Mr. Speaker, the government is inviting us today to a third debate on Canadian defence policy. Going against all logic, the government started this series of debates by asking the House to reflect on two special aspects of such a policy, namely the role of Canadian peacekeepers in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Croatia, and the
testing of cruise missiles over Canadian territory, before letting us know the general direction of its intended defence policy.
Today, without any warning, the government is asking the House to debate the main thrusts of our new defence policy using as a base a vague and general document which has been handed out to members at the very last minute. Moreover, the government assumes that a defence policy can be considered independently from foreign policy, which is not the case. There again, the government carefully avoided to unveil its intentions regarding the direction it will give to this new foreign policy.
However, since we must accept the general format decided upon by the government for this debate, I will say that we first need to put this question in the general geopolitical context of the day, because it is this context which determines the choices Canada will have to make when defining its defence policy.
It might be useful to recall that at the end of the second world war, the world split in two distinct blocs, the western bloc and the eastern bloc, which set up two competing military alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, that Canada joined in 1949, and the Warsaw pact.
At the end of the cold war, toward the end of the eighties, this polarized political situation changed drastically. The Warsaw pact dissolved, leaving NATO without any apparent rival. Therefore, western countries do not seem to be facing any readily identifiable threat. World stability is no longer the result of a balance of power between two groups. New nuclear powers are gradually emerging, and they often are politically unstable. Under such circumstances, it became difficult for Canada and its allies to question the collective security system which had determined their defence policy during the cold war.
On another level, the decreased influence of the east bloc countries and Russia on international issues had a direct impact on the political and military stability in several regions of the planet. Yugoslavia and the ex-Soviet republics are the most striking examples of that.
Some regions have also tried to take advantage of the new division of strategic powers to assert their political and military presence in their part of the world. The Persian Gulf war remains the most striking case, in line with the new configuration of global politics.
In response to the emerging political balance, NATO countries reviewed and then modified their defence policies. The same process went on in Canada and, in 1992, the government presented a new political statement to replace Perrin Beatty's white paper dating back to 1987.
The defence policy of western countries was readjusted in several ways. First, the most important measure in my view was to reduce the defence budgets; since exterior threats were no longer comparable to those that prevailed during the cold war, defence did not require as many resources as it did in the past. The armaments industry was affected directly by that readjustment because its markets shrunk considerably. In arms producing countries, hundreds of thousands of people were laid off and Canada was no exception.
Second, on a more strategic level, was the review of potential sources of outside threats. Under the new international order, the danger of an east-west conflict has greatly diminished. The new dangers, as identified by NATO members, stem from the regional conflicts which have been emerging in various parts of the world over the last few years. Canada shares this point of view, as attested by its 1992 policy statement.
Third, the political and strategic mandates of the major international organizations are being totally redefined. The UN and NATO are two cases in point.
The United Nations organization, through the Security Council, is increasingly being asked to take action in conflicts arising in various parts of the world. The latest ones, the gulf war and the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, herald new trends which have a significant impact on the national defence policy of western nations.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for its part, seems to be willing to take on a much bigger role since the disintegration of the Warsaw pact. Originally designed to ensure the mutual defence of its member countries, NATO is now seeking to modify its defence mandate in the north Atlantic to become more closely associated with the United Nations organization, as its military arm whose role would be to enforce the mandates given the UN by the Security Council.
This trend is reflected in negotiations on the use of air strikes against Serbian troops in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
As a member of two major international organizations, NATO and the UN, Canada cannot and must not withdraw from discussions on these issues. The international situation is very unstable, and it would be extremely dangerous to renege on our international commitments.
As you know, Canada does not have the necessary resources to provide for the security and full defence of its vast territory.
This given has had a decisive factor in Canada's defence policy for several decades, as can be seen by this country's participation in joint security systems established through NATO and NORAD. It would also be unrealistic to think Canada is not affected by changes in the global political situation. We must realize that Canada can play a strategic role at the international level and, in return, rely on its international
alliances to guarantee the security of its territory. That was the gist of the 1992 policy statement.
The statement replaced the 1987 white paper which, as I said earlier, was drafted in a cold war context. The new defence policy was intended as an adjustment to the new international situation. It pointed out the risks that continued to exist from a strategic point of view, despite the collapse of the Warsaw pact, and perhaps I may quote the following:
The nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union remain sufficient to devastate this continent. At a time of ongoing instability in the Commonwealth of Independent States, prudence requires that we take these capabilities into account in the formulation our defence policy.
The size of our country, its strategic location, and the limited resources that we can devote to defence mean that, for the foreseeable future, Canada will maintain its long-standing relationship with the United States.
Until further notice, this policy statement is still the Canadian government's official policy on national defence. A few adjustments have been made, however, including the renewal of the Canadian-American agreement on cruise missile testing. Furthermore, with its contingent of peacekeepers, Canada has also helped redefine its role within our international institutions.
As far as strategy is concerned, we have seen that the geopolitical context is changing very fast. As I said earlier, this development should not necessarily be interpreted as a portent of a new era of peace. The carnage taking place in various parts of the world should give us some indication that is not the case.
It would be illogical to think that just because the world is no longer divided into east and west as it was after World War II, we should abandon our role within the joint security systems.
The concept of threat should not be perceived only as being inherently linked to the concept of territory. Should the conflict in the former Yugoslavia spread beyond its borders, for example, Europe and NATO would be directly involved. The catastrophic consequences of such a scenario are serious enough to make us realize how important it is to have a defence policy which is not only intended to protect the territory of Canada or Quebec, but also takes into consideration the security of our strategic and traditional allies.
During the last election, and many times since October 25, the Bloc Quebecois has reaffirmed its support for cuts in the budget of the Department of National Defence. Despite the international context I have just described, we believe that we could cut that budget by some 25 per cent without dramatically impairing the operations of that important department.
Reducing the budget of the Department of National Defence by 25 per cent does not mean that we should withdraw from our obligations. On the contrary. The Bloc Quebecois is not advocating the total elimination of all major equipment procurement programs, though we believe some should perhaps be abandoned.
These programs remain important if Canada is to live up to its international commitments, but the rapid changes on the political scene worldwide make it necessary for western countries to redefine their defence policies on an ongoing basis. Canada is no different.
A new government has been elected and it is now its responsibility to propose new directions, in terms of defence, that can adequately address these rapid and fundamental changes that are occurring throughout the world. In this regard, you will note that the Liberal Party of Canada had already stated some of its positions while sitting on this side of the House, in the opposition, and during the last election campaign.
But it is worth pointing out, Mr. Speaker, that this is not the first time that the Liberal Party sends conflicting and unclear messages about its defence policy. Let me just remind you that, in the early seventies, under Pierre Trudeau, the Canadian government tried at first to distinguish itself from its American neighbour, but later, in the early eighties, its positions got considerably closer to the Americans'. As evidence of this, it is interesting to note that it is the Pierre Elliott Trudeau administration that first authorized cruise missile testing on Canadian soil in 1983.
Let me also remind you that Prime Minister Trudeau had taken on an international peace mission while at the time increasing considerably national defence budgets and authorizing the purchase of sophisticated equipment in order to support Canadian defence policy. I am thinking, for instance, about the acquisition of CF-18s and the first order for new frigates intended for the Canadian navy.
While sitting in the opposition, the Liberal Party often blamed the Conservative government for being too conciliatory with the United States. It did not keep the Liberal Party from reaffirming its support for the cruise missile tests last January, even though many of the top members of the party had objected to such tests. It is not easy therefore to anticipate what the main orientations of the government will be on the issue of national defence.
Yet, on a political level, it is important that we make sure the government determines in the very near future the thrust of new defence and foreign affairs policies that will be credible, clear and feasible.
It is too late to go on listing platitudes like they have been doing in the red book until now. The Liberal Party is in office; it must act responsibly and stop pretending it is consulting people
in order to gain time. Consultation is definitely a good thing, but it does not relieve the government from its obligation to reveal its intentions and the general principles of the policies it wants to implement. Discussion is valuable only if it is based on solid grounds.
The House of Commons is now in its third emergency debate on issues that are not supported by an honest and concrete national defence policy. What is even worse is that those debates do not seem to lead to any well defined policy.
Such an attitude is totally inappropriate. At this stage of the discussion, we denounce resorting to emergency debates on a national defence policy when the government has not even presented its new white paper on the subject.
I also seriously question the creation of a joint committee of the House and of the Senate to study and define the direction Canada's new defence policy should take. I doubt it is pertinent and financially sound as an operating procedure.
Since there is already a House standing committee which has been given the mandate to study defence issues, we believe a joint committee would only duplicate its efforts, with all the expected drawbacks as far as efficiency and cost effectiveness are concerned. We think the government must avoid such expensive practices which only go to demonstrate that the Senate of Canada is useful and its existence fully justified. This inference alone should lead us to question the relevance of keeping this antiquated and archaic institution.