection of our precious environment.
In December 2006, then-transport minister Lawrence Cannon set up an advisory panel to review the Railway Safety Act. The panel came up with 50 recommendations to improve rail safety in Canada. The panel’s report recognized that SMS had not resulted in the overall safety improvements that were expected. The panel called for a strong and proactive role for Transport Canada’s rail safety directorate and a strong commitment to funding and staffing.
I understand there is currently a lack of protection for railway workers who report safety violations to Transport Canada. They are not allowed to bypass their company’s SMS. If that company has already accepted the complaint as a tolerable level of risk, nothing can be done, and Transport Canada will never know about it. Whistleblower protection must be incorporated into the Railway Safety Act, and soon.
I'm almost done, Mr. Chair.
Safety is not a frill. The railway companies are a very important industry, and we've all alluded to that. They employ thousands of Canadians from coast to coast and some in the United States. The products they move—agricultural, industrial, commodities, etc.—are an integral and important part of our economy responsible for a large part of our prosperity.
That being said, Canadians must be assured that rail safety is not being compromised in the interest of profits. It is false economy to cut back on safety. Costly, preventable catastrophes happen because potential risks in the system are accepted as normal.
When the space shuttle Columbia was destroyed in February 2003, seven astronauts died. The report on that disaster revealed that it was a result of flawed safety practices. Even after Challenger blew up in 1986, also killing seven astronauts, NASA did not improve its safety systems. The August 2003 Columbia accident investigation report found that managers accepted flaws in the system as normal and frowned on dissent.
I would not like to think this is the kind of atmosphere that has developed and continues to simmer undetected and unknown to the government and the public in some segments of railway companies until one day other unspeakable tragedies, not unlike those in Mississauga in 1977, and Lac-Mégantic last July, occur.
Just one last thing. I think as an ongoing discussion, especially in this city and across the country, the terrible and tragic collision between a VIA train and an OC Transpo bus in Ottawa last September 8, which left six bus passengers dead and 30 injured—many seriously—has raised many concerns about the safety of railway crossings in this country.
Transport Minister Raitt announced recently that under the grade crossing improvement program, Transport Canada would inject over $9.2 million for improvements at over 600 railway crossings across the country. I would hope a large part of this money focuses on public education and enforcement.
Let's put the facts into perspective. As reported by the Canada Safety Council there were 169 rail/highway crossing crashes in this country in 2011. Of those, 25 people were killed and 21 were seriously injured. It is suspected that some of those killed were suicides, very much a mental health issue. A motorist is 40 times more likely to die in a crash involving a train than in a collision involving another motor vehicle. Most collisions occur within 40 clicks of the motorist's home. The principal cause of the level-crossing collisions is a failure of the motorist to stop or exercise due care and caution or to observe and comply with existing laws and regulations. Roughly 50% of all rail/highway crossing crashes occur at crossings equipped with flashing lights, bell or flashing lights, bell or gate, or whatever goes along there.
Many of these collisions can be reduced by driver behaviour combined with enforcement and common sense and at a very modest cost. In the grand scheme of things, should this not be the priority?
Thank you very much.