Evidence of meeting #7 for Transport, Infrastructure and Communities in the 43rd Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was transport.
A recording is available from Parliament.
4:05 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
Thank you for your question.
As you mentioned, Mr. Barsalou-Duval, we met and spoke with both of the individuals more than once, I believe, and were thoroughly briefed on their questions. They brought up some very good points. In general, I'd have to say that we did investigate those questions that we were not able to answer on the spot, but many we did.
We did investigate. I believe Mr. Primeau brought up some technical concerns about the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator system. We went back on Mr. Primeau's behalf. I don't believe that we had asked his specific question previously, so we welcomed it. We went back to Boeing and got a response that satisfied our concerns.
I'm not 100% sure whether we closed the loop with Mr. Primeau, but we certainly satisfied ourselves that the specific recommendation and concern that he raised had been addressed to our satisfaction.
4:05 p.m.
Liberal
4:05 p.m.
Bloc
Xavier Barsalou-Duval Bloc Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC
Mr. Turnbull, I really liked your answer to my question, that you examined the points that Mr. Primeau submitted in depth.
I am pleased to learn that, but I would have preferred to hear an answer to my question, which was whether the two recommendations you shared with us are going to be adopted by Transport Canada going forward, meaning for the next aircraft you certify.
4:05 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
The answer is yes. I believe one of the recommendations, as you briefly described.... It has an influence on what we call the changed product rule, which indicates to us, when a product is modified, to what extent the entire system has to be re-evaluated. This is one of the key recommendations of the JATR report, and the re-examination of the interpretation of that particular regulation, in terms of how we certify and establish standards for modified products, is one of the key investigations or activities that we will carry out in a joint fashion with our other airworthiness authority partners moving forward.
4:05 p.m.
Bloc
Xavier Barsalou-Duval Bloc Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC
Thank you for your answers.
I have a few more questions for you.
The last time you testified, I recall asking you why you did not test the MCAS, the Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System, given that it was a new system installed in the aircraft. Normally, logic dictates that new systems are tested.
Your answer was that you had no reason to question it, that the operation of the MCAS had been explained to you, and you were satisfied with the explanation. You did not investigate any further.
However, we subsequently learned that, in internal documents at Transport Canada, test pilots had expressed concerns about a key system in the MCAS on the 737 MAX, namely the stall avoidance system. I would like to know whether that was true at the time of the testimony during which you told me that you did not conduct any tests.
The document points to the opposite, and even that some concerns were raised.
4:05 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
Obviously after the accidents, it was certainly a huge preoccupation of ours. In doing our original validation through 2016, we did inquire about the MCAS system. We were made aware of its functioning, but unfortunately, at the time we were not provided with a full explanation of its functionality. We did dig into that, but we were satisfied with the answer that we had. I believe it's already on public record that certain aspects of how the MCAS system functioned were not particularly made available by Boeing. I won't get into speculating to what extent the FAA was aware of it, but that's on public record as being an issue.
Certainly, after the accidents, unfortunately, was when we dug in and went back to that question. It was then revealed that the MCAS had additional functionality that required further examination. This is really one of the central issues in the studies that Mr. Robinson mentioned that are going on within the U.S., as the U.S. is the state of design for the aircraft.
We have learned an awful lot since then; there's no question.
4:05 p.m.
Bloc
Xavier Barsalou-Duval Bloc Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC
I wonder about the following question. Last time, I asked you whether it was a mistake not to have tested the MCAS. Your answer was no because you couldn't test everything. However, it was a new component. We are now learning that Transport Canada's test pilots expressed some concerns.
I would like to know whether it was an error to continue with the certification and approval of the aircraft, given that unanswered questions on that matter remained.
4:05 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
In retrospect, we can look back at that and we can acknowledge that it was an aspect of the original certification that was not done properly. As a validating authority, we got the information that we got and we based our decision on the information that was available at the time.
4:10 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Thank you, Mr. Turnbull. Thank you, Mr. Barsalou-Duval.
We'll now move on to Mr. Bachrach for six minutes.
4:10 p.m.
NDP
Taylor Bachrach NDP Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before the committee again.
Mr. Robinson and Mr. Turnbull, as the director general of civil aviation at Transport Canada and the director of national aircraft certification, is it fair to say that after the Minister of Transport, you two gentlemen are responsible for the certification of the 737 Max?
4:10 p.m.
Director General, Civil Aviation, Department of Transport
I'll address that question.
When it comes to the validation of the 737 Max, the national aircraft certification team within civil aviation, which is led by Dave, will complete its full review. They will provide the recommendation and the assessment against our regulations of whether the aircraft meets the minimum expectations that we have, which are outlined in both regulations and standards. Mr. Turnbull will make a decision on whether to validate that aircraft, at which point we will notify the state authority that certifies the aircraft, as well as the operator.
4:10 p.m.
NDP
Taylor Bachrach NDP Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC
Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
I'll take that as a yes. I used the term certification improperly. Perhaps it should be validation. You two gentlemen are accountable for the certification of this aircraft in Canada. Were you in these positions when the 737 Max was validated as safe to fly in Canada?
4:10 p.m.
Director General, Civil Aviation, Department of Transport
Mr. Turnbull was in the national aircraft certification director position. I was not in the director general position.
4:10 p.m.
NDP
Taylor Bachrach NDP Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC
Mr. Turnbull, do you regret validating that particular aircraft as safe to fly in Canada, knowing what you know now?
4:10 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
No, I do not.
I greatly regret what has happened and huge sympathies go out to the families, obviously, with these tragic accidents. I stand before you today being fully confident that we made the right decision with the information that we had. We did do our usual due diligence through our normal tried and true validation process that we've applied to many foreign aircraft. We did our job.
The concern that we're dealing with here is the after-discovery of some of the functionality of the system and its behaviour in certain failure conditions, which was not made readily apparent to us during our validation process, despite our efforts.
4:10 p.m.
NDP
Taylor Bachrach NDP Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC
Mr. Turnbull, we have this concern paper that notes that Transport Canada's own test pilots did experience the situation in the cockpit and documented it—unless I'm missing something. Looking through this, it seems to me that Transport Canada received that note of concern and then didn't act on it. Instead, it proceeded with the validation of the certification.
Am I missing something?
4:10 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
Respectfully, you are, actually. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to revisit this because I did not complete my explanation with Ms. Kusie earlier.
What is raised in that concern paper was a question to help us understand the methodology whereby Boeing has demonstrated compliance to a particular requirement. That concern paper does not in itself reveal or demonstrate a discovery of a problem with the aircraft. The outcome of that inquiry would indicate to us whether the systems implicated represent a stall protection system or a stall identification system. That was the gist of the question. If you read to the end of the document, you'll see we did get the response, which satisfied us that the system is indeed only a stall identification system.
Had it been a stall protection system, the design integrity for the relevant systems would have been held to a much higher level. We were satisfied with the response. At that point, we were fully in the know as to how the testing had been done. That concern paper does not in itself in any way represent a problem. Because the nature of the question was trying to understand the method by which that system was certified, that in itself did not reveal any concerns. I look back on that issue paper and I have no regrets. We asked the question. We did indeed defer the answer to a later time.
In the end, the answer came back and it confirmed what we had wanted to hear, but it does not relate directly to the problems that caused the accidents.
4:15 p.m.
NDP
Taylor Bachrach NDP Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC
Mr. Turnbull, I believe you met with Mr. Primeau, the independent aerospace engineer who has years of experience in the design of these control systems. Did you find him to be credible in the information he presented to you?
4:15 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
Yes. I think Mr. Primeau has the credentials, and we could speak intelligently with him on a number of levels, among them the technical level; there was no question. However, Mr. Primeau was misinformed on a few items and we did correct him on some of the issues as we spoke to him. As I mentioned earlier, we looked into some of his assumptions, and in the end, having closed the loop with Boeing, we effectively answered his question. From our perspective, there were no residual concerns.
Overall he was a credible witness, and his questions were welcome.
4:15 p.m.
NDP
Taylor Bachrach NDP Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC
Mr. Primeau appeared on Tuesday before the committee, and it appears that not all of his questions were adequately addressed. I asked him if he would get back into the 737 Max as a passenger, and he said he would not. I'm just wondering how you respond to the concern that he seems to still have as an engineer who specializes in these systems. He does not feel that the safety issues have been adequately addressed.
4:15 p.m.
Director, National Aircraft Certification, Department of Transport
It is of course his privilege to have that opinion. It's unfortunate, however. Without disrespecting Mr. Primeau's credentials, to be fair, he has not been privy to the literally thousands of hours that my team has put into investigating, in explicit detail, the failure modes and the system as it failed, and how we have developed in collaboration with the FAA a series of fixes. He is not privy to all that information. My team is.
4:15 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey
Thank you, Mr. Turnbull.
Thank you, Mr. Bachrach.
We're now going to go to the second round, which will be five-minute slots.
Mr. Kram, you have the floor.
4:15 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Kram Conservative Regina—Wascana, SK
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Turnbull, for joining us today.
In June of 2017, Transport Canada certified the Boeing 737 Max 8. That plane later turned out to be unsafe. What went wrong with the certification process and what can be done to ensure that mistakes like this do not happen again?