I agree with exactly what Paul stated. Peter DeFazio, chair of the transportation and infrastructure committee in Congress, did a fantastic job of uncovering a lot of issues, but there are still a lot of details we do not know anything about. For instance, there's the whole idea of issuing an airworthiness directive. I did my own calculation, and I figure they passed the threshold for issuing an airworthiness directive by a factor of 5,000. That is incomprehensible. You would think there would be something in the regulations stating that once you get to a certain threshold, you must at least consider grounding a plane. That's quite a large factor.
There are a number of things or facts we don't know—for instance, how these engineers had approved that plane. It almost sounds like there was one person who was behind the curtain, but there must have been a whole fleet of engineers reviewing this aircraft. I have to call the whole professional engineering association into question. Is there any group looking at that?
How a second crash could happen is beyond me. That's what I want to get down to. This doesn't usually happen. We think Transport Canada played a role in it. Even though perhaps they were hoodwinked initially, they could have at least prevented the second crash by flagging it and saying, “You know, there's a problem here.” There obviously was one.