Evidence of meeting #16 for Transport, Infrastructure and Communities in the 43rd Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was mcas.
A recording is available from Parliament.
6:25 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Thank you, Mr. Shipley.
Thank you, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Turnbull.
We're now going to move on to Ms. Jaczek.
Ms. Jaczek, you have the floor for five minutes.
6:25 p.m.
Liberal
Helena Jaczek Liberal Markham—Stouffville, ON
Thank you, Chair. Thank you to our witnesses.
I think all that we've heard this evening is really very reassuring in terms of the steps that have been taken in relation to the tragic accidents with the Boeing MAX 8. However, there is one very simple question that I think many people in the public would ask: If the fault was the MCAS system, was there any consideration of actually removing the system completely?
It was obviously introduced to solve a certain problem. You have now modified its use with all sorts of sensors and other very technical aspects, but why not just simply remove the system and return the plane to its previous condition, which was apparently flying safely?
6:25 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
Thank you for the question. That's a very interesting topic indeed.
A previous question touched on the voice that was heard from one of my team members, who looked very closely at that question and did quite an in-depth analysis of the pros and cons of MCAS. We had that discussion. We had that investigation. We had that conversation with the FAA.
The reality of it is that, as a validating authority, we're not in the driver's seat. We looked at the issue very closely. It was determined by the FAA, and in the end we did agree, that MCAS, strictly speaking, is required to meet strict compliance to a very specific requirement that specifies a particular control column force in a stall, in what we call a windup turn, or a banked turn, where the aircraft is experiencing some G-force. That said, that requirement in itself is quite subjective. That's where this conversation came from.
Had we been in the driver's seat, I could put 20/20 hindsight on it and say that maybe if it was Transport Canada certifying the aircraft originally, we would have not required MCAS, but I will remind you, or inform you, as the case may be, that this is a system that Boeing offered up. Based on our investigation, there was never really much of a debate that we could ascertain that went on between Boeing and FAA as to whether the system was required. Boeing offered it up to meet a specific need, to meet this column force requirement. From what we've gleaned, I guess there was never really a conversation between Boeing and FAA to really scrutinize that question as to whether MCAS was really required.
To wrap it up, in the end, I would be free to say that the length of time to fix the aircraft was related to the decision to leave MCAS on. There's no question. Had MCAS been removed...and as I explained earlier, the aircraft has been thoroughly tested by the FAA and us—and EASA, by the way—with the MCAS off, with safe flying characteristics. Nevertheless, there was this specific kind of picky requirement, if I may, that said this force had to be 50 pounds. Without MCAS, it was falling slightly short.
Technically speaking, it's required for compliance. Is it really needed for safety? Debatably, no, but again, the FAA took the design as presented from Boeing. They accepted that was to be evaluated. Again, their job is to evaluate what is presented to them. I won't say that the process to reach return to service was not simplified by MCAS being left on. A lot of the work was to fix the system, to work around some of the not desirable features, shall I say, that MCAS brought to the airplane. That's why it took so long.
6:30 p.m.
Liberal
Helena Jaczek Liberal Markham—Stouffville, ON
Thank you.
Thank you for that because it does relate a little bit to Mr. El-Khoury's line of questioning in terms of complicating systems and then having to evaluate the plane as a whole.
I just want to touch on one piece. We heard some heartbreaking testimony from families who lost loved ones on the plane. I'm wondering if Transport Canada learned anything in terms of communication in these sorts of tragic events. It struck all of us, I think, that perhaps they were still searching for answers. They were still obviously grieving. I'm wondering if there's anything Transport Canada has thought about in terms of, heaven forbid, any future situations like this.
6:30 p.m.
Director General, Civil Aviation, Department of Transport
Thanks for that question.
I've had the opportunity to speak with the Canadian families, individuals associated with victims who were close to Canada, on a number of occasions now. I've learned a great deal from all of them. My condolences again go out to each and every one of them. I can't imagine the impact that this has had, nor do I want to imagine it.
We've learned a great deal. When this first occurred, we treated it as an aviation safety issue that we needed to get to the bottom of. Our national aircraft certification group and our aviation safety experts wanted to get to the bottom of it. We clearly outlined to the FAA our expectations, where we were not going to go, where we wanted to go. We started working with our aviation partners, and we wanted to address this issue.
What we missed was the personal impact, the human impact, that these accidents have. That's what we will learn and will do better on in the future. I do hope that—and I take the point that was made—we don't have to act again in this sort of way, but we did already. We just passed the anniversary of PS752 and the downing of that aircraft.
The conversations that we had with the family members of ET308, the Ethiopian Airlines 302, have directly impacted how we engage with families. It's impacted how I continue—how we, as a team, continue—to engage with the Ethiopian families, but it impacted right away how we engaged, from the beginning, with the PS752 families.
6:35 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
Thank you, Ms. Jaczek.
We're now going to move on to Mr. Barsalou-Duval for two and a half minutes.
Mr. Barsalou-Duval, the floor is yours.
6:35 p.m.
Bloc
Xavier Barsalou-Duval Bloc Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The age of the aircraft and the fact that it's covered by a grandfather clause worry me, and I'll tell you why.
I have a computer with a CPU I bought in 1995. I could use that computer today, if I really wanted to, but it would be a struggle and probably not work as well as a current model. The same is more or less true of this aircraft. The basic design remains unchanged to avoid recertification, but the aircraft has become larger over the years, which makes it all the worse.
In 1967, the 737 MAX could carry 115 passengers. Today's model, the 737 MAX 8, can carry up to 200 passengers. The aircraft is now twice as heavy and 10 metres longer. Those aren't minor changes. On top of that, the aircraft is 50 years old.
When, then, will the grandfather clause cease to apply? The clause has exempted the aircraft from recertification and allowed changes to be made because the aircraft's original design still stands.
Are there limits to that coverage?
6:35 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
Thank you for the question
You pointed directly at what is really the number one priority in investigating the certification policies and procedures, i.e., the lessons learned that came out of the accident. That is, as I mentioned earlier in this committee hearing, the changed product rule. That set of regulations, generally known as the “changed product rule”, define a process whereby a changed product is evaluated and it is determined whether the aircraft, in its changed form, should step up to the latest design standards, or whether certain aspects of the aircraft, or certain systems or features on the aircraft, are allowed, as you referred to it, to be grandfathered or to recomply with the existing standards.
That is clearly an area—
6:35 p.m.
Bloc
Xavier Barsalou-Duval Bloc Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC
I encourage you to review your automatic recertification process, at least as far as the grandfather clause goes.
I'll conclude with this question. Actually, it's more of a request. Could you provide the committee with the concern paper I asked you about earlier? The one from 2003 regarding the Challenger 300. I'm told it's called the I-8. I would very much appreciate receiving that. It would tell us what the concerns were with the Challenger 300 and whether they were the same in the case of the 737 MAX.
If you would like to finish what you were saying in response to the previous question, go ahead.
6:35 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
I may need some more specifics there. In the course of certifying domestically—in this case it's a Bombardier aircraft—we may have as many as 20, 30 or 40 issue papers on any certification. I'm not particularly current on the one you're referring to.
6:35 p.m.
Bloc
6:35 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
That is a file number, not an issue paper number.
6:35 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
I'd be happy to exchange information with you on that to get the specifics of what you're looking for. The answer is that we'd be happy to provide anything you would request.
6:35 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Thank you, Mr. Turnbull and Mr. Barsalou-Duval.
We're now going to move on for two and a half minutes to our last speaker, Mr. Bachrach.
Mr. Bachrach, the floor is yours.
6:35 p.m.
NDP
Taylor Bachrach NDP Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, again, gentlemen, for answering all of our questions.
My last question has to do with something that arose as part of the various investigations in the United States. I think committee members followed with interest the reports of the U.S. House committee on transport and later the U.S. Senate committee that looked into these matters. One of the things that really stood out to me was the reference to the use of something called “authorized representatives”. As I understand it, these are employees of Boeing. They work for the company and draw a paycheque from the Boeing company, but they're actually seconded by the FAA—by the regulator—to do the work of the federal regulator.
To me, this seems to put them in the position of being a bit of a double agent and having two masters. It doesn't seem to lend itself to having a certification system that has real integrity. When I raised this with the minister at our committee, he said that this is done all the time and in fact we use authorized representatives in Canada.
Given the shocking revelations that came out of those two reports in the United States around the “culture of concealment” and all of the things that led to MCAS being hidden from the pilots and others, is Transport Canada looking into the role of these authorized representatives? Is this something that we can improve in our validation and certification processes, so that we will have fully separate professionals who are not beholden to the companies that are having their aircraft certified?
It seems to me that this would be something that would benefit the Canadian public and help restore—or at least increase—the amount of trust that people have in these systems.
6:40 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
Thank you for the question.
The Canadian system of delegating authority, at least in the context of our aircraft certification, goes back to 1968. It's a well-established and well-developed system. I would agree that to the outsider it may involve a suspicion of conflict of interest. The reality is that the delegation system has been promulgated and accepted, not only within Transport Canada but to these external holders, to leverage our resources to allow and give credit to those organizations that have that expertise and can make the call.
The key to the whole process working and where we can really shut the door on any concerns of conflict of interest is our oversight of those delegates in doing that work. That is the key. As I said earlier, delegating the authority does not equate to relinquishing the regulator's knowledge and understanding of what is being done and what is being carried out. Right up until the moment a delegate in the Canadian system makes a determination of compliance to a particular requirement, they have had a discussion with their counterpart in my organization to agree mutually, working as a team, as to whether that finding should be made. It is not the case, necessarily, of somebody going away—out of sight, out of mind—and making these determinations on their own.
We're well conscious of the potential for conflict of interest. We've set up a system within the companies whereby the delegates themselves can reach across the room or across the table to us as the regulator and point out where they may be in a situation where their superiors are pressuring them. They have systems and mentors within their own companies that allow them to reach out and have those conversations.
We meet at least quarterly with every major delegated organization that we interface with. These are the types of things we are talking about in terms of how to maintain and how to, shall I say, nip it in the bud, if we've heard any signals of a delegate being pressured to make a decision that went against his or her technical best judgment. That feedback loop and that transparency is very consciously and very deliberately built into our delegation system to address the very concern that you raised.
6:40 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Thank you, Mr. Turnbull.
Thank you, Mr. Bachrach.
Thank you, Mr. Robinson, as well, for your testimony today.
To all members, thank you. There's no doubt this will add to the final report that the analysts will be working on.
With that, we will end this meeting. Before I do, I want to mention that it would be great if any information that has been requested of the witnesses could be passed on to the clerk. The clerk will pass it on to the members of the committee.
With that, and with no other business, the meeting is adjourned.