However, the question remains valid.
As Mr. Robinson explained, our process of raising papers throughout the validation process is aimed at seeking an understanding of how the certifying authority drew their conclusions. Particularly in this case, the question, and it was only a question, was to confirm and to understand a methodology that Boeing had been using to achieve compliance to a basic stall requirement, I'll call it part 25, paragraph 201.
What's been cited in the transport committee today represents focusing in on a particular part of that paper where indeed we did defer the closure of the concern paper to a future activity. That is not an unusual act for us to take. In each individual situation, where we have deliberately decided to leave an issue open, we make a deliberate determination whether the leaving open of that issue, if I may, actually constitutes a safety concern or not. In this case, it did not. We very deliberately left it open, knowing full well that we had not discovered a problem, but we had not yet fully grounded out a full understanding of how Boeing had conducted the test and how compliance had been found.
Why did we need to know this in the first place? The outcome of that exchange, which is included in the same document, would reveal that in the end we actually did get an understanding that in fact the system in the aircraft in question, in other words the speed-trim system that includes MCAS, does in fact play a role as a stall identification system versus a stall prevention system.