Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee. It's a pleasure to be here.
I'd like to speak briefly to two issues that have been a focus of my research recently, related to number 8 in your questions to witnesses: “What are the main obstacles to a smooth transition...?”
This adage represents for me the most important principle in measuring how closely the stated intentions of organizations like Veterans Affairs, DND, and the CF match their actions. It can help us identify systemic barriers to transition as well as guide investigations into other processes. This principle also allows us to determine whether lofty statements of intent by senior leaders are actually supported by appropriate matching reward systems that will help to realize the stated intent. Research has shown that if reward systems do not match stated intent, little will get done.
I will use the systemic barriers to military and civilian staffing for the joint personnel support units—which we've heard about already—and associated support organizations as an example of how this principle can be applied in practice.
A number of commentators, including General Vance, the current CDS, have portrayed the JPSUs as an excellent concept that was badly executed. For example, a 2013 DND/CF ombudsman’s report identified acute staffing shortages in the JPSUs as a key problem in their deficiencies. These shortages were entirely predictable when the JPSUs were created in 2008, because the shortages were caused by systemic problems that were well known at the time.
Five years later, in 2013, in response to criticism of the JPSUs, the CDS at the time, General Tom Lawson, declared that JPSUs were a part of his “personal priority” of “caring for our members and their families”. Despite the CDS’s assertion of priority, the CF had assigned JPSUs the lowest staffing priority level—that is, level 6 on a scale of 1 to 6, which you heard about earlier—and this virtually ensured that the military staff shortages would eventually impact negatively on their missions. This is a systemic problem that is based on the CF culture, where the teeth, the combat units of the organization, almost always receive staffing priority over the tail, the support units.
On the civilian staffing side, complex public service hiring processes and inadequate compensation rates have frequently been identified as serious obstacles to the timely employment and retention of health care professionals for DND. Again, this is a systemic problem that was understood to be a long-standing problem for DND when the JPSUs were created, and therefore would undoubtedly have an impact on them in the future. This systemic problem will surely impact on the new, proper, professionalized organization intended to help CF members better transition to civilian life, which the CDS referred to last year before this committee.
I will conclude with some points on your measurable outcomes, specifically what two questions might be asked of those responsible for creating and implementing policies on veterans’ transition to assess their plans and progress against their stated intention.
The first question could simply be, “What staffing priority level has been assigned to this organization?” This answer would be a measurable outcome of the level of priority that has been assigned to it by the CF, regardless of stated intent.
The second question could be, “What steps have been taken to address the issues with public service employment practices that have been significant barriers to hiring and retaining health care professionals in the past?” Once again, the answer would be a measurable outcome of the actual level of priority assigned to any particular plan.
My final point restates this principle that enables those investigating or overseeing any activity to have a focus that can guide lines of questioning and help to identify systemic barriers to transition.
Thank you, and I look forward to the panel’s discussion.