Transport Committee on Nov. 26th, 2020

[Nicholas Robinson]

I don't believe commercial pressures are put on the process within Canada. We do prioritize as Mr. Turnbull identified. We do need to know, with regard to a validation, when a product is expected to be or wished to be used in Canada. That will allow us to prioritize. We are working on certifying as well as validating a number of products. If we know a product is not expected to be used in Canada for a number of years, that will have a lower priority for us to look at it in the immediacy, and we will look more at a company that wants to bring in a product right away.

We've had a couple of instances during COVID-19, for instance, where a company wanted to bring in a product that wasn't originally certified. It was a special-type certification, not a full certification, but they wanted to bring in a product that wasn't validated for use in Canada. We prioritized that, so we wanted to know. This is something related to COVID. It's not being driven, but we know that this project should get a number of resources right away as opposed to another project that we might see only needing to be brought into force in a number of years, because they're considering bringing in a product like that.

From a commercial perspective, we need to know those delivery dates in order to prioritize our resources, but they don't determine our process. Our process is determined by the regulations and the standards we set.

[Doug Shipley, Conservative, Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON]

During some of my research, I've come across some notes that there were some internal emails and some issues going on within Boeing that are less than positive. Are you satisfied with Boeing's process in addressing concerns that are brought forward from staff?

[Nicholas Robinson]

That is an issue that, from an information perspective, the state of design will have to address, with regard to how those questions are brought forward amongst staff. When we are looking at a product, we are holding it against a set of regulations. The internal dynamics of Boeing is something that we're not as involved in.

[Doug Shipley, Conservative, Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON]

If there was a message or a whistle-blower from a manufacturer, how would you treat that?

[Nicholas Robinson]

We need to know the information in order to certify a product, the full set of information. As we've described here today, when information is not known by a validating authority, things can go wrong, and in this instance, something did go wrong. Our expectation from a manufacturer is that we need to know the full scope of the project.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Robinson, and thank you, Mr. Shipley.

We'll now go on to Ms. Jaczek for five minutes.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to both of the witnesses.

Many of us have become really concerned about concern papers. I would suggest that, in essence, it's because the use of the words “concern paper” leads to concern, which it obviously did with the victims' families we heard from on Tuesday.

Do you, in essence, look at your concern papers in any sort of graded fashion? Do you, as your positions allow, look at whatever note is made by a concerned pilot or whomever this concern comes from? Do you say that this is absolutely crucial in some cases, and that if you don't get the answer, you're not validating? You've described in this particular case that it did not endanger safety.

Do you have a “nice to know” kind of inquiry, as opposed to a crucial inquiry? Do you have that system of ensuring, when you're looking for answers, that you've looked at it in that way?

[Nicholas Robinson]

Absolutely.

I take the point that was made, Mr. Chair. The terminology of “concern paper” needs work, and you may see changes moving forward on that.

A concern paper, if it's related to a serious safety risk, would not remain open if that safety risk hasn't been addressed. However, a concern paper, as Mr. Turnbull noted, that identified a disharmonization of the regulations that needed to be addressed as part of a CMT, or a certification management team, as a whole could remain open, and the validation of a product could continue. Those assessments are made on an ongoing basis.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

In retrospect, I'm sure you've examined all the information you received from pilots, on simulators and so on. Was there anything that talked about what you've identified as probably the crucial factor, in other words, changing the technology, the MCAS system, and what that did to the safety of the aircraft as a whole, in other words, the interaction with the existing aircraft? If you look back, have you seen anything that might have led you to have a really important concern and to issue yet another concern paper?

[Nicholas Robinson]

If we had found anything in the validation process that was a concern, that addressed a safety risk that hadn't been finalized or brought to a conclusion in our validation process, the aircraft wouldn't have been validated in Canada.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

Obviously you've done a lot of reviews. We know that obviously the U.S. Congress has had its investigations. The FAA is obviously going to have to change a number of its processes in accordance with what the U.S. Congress is doing.

Going forward, what additional aspects of validation are you going to introduce for the safety of Canadian air travellers?

[David Turnbull]

Thank you for the question.

I'd like to say the good news is that the fundamental processes we've had in place and we've refined over the years do not need to change.

The process itself is scalable. What I mean by that is that our validation efforts can adapt to the situation, just as they have throughout the validation of the design changes. Given the profile of these two particular accidents and the complexity of the issue, the validation process in this design change activity has been significantly higher than it normally would have been, but it is the same process. It still follows the same protocols. It still works the same way.

In the future, with other applicants, in future aircraft, we will continue to do what we've been doing. Obviously we have learned some lessons here—so has the FAA. We're going to be applying those lessons, and those lessons become risk areas for the future that may result in our taking a greater depth of review in certain areas, which we might not have otherwise done. Because the process is scalable, it allows us to take the level of review that we deem necessary.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

I have one last piece. On Tuesday, CUPE came and spoke to us about their cabin crew safety issues. From what the witness told us, it seems that perhaps there hasn't been sufficient attention to some of those concerns. Are you aware of CUPE's concerns, and do you have any idea, going forward, as to how to incorporate those into your reviews?

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Gentlemen, give a quick answer, please.

[Nicholas Robinson]

We met with CUPE earlier on in this process. I can actually report to the committee that we're meeting with CUPE again—and that was set before their appearance on Tuesday—to outline exactly how...and the conclusions we brought with regard to our validation and what they can expect. We expect they will bring forward those issues. Much like I said at the start of this committee appearance, we will be working with our Canadian operators, all of the unions, air crew unions, towards our next steps, an airworthiness directive and directives on training, which we expect to be in place sometime in January 2021.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Ms. Jaczek, thank you.

Thank you, members.

Most importantly, thank you to the witnesses, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Turnbull.

It was a wonderful discussion. We have lots of answers to great questions. I want to thank you for this time. I really appreciate it and the committee really appreciates it.

With that, I am going to go in camera.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Mr. Chair, before we go in camera, could I have the floor for a moment?

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Mr. Bachrach, go ahead.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

I appreciate the testimony of the witnesses today, and I appreciate your giving me a brief moment to move my motion, notice for which was provided. I believe the clerk has translated copies for all the committee members, which he can email to you.

I move:

That the committee call on the federal government to launch, as early as possible, a public inquiry into Canada’s aircraft certification process and its role in certifying the Boeing 737 Max 8 as well as Transports Canada’s actions following the Lion Air crash in 2018; and that the Chair of the committee writes to the minister to inform him thereof.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Bachrach.

I am going to ask for comments or questions on this, noting of course that it's going to take away from our time to give drafting instructions, but I will allow it.

First off, Mr. Clerk, is the motion clear enough for you? Is no further clarification needed?

Thank you.

I am now going to go to members of the committee. If you'd like to speak to the motion, go to “participants” at the bottom of your screen and push the “raise hand” button. I have the queue here in front of me. I have, first off, Ms. Jaczek.

Ms. Jaczek, you have the floor.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to Mr. Bachrach for raising this issue, particularly as we did hear, of course, from the victims' families just a couple of days ago about their feeling that they needed something more, which they termed a “public inquiry”.

Quite honestly, I've given this a lot of thought over the last two days. I looked at the briefing notes that we received about activities, such as the U.S. congressional hearings, activities in the U.S. and the fact that we, as a committee, have been looking at this issue now since January. I think we've all been asking pretty searching questions. I really feel that we have enough information. I feel that a public inquiry really couldn't add any particular value.

We've been meeting in public. Our deliberations have been public. The testimony has been frank and I think very informative. In essence, I'm saying that I don't see that there's going to be any particular added value at this point in accordance with Mr. Bachrach's motion.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Ms. Jaczek.

Mr. Rogers, you have the floor.

[Churence Rogers, Liberal, Bonavista—Burin—Trinity, NL]

I firmly believe this motion is premature. With the work we've been doing as a committee, all the witnesses we have been hearing from and the information we have received from a lot of different sources, we should take this information first, complete the study, do our report and if, at the end of the day, that becomes a part of the report or a recommendation in our report, then so be it. However, I do not think this motion should not be passed today. It's premature. It should be something that becomes a part of our overall report.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Are there any further questions?

I have Mr. Bittle, Mrs. Kusie, Mr. Barsalou-Duval and Mr. Bachrach.

Mr. Bittle, please go ahead.