Transport Committee on Feb. 16th, 2021

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Thank you.

Certainly we are concerned about competition, and of course as Conservatives we always believe in the free market, but we are particularly moved today by the advance news that it looks as though the European Union will not be moving to approve this transaction, and we are concerned that it would be moot at this point.

It's one of the three necessary components for the transaction to go through. If, as we have heard, that the European Union is not going to approve it, then it would seem to us that it is not a good use of time to spend time on something that appears inevitably will not occur. Therefore, we will not be supporting this motion at this time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mrs. Kusie.

Are there any further comments or questions? With none, we'll go to a vote.

(Motion negatived: nays 9; yeas 2 [See Minutes of Proceedings])

Thank you, Mr. Clerk, Mr. Barsalou-Duval and members.

Mr. Barsalou-Duval, you have the floor, and you're at one minute, 34 seconds.

Mrs. Kusie, did you have your hand up?

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Yes, I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

What time will we be going to this evening, so all committee members and witnesses can expect how long we will be here? I'd like to verify, please. I have an adjournment speech, but that's beside the point.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

That's a good question, Mrs. Kusie, and maybe I should have mentioned it at the beginning of the meeting. I apologize.

I'm going to try to get—

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

I could have missed it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

No, you didn't. It's my fault. I should have mentioned it in the first part of the meeting.

My intent is to try to get through all three rounds, and I believe if we get this thing going smoothly and get going with the meeting, we should be done around 6:30, give or take a couple minutes. That's what I'm striving for.

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Mr. Barsalou-Duval, it's all yours.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being so patient.

My first question is for you, Mr. Robinson.

The government claims that the Boeing 737 MAX has become the safest aircraft in the world, given all of the checks and reviews that have been done. Excuse me for being a bit confused, since the Boeing 737 MAX is equipped with MCAS, which is supposed to automatically correct any flight instability resulting from the fact that the aircraft grew so large over the years that it became unstable and no longer functioned as it should have. MCAS works in combination with a hydraulic system that operates the horizontal stabilizer.

Can you tell me which is safer: that system or the fly-by-wire system used in modern aircraft?

[Nicholas Robinson]

Mr. Chair, as to the comment that the aircraft is the safest in the world, I've never mentioned that, nor would I. It undermines the fact that the certification system is based on clear sets of regulations. We ensure that all aircraft meet those regulations and standards, so when you see an aircraft that's certified or validated by Canada, you know it's meeting that standard.

I wouldn't put one aircraft as being at a safer standard than the other. We have a clear bar that needs to be met in Canada, and that's what is met for all our aircraft. I don't know if that came from another source, but that would be our Transport Canada perspective: that all aircraft we certify or validate are safe. They've met our standards, and our standards and regulations are clear.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

Thank you.

It was the Americans' responsibility to certify the aircraft, and they did. If, however, Canadian authorities were responsible for certifying a similar aircraft, with the same technology and functionality, would it have received certification in Canada?

[Nicholas Robinson]

For that question, I'll turn to my colleague, Mr. Turnbull.

[David Turnbull]

Along the lines of what Mr. Robinson previously indicated, my experience working in this organization is that we would not be prone to not knowing something so fundamental about the design and functionality of the aircraft.

Would we have certified the aircraft if it was our responsibility? Eventually, yes, but I like to think we would have caught and addressed the considerations or the things that were missed with respect to the failure modes that were introduced with the use of MCAS and the way it was implemented.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

Thank you, but I'm talking about more than just the MCAS issue. I'm talking about the aircraft overall. If the same aircraft had been manufactured in Canada, would it have received certification?

[David Turnbull]

Again, I can only compare it to the certification activities that we undertake as the state of design. For a case in point, at the time, the Bombardier C Series, now the Airbus A220, was a significantly more technologically advanced aircraft than the Boeing 737 MAX and was a six-year project, with 150,000 hours that we put into it. It has a very safe record. God forbid there be any accidents.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

I have another question. I heard about the Challenger 300, a Bombardier plane that was certified in 2003, so over 15 years ago. Like the Boeing 737 MAX, it had a manual reversion mechanism in case of hydraulic loss. That aircraft was the subject of a concern paper, as you call it.

I would really like to know why such an aircraft would be approved in Canada in 2021 when it was the subject of a concern paper in 2003.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Gentlemen, give a quick answer, please.

[David Turnbull]

I'm not familiar with the specific concern paper you're referring to. The Challenger is not a fly-by-wire aircraft, so when you say revert to hydraulic, I'm not sure exactly what you're referring to.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

I'm referring to the fact that the aircraft has no fly-by-wire system and was the subject of a concern paper.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Mr. Barsalou-Duval, the time is up. Thank you.

Gentlemen, thank you.

We're now going to move on to Mr. Bachrach.

You have the floor for six minutes.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to both of our witnesses for being with us today to answer our questions.

My first question relates to the MCAS system. I was reading an article in The Globe and Mail last month by Brian Barsky, the engineering professor from the University of California, Berkeley. I found this quite troubling. He writes that the 737 MAX 8 “has ill-positioned engines, situated too far forward on the wings, a design that causes unstable flight.”

I imagine that for most of the flying public, reading that would cause concern because stable flight would seem to be one of the primary objectives in aircraft design.

Can either of our witnesses comment on that quote and the seemingly fundamental design flaws behind the 737 MAX 8?

[David Turnbull]

I would start off by saying that there is a lot of false information in that Globe and Mail article. We actually prepared a response. Your question relates to a previous comment by Mr. Barsalou-Duval.

The aircraft does not rely on MCAS to be stable. This is a fallacy. The media has taken this and it's gone a little bit too far. Our push-back on The Globe and Mail includes an attempt to correct that fallacy, in that the MCAS system is simply a system that will increase the nose pitch-down moment on the aircraft to affect the feel that the pilot has in the control column as part of the stall identification system. The aircraft has been thoroughly tested with the speed trim system—which includes the MCAS system—completely inoperative and the flight characteristics have been found to be totally acceptable.

This is not an inherently unstable aircraft. Anything that you're reading out there that says that MCAS is there to prevent an aircraft from stalling or that it is otherwise saving the day on an “unstable aircraft” is simply untrue.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

There seem to be a number of independent experts, and we've certainly heard from some at committee, who have asserted precisely that, so I suppose we get into a situation of “he said, he said”.

According to a report in The Globe and Mail, Transport Canada chose to disregard a senior Transport Canada engineering manager's recommendation that the MCAS system be removed entirely. Is this true, and if so, why was that and what considerations went into that decision?

[Nicholas Robinson]

I'll speak to this, because The Globe and Mail article mentioned that the senior person was me. I can speak to this directly.

In fact, when our expert came to us with the idea of looking at the MCAS of the aircraft, the first thing Dave and I did was to really start to explore the issue. What a great idea. What an idea that we want all of our experts to bring forward to us when we look at a validation or a certification issue. We want them to take issue with what's in front of them and explore it to the fullest. That's why to a previous question to me on whether there was any influence with regard to this validation process, I said there wasn't. Our experts were given full range to over-review the concerns that we clearly outlined to the FAA back in April of 2019 and to bring to Dave the changes that they would require, that they thought were absolutely necessary in order for Canada to be comfortable and for me to make remarks to this committee to say that we are fully satisfied that all of our safety issues have been addressed.

There again—and I'm back to my colleague's question—was another assertion in The Globe and Mail that was absolutely false.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

You required several physical changes to the MAX 8 above and beyond the FAA's requirements, and that's certainly commendable. My question is why you stopped short of requiring a third angle of attack sensor. I understand that this is something that was recommended by several independent experts. It's something that's used in the Airbus A320neo.

What were the factors that went into that decision not to require a third sensor, and were there concerns expressed by Boeing related to that possible change?