There are a variety of experiences, but largely what happens is one of two things. The proponents are largely consortia, and it is important to understand how big these projects have become and why it's often many global firms that are bidding on infrastructure here in Canada. The proponents have to put in extra cost to take into account the unknown.
When you have a construction contract, that's one kind of thing. When you're talking about taking over the entire maintenance and operation of it, then you increase the unknown, so they pad the numbers to go in. If something happens, they come back to government and say, “I'm sorry, our hand is out. We want money back”, and we just saw that happen with the crosstown line in Toronto.
We saw in the U.K. that, when they decided it was too much, they just went bankrupt and walked away. We saw that with the Hamilton sewage situation, where a P3 was put together, and it changed hands three times. We've seen that with Highway 407, where there was supposed to be the risk to say they would make sure that trucks could operate on 407 so they could support our manufacturing industry, and then, when it didn't suit them and they priced it out of the market, they were forgiven $1-billion penalty they should have paid in order to serve the public interest.
Time after time after time, you see that the set-up works in theory one way and in reality in a very different way, and the public interest is not served. This bank should go back and focus its investment on supporting public enterprise and public assets.