Through the chair, I thank you very much.
Perhaps I will start by saying to the committee that our underlying assessments of the risks have not changed. The pragmatic and principled approach of this government has national security and economic security at the core. As I mentioned earlier, we are constantly collecting intelligence relevant to economic security threats, including foreign interference, espionage or cyber-threats. As well, we are constantly, as Mr. Bilodeau said, producing intelligence and information to inform the government. Our job, at this point, is to make sure they are navigating those partnerships with an informed perspective.
As it relates to these particular ferries, our role, at this point, after a procurement decision has been taken, is to be available to our stakeholders—the province and BC Ferries—should they have concerns. It's also to make sure they are equipped, as the member referenced, to understand the various risks in engaging with a state-owned enterprise in this particular context. What that looks like is making sure they are equipped with tools prior to travelling to a country or engaging with different entities, so they can understand what foreign interference looks like and be extra confident that they understand how to report to the national security agencies—CSIS, the RCMP and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security—any concerns about those engagements.