Debates of Sept. 29th, 1994

Supply

[The Acting Speaker (Mrs. Maheu)]

Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. member, but he undoubtedly knows that questions must be put to the Chair. Members cannot directly ask questions to the minister concerned. The minister may answer the question.

[Herb Gray, Liberal, Windsor West, ON]

Madam Speaker, the McDonald royal commission was created to do its work at a time when there was no equivalent of the Security Intelligence Review Committee. The security service of the RCMP did not operate within a specific legal framework as does the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and there was no mechanism for oversight or review. At that time something had to be set up to carry out the kind of work that SIRC is now mandated to do under the relevant legislation. It was a very different situation.

Now we have a civilian security service that was created specifically by Parliament and which has a specific mandate and authority. It has limitations. For example it cannot look into matters involving lawful dissent; it cannot look into lawful advocacy, protest or dissent. This is clearly set out in the law.

We are dealing with a very different situation today. The experience of the McDonald commission is not relevant. As I said, it related to a time when there was no civilian security service operating in a specific legal framework with an oversight system as we have now.

Finally, the hon. member asked me whether SIRC was seized with certain allegations. Since SIRC is a body independent from me, I am not in a position to comment.

I conclude by saying I am continuously amazed by the interest of Bloc members in anything with the word royal connected to it and in having a royal body set up. Perhaps they should check with Mr. Parizeau who could possibly be very upset to see the interest of the Bloc in this House in relying on and calling for a royal commission.

[Michel Bellehumeur, Bloc, Berthier—Montcalm, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to speak on the motion put forward by the Bloc Quebecois today because I think that it is imperative that we have such a debate. The question we must ask ourselves is why we are now requesting a royal commission of inquiry on the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

I use the term royal commission of inquiry not because I am a royalist, but because I have to use the tools made available to us by this Parliament. Moreover, I would like you, Madam Speaker, to assure the Solicitor General that in an independent Quebec, we will not call such a body a royal commission of inquiry, but rather a state commission, a commission of inquiry of the sovereign state of Quebec.

[Some hon. members]

Right on!

[Michel Bellehumeur, Bloc, Berthier—Montcalm, QC]

That being said, it may be necessary to look at the origin of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to be able to understand the whole problem. You will see that it goes back to the commission of inquiry concerning certain activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, better known as the McDonald Commission, which published its report in 1981. The commission had been established in 1977 in the wake of a series of illegal acts and practices by the former security service of the RCMP.

The McDonald Commission had the mandate to look into illegal activities on the part of a supposedly reputable institution respected by the majority of English Canadians, and I am talking about the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, better known under the acronym RCMP. It is important to go back to the 70s to really understand the history of the secret service in Canada, but first, let us look at the act by which the Canadian secret service was created.

In 1966, the RCMP became the responsibility of the Solicitor General when it was given the status of a government department. Before that, the police force was under the authority of the Minister of Justice. The reorganization that took place in 1970 was the result of another royal commission of inquiry, the MacKenzie Commission, which published its report in 1969. The commission's main recommendation was to create a civilian security service. The commission considered it inappropriate to leave security functions to the ordinary police services, and the special operations branch did not have the complexity or the analysis expertise deemed necessary to play its role in security matters.

It also recommended that a bill be passed to authorize investigation methods like undercover operations, and to improve the security screening process, including the addition of an appeal procedure. Accordingly, a security intelligence service was established under a civilian director. Until then, you could tell RCMP agents by their red uniform, but security agents became less easily identifiable and then, I am sure you agree, unrecognizable.

Let us go back to the 1970s period when things went awry. Uniformed officers, unlike civilians, all had positions of power. At the end of the 1970s, for example, not a single civilian had a position above that of an officer in a planning or operations sub-branch. RCMP employees, therefore, wielded absolute power. Not only did they have police powers, but they were also had considerable leeway with the structure. Civilians knew almost nothing of what was going on in that section of the RCMP.

Ironically, the same thing is happening in 1994 with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, but this time, Parliament itself and the general public in Canada and Quebec are kept in the dark concerning our intelligence service. Questions are asked, but there are no real answers. The fact that elected representatives could not get near or watch the RCMP in those days led to wrongdoings. And believe me, there were a lot of wrongdoings.

The October crisis stunned everybody, both the Quebec population and the government. The then Prime Minister, Mr. Trudeau, did not know, when he invoked the War Measures Act, that he was unleashing a mad dog. I hope, and I would like to believe, that he was not aware of that.

The government realized that it knew very little about the sovereignty philosophy in Quebec. Therefore, it asked the RCMP to adopt an active strategy on that issue and to get all the information it could on the bad separatists.

In several cases and in various contexts, members of the security service committed extremely illegal acts and I think it is worth mentioning again some of the actions taken by the RCMP during those days. They set fire to a barn in order to prevent the so-called separatists or sovereignists from holding a meeting. They broke into the offices of a leftist news agency in Montreal, stole and destroyed files, broke into the offices of the Parti Quebecois, a legitimate political party, and even stole lists of members of that democratically recognized party.

When I think about those days, I still shiver with rage. It is a pitiful page in the history of Canada, especially when you see that one of the people involved, Mr. Normand Chamberland, who was accused of stealing dynamite at the time, has been promoted within the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and is now the Deputy Commissioner for Quebec, no less.

It seems that those responsible for enforcing the law can break it once in a while and even get rewarded for it. It is also important to note that the RCMP did not commit that kind of abuse only in the 1970s and only against separatists. The McDonald Commission indicated that other illegal activities had occurred, such as opening of mail, illegal access to supposedly confidential government information, planned prostitution, blackmail and other actions of that type which had been taking place for a long time with regard to various aspects of national security, from spying and counter-intelligence to subversion.

The main recommendation of the McDonald Report advocated the creation of a totally independent intelligence service of a civil nature and it did so for the same reasons as the MacKenzie Commission did, that is the need to restructure the agency with a view to collecting and analyzing data instead of using mainly deterrence and repression. Therefore, the mandate of the proposed new agency would be defined by legislation and the law would state clearly which threats to Canada's security the agency would be authorized to investigate. The definition would cover four areas: first, espionage and sabotage; second, foreign interference; third, political violence and terrorism; and

finally, subversive activities aimed at destroying the democratic system.

The report also recommended that the new agency be prohibited from investigating legitimate advocacy, protest or dissent, and that it not have the power to implement security measures.

All this led to the McDonald report published in 1981. The government indicated that it would accept the principal recommendation to create a civilian security intelligence service. Subsequently, a special transition group was set up at the Department of the Solicitor General to prepare legislation to that end.

In 1983, Bill C-157 was tabled in the House of Commons to create the Canadian Security Intelligence Service or CSIS, along the lines recommended by the McDonald Commission but with some major changes and additions.

As a result of severe criticism from the public that the service's mandate was too broad, the bill died on the Order Paper. During the second session of the 32nd Parliament, a new bill was tabled in the House. This was Bill C-9 which, for all intents and purposes, incorporated all the recommendations of the commission. Parliament adopted the bill, with very few changes, in 1984.

The legislation was intended to restrict the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and create monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service did not exceed its mandate.

Central to the bill is the definition of the expression "threats to the security of Canada," which determines the general parameters of CSIS. The definition also specifies that lawful advocacy, protest or dissent are not included. If we consider this definition and the allegations published in the media, especially about spying on a democratically recognized party-we have seen that happen before-and investigating the CBC and certain leaders of the Canadian Jewish Congress, there are some very real problems.

CSIS members seem to have trouble with the definition of lawful advocacy. In any case, if the past is any indication of what the future holds, we can assume that members of CSIS have the same attitude as the former RCMP intelligence section, which does not augur well for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. We have the right to know, and we have the right to call for a royal commission of inquiry.

As far as the basic duties of the service are concerned, these are set forth in section 12: to collect by investigation, and analyse and retain, information and intelligence respecting threats to security. According to section 13 of the Act, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service may provide security assessments on future government employees. Finally, under section 16, CSIS may assist in the collection of information relating to defence and national affairs, by investigating and conducting surveillance of any persons, other than Canadian citizens or permanent residents.

As we consider the history of intelligence services in Canada and their questionable activities, which always raise a number of questions in my mind and in the minds of many taxpayers in Canada and Quebec, there is one question we have every right to ask: "Who watches the intelligence agency that is watching us?"

One would expect that in 1994, our institutions would be monitored by people elected through the democratic process as the legitimate representatives of the present Parliament of Canada. Not at all, that is not the way it works in Canada, in 1994. Legislation was enacted to establish the office of the Inspector General and the Security Intelligence Review Committee, better known by its acronym, SIRC, as we said earlier.

The Inspector General is appointed by the Governor in Council and his duties are to review the operational activities of CSIS and to report to the Solicitor General and SIRC, as well as to monitor the legality and relevance of these activities.

SIRC is made up of five members maximum, chosen from Privy Council members, appointed by the Governor in Council after consultation between the Prime Minister and the leaders of recognized opposition parties in the House of commons. We will see that it is not always the case. Its role is to review CSIS operations and to report to the minister and Parliament.

When it comes to reporting to Parliament, MPs are certainly not overwhelmed with information. As parliamentarians we know virtually nothing of what goes on within the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. This department spends millions of dollars, but Parliament, the supreme authority, knows almost nothing.

Those who watch over CSIS were never elected to the job. They are political appointees, and MPs are deliberately excluded.

Do you think I am reassured by the fact that the deeds, or alleged acts, committed under the Conservative government are being investigated by a group with a Conservative majority? Certainly not, it rather worries me. Who are these valiant watchdogs, that some journalists humorously call lapdogs? Three of them are personal friends of the former Prime Minister of Canada, and very, very close to the Conservative Party. Another comes from the ranks of the Liberal Party of Canada; he is a former president of the party. You know him, he is the lawyer who is getting $250,000 to do some kind of inquiry with some native representatives. As a hobby, he sits on the review committee. Quite a review he must do.

The last member was appointed from among the ranks of the NDP. Ever since I have been sitting on the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs and on the Sub-Committee on National Security-I have not seen the latter yet and I wonder whether it is really interested in meeting with us or even in doing its job-I have doubts about the kind of report all of them will be able to produce.

Where are the members representing the current Official Opposition? Where is the member supposed to represent the other opposition party in this House? They are nowhere to be found. We are asked to trust five individuals, appointed by our predecessors, who are looking into extremely important activities which have an impact on their own political party.

The main objective in creating CSIS was probably to have some control or to check into allegations but in reality this has not happened.

As crazy as it may seem, when the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was in the planning stages, some members and certain opposition parties said that there was no need to create a civilian body and that all that was needed was a piece of legislation clearly setting out the RCMP's frame of reference so that it would not go overboard.

For someone from Quebec who has lived through the 1970s, which were a turning point in the history of the province, this seems rather strange. I am not referring to myself as I was still quite young in those days. It is somewhat ridiculous to trust this agency once more, but again some people thought that the RCMP could still do the job.

The only thing I find reassuring is that when the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was created, there were those who thought that its mandate was too broad. I could not agree more with them and history has proven them right.

Similarly, the definition of the word "threat" is very controversial. And again I agree with those who thought at the time that it was so vague that it could encompass a variety of activities not even closely related to real security. Current events have borne this out.

The government is of the opinion that the definition should be interpreted in the context of, on one hand, the provisions protecting legitimate dissidence and limiting the agency's authority to what is strictly necessary and, on the other, the new monitoring and surveillance system. According to the government, within such a context, the definition is a reasonable one.

When I look more closely at the investigative power of SIRC and its access to information, I get scared. I get very, very scared.

Another concern of mine is the range of the SIRC mandate that allows it to use any investigation technique. The two most serious issues have to do with how this organization is being monitored: first, the office of the Inspector General must have access to information, and second, so must SIRC.

We must acknowledge that, before the Sub-Committee on National Security, I was told that SIRC has access to every document possible. Indeed, it has access to all this documentation, but only if the Canadian Security Intelligence Service agrees to hand it out. And that is not how things work out in reality.

SIRC does not have access to Cabinet documents, either. Yet, as we have learned recently, an assistant of a former Solicitor General of Canada can walk out with two cases of documents, with no questions asked, while SIRC is not even aware of the existence of such documentation. This really belongs in the realm of fiction.

Why can we not grant this investigative power to people who have a vested interest in the truth and are able to reassure the public? In fact, this issue was raised when Bill C-157 was debated. We examined the possibility of implementing some kind of parliamentary review, as recommended by the McDonald Commission. At the time, both Opposition parties and some government members supported the creation of a special Parliamentary committee which would have had access to information regarding CSIS to ensure that it does not overstep its mandate.

Madam Speaker, you are indicating that my time is almost up, yet I could go on and on.

I want the government to know that there is no way we can get definite answers to our questions if we leave it to SIRC. I have sat and I still sit on the Sub-Committee on National Security. When an elected member of Parliament, a legitimate representative of the people is told by witnesses that they do not have to answer either yes or no, we have a problem. A very serious problem indeed. The system is sick. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has become a monster that no one can control, not even Parliamentarians, and this is totally unacceptable in 1994.

That is why only a royal commission of inquiry can get to the bottom of this issue. Taxpayers would then get satisfactory answers to questions they have been asking ever since the creation of CSIS in 1984.

[Patrick Gagnon, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to Solicitor General]

Madam Speaker, I did indeed listen carefully to the comments made by my hon. colleague from the Opposition. First, the hon. member referred to events that occurred in 1970, which I think is a rather sensitive period, but we are not here to go through that again, since this was already covered by the McDonald Commission, which led to the creation of SIRC and CSIS.

Moreover, I find rather strange that when abuses are discussed, those which happened in the 1950s are never mentioned. The hon. member did not mention the Padlock Act passed by the Union Nationale. They went after the Asbestos workers in 1949. They went after my constituents in Murdochville. I find it passing strange that nothing is said about abuses done either at the federal level or especially at the provincial level.

I am not here to criticize the province or the country, but I would like nevertheless to indicate to the hon. member that SIRC was created to ensure the presence of a civilian body operating at arms length both from CSIS and the government itself. We are looking forward to the report SIRC should present in the next few weeks, and I am sure it will be to everyone's satisfaction, or at least I hope so. We will see what we will be able to discuss here with the Opposition members.

[Michel Bellehumeur, Bloc, Berthier—Montcalm, QC]

Madam Speaker, I think that the hon. member did not ask a direct question but made some questionable allegations, which is even worse.

He said that I referred to the events of 1970. Yes, I did. I do not think that we have to go back to 1950 to dig up provincial problems, when the RCMP is exclusively under federal jurisdiction. We are here to prevent more overlapping, to see that the present Constitution and set-up are respected. Later on, when Quebec has decided on its future, it will be different story.

I must say to the hon. member that if we consider what happened in the 1970s and the information released by the CBC on CSIS's investigation of some members of the Jewish Congress in Toronto, the possibility that CSIS financed or helped found the Heritage Front, the employment of Bristow, a member of Heritage Front, as a bodyguard of the leader of a recognized party, I think that we can make comparisons between 1970 and 1994. There are still reasons today to demand a royal commission of inquiry, just as there were when the McDonald Commission started its hearings in 1977. All we want is to get answers to the questions we have been asking since that time. We never got any answers.

Just by looking at the Harlequin reports published once a year by the SIRC for the past two or three years, it is obvious that we will not be able to get answers even though we, as parliamentarians, were democratically elected by the people of Canada to oversee and monitor public expenditures. These little documents published by the SIRC from time to time will not shed much light on these activities. We need a royal commission of inquiry and I think we have enough allegations to warrant the setting up of such a commission. If there is nothing serious in these allegations, why is the Inspector General of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service looking into the matter? Why is the SIRC looking into the matter and why were its people so nervous when they approved before the Sub-Committee on National Security of which I am a member?

Why is it that parliamentarians felt the need to create this Sub-Committee on National Security to study these allegations? Because they had good grounds for doing so. But, despite all that, we will not get any answers unless we set up a royal commission of inquiry to look into the matter. Then our questions would be answered.

[Val Meredith, Reform, Surrey—White Rock—South Langley, BC]

Madam Speaker, I would like to ask my hon. colleague from the Bloc why he is not prepared to give SIRC an opportunity to prove it is incompetent of coming up with a report that is satisfactory to us.

The hon. member and probably most other members in the House know how I feel about the make-up of the Security Intelligence Review Committee. It is not a make-up of which I approve. It is not a process of which I approve. However I feel we should allow it to do its job and then judge whether or not the report is adequate and fulfils the needs of the Canadian public to know the facts.

Why is the hon. member unprepared and unwilling to let SIRC complete the report, then sit in judgment and ask for a further commission to be established because the committee has not done its job rather than accusing it of not doing its job when it is not given the chance to do it.

[Michel Bellehumeur, Bloc, Berthier—Montcalm, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to answer that question from my hon. colleague whom I admire and for whom I have a liking since we once worked together. There is something else I admire about her, her naivety.

When the SIRC came before the Sub-Committee on National Security, we could see that we would not get answers to our questions. To questions as simple as: "On what date did Mr. So-and-So contact Mr. Such-and-Such?" the Service member's answer was: "I cannot answer you, Mr. Bellehumeur".

When I asked other questions on facts not related to national security, I was told: "We cannot answer you, Mr. Bellehumeur. We will take note of that question and we will get an answer for you, but it will come from the Solicitor General of Canada, not from us".

What will we get from the SIRC? What answers will we get to our questions? Answers censored by the Solicitor General of Canada? That does not satisfy me. Nor does it satisfy the taxpayers I represent. We really need a royal commission of inquiry, where the principals will come face to face with us and will be compelled to give the commissioners answers to the questions we asked and to which we did not get answers from the SIRC.

[Patrick Gagnon, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to Solicitor General]

Madam Speaker, does the hon. member realize that the review committee can enter any office or public institution and visit all the premises, examine every document, voucher, or file in that office or institution? I get the impression the hon. member did not quite understand when the Solicitor General said the review committee has the same powers as a royal commission of inquiry.

I do not see any purpose in having a royal commission. Since members opposite always complain about duplication, why should we have a royal commission? We already have a review committee, the SIRC. We all know that SIRC was created precisely to investigate allegations such as those made recently.

[Michel Bellehumeur, Bloc, Berthier—Montcalm, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thought that, after one year in Parliament, the hon. member would have lost some of the illusions he still seems to harbour.

[Patrick Gagnon, Liberal, Bonaventure—Îles-De-La-Madeleine, QC]

Madam Speaker, on a point of order. I object to that personal remark. I asked a question and I want to get an answer. Let us leave character out of this.

[The Acting Speaker (Mrs. Maheu)]

Order. The hon. member knows that no reference to another member's character should be made in this House.

[Michel Bellehumeur, Bloc, Berthier—Montcalm, QC]

Madam Speaker, I apologize if I insulted the hon. member, but nevertheless, that is what I think.

[The Acting Speaker (Mrs. Maheu)]

I believe that the hon. member knows what he is saying, since his words are very well chosen. I ask him to withdraw them.

[Michel Bellehumeur, Bloc, Berthier—Montcalm, QC]

Which ones? He made two objections. Does he want me to withdraw the expression "I think" or the comments that I made on him?

[The Acting Speaker (Mrs. Maheu)]

I consider that the member has withdrawn his words.

[Patrick Gagnon, Liberal, Bonaventure—Îles-De-La-Madeleine, QC]

You know, Madam Speaker, the Opposition member is still a good devil. I rise today to speak on this motion.

[Michel Bellehumeur, Bloc, Berthier—Montcalm, QC]

On a point of order, Madam Speaker. I believe that the member just attacked me by saying that I am a devil, whether a good or a bad one, but still a devil. I would ask the member to withdraw his words.

[The Acting Speaker (Mrs. Maheu)]

Does the parliamentary secretary withdraw his words?

[Patrick Gagnon, Liberal, Bonaventure—Îles-De-La-Madeleine, QC]

Madam Speaker, I did not use them pejoratively.

[Michel Bellehumeur, Bloc, Berthier—Montcalm, QC]

I accept the hon. member's apologies.

[Patrick Gagnon, Liberal, Bonaventure—Îles-De-La-Madeleine, QC]

As I was saying, I rise today to speak on this motion which, as the solicitor general mentioned, involves a certain number of problems and misunderstandings. It seems essential to me that the members of this House understand and fully appreciate the complex and sensitively ordered system of checks and balances that is part of our national system of security intelligence.

Also, that system is designed to ensure a balance between the protection of individual freedoms and the need to protect the Canadian public against threats to the security of their country. Most people will agree that we must protect Canada against threats to its security and that this protection requires a security intelligence agency.

There is no doubt in my mind that Canada needs a security intelligence service, as all other industrialized countries do. Let us take for example the threat that terrorism involves. Canadian democracy is based on a climate of freedom and political objectives are met through open discussions, debates or other legitimate activities toward lawful advocacy.

However, that climate, as well as public safety, is jeopardized when an individual or a group is trying to meet those political goals through violence or threat of violence.

In the 1980s, terrorism became a major concern for safety and the government gave CSIS the mandate to gather, on a priority basis, security information on terrorism. Our first line of defence must be information.

The other thing which is threatening us is espionage. Since the emergence of nation-states, espionage has become part of everyday life. Every nation is striving to improve its position within the international community. However, we have to admit that even if the political scene is better world-wide, some nations still resort to deceptive or clandestine activities for the purpose of enhancing their international position.

Canada must protect itself against such threats, whether they take the form of traditional espionage or of any other means of illegally obtaining the technological know-how of this country.

Canada must also be able to identify and to thwart steps taken by foreign countries or agents seeking to secretly influence or harass our ethnic communities. Again, we must protect those who have elected to settle in Canada and make it their new homeland.

Here also, the gathering of good intelligence is at the very heart of our first line of defence. I am convinced that the CSIS Act is an efficient piece of legislation, enforced according to the wishes of Parliament set forth ten years ago. The CSIS Act provides a legislative framework likely to ensure the delicate balance between efficient national security and the respect of

individual rights and freedoms. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act defines the mandate of CSIS and gives it the necessary powers to fulfill it.

It provides a unique operational framework for CSIS. It defines the powers of the service and specifies its limits. These take the form of various control mechanisms: political controls, subject to ministerial accountability and responsibility; judicial controls and external controls by the Security Intelligence Review Committee, or SIRC.

The act also provides a mechanism allowing any person or group of persons to complain about any aspect of CSIS activities. Furthermore, the Security Offences Act, which was passed at the same time as the CSIS Act, confirms the RCMP's responsibility concerning security offences, as well as its responsibility in preventing such offences.

These two acts provide a legislative framework flexible enough to adapt efficiently to the circumstances of each case. Furthermore it should be emphasized that the political and judicial structure of these two acts is unique in the world. The government used policy directives to guide their interpretation and implementation.

The main stakeholders in the Canadian security intelligence system made sure that the legislation was practical and efficient. The service has developed and follows a strict and satisfactory investigation procedure. Since 1984, the Inspector General and the Security Intelligence Review Committee have played their role in an orderly and strict manner.

The Solicitor General relies a great deal on their work, especially on the reports of the Inspector General that enable him to make sure that the service is conforming to legislation and following departmental directives on orientations. The review committee's annual report that the Solicitor General tables in Parliament completes the annual cycle of public accountability.

Finally, the RCMP and CSIS have established measures and developed mechanisms for co-operation. This is how the legislation works today. Solid legislation, detailed government instructions and an efficient internal administration are the elements which allow the service to fulfil the mandate it received from Parliament ten years ago.

The government does not stop there. I wish to remind everyone that this government is constantly trying to find means to improve the quality of the service. As the minister responsible for CSIS the Solicitor General must make sure that in its daily operations the service maintains a fair balance between national security requirements and the rights and freedoms of Canadians. The minister does that by using his authority to approve and to give directions and also by relying on the reports of the Inspector General and the review committee.

Therefore, his task is to exercise a ministerial control. He answers for the CSIS to cabinet and to Parliament. Two main processes allow the minister to fulfil that responsibility. The first one is his approval or concurring authority.

In keeping with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Solicitor General must personally approve all investigation warrant requests, all agreements concluded between CSIS and other organizations, departments, provinces and foreign countries, and all requests for data collection in Canada by CSIS on behalf of foreign countries.

Now, let us examine the other act, passed in 1994, the Security Offences Act. This act confirms the RCMP's overriding responsibility in investigating certain security offences. Intelligence gathering, protection and enforcement are the three pillars of our security system.

The RCMP and CSIS have complementary functions. Each service assumes a distinct role within the wider framework of our national security system. CSIS is responsible for gathering intelligence concerning threats to security and giving warning about such threats. The RCMP is responsible for investigating into offences, either planned or committed and, above all, for crime prevention.

In order to facilitate CSIS's task, the CSIS Act contains detailed definitions of possible threats to the security of Canada.

This enables CSIS to rapidly adapt to circumstances in our constantly evolving world and to ensuing threats, as was Parliament's wish ten years ago. For example, the CSIS Act has allowed this organization to adapt to political and economic upheavals in the world during the last ten years.

Although areas of concern are not the same, we can still feel very strongly that hostile intelligence services threaten our national security. In matters of terrorism, new threats to the security of Canada have evolved as a consequence of foreign conflicts being unfortunately introduced into Canada. Terrorism is a scourge that spares no nation on Earth. Unfortunately it does not seem to be receding, quite the contrary.

Ever since its creation in 1984, CSIS has been able to evolve considerably thanks to the flexibility provided by the act and to ministerial directives. The act continues to give us the necessary means to face any subversive action. Naturally, because of its very nature, a security intelligence service must remain secret. This is particularly necessary in some cases, when the right of someone to privacy is to be protected.

Secrecy is also required to protect certain operational activities like staff distribution, modes of operation and sources of information. Everybody recognizes that secrecy as an end in itself does not serve anyone.

I have touched on the kind of security intelligence system that Parliament wanted to meet the needs of democracy, and I have touched on some of the real threats that make such a system a necessity in a democracy.

I am only echoing the words of the Solicitor General when I say that we do not need to set up a royal commission of inquiry, because we already have in place systems like the SIRC, that have the wide powers necessary to conduct an in-depth inquiry.

Therefore, before deciding on anything, let us wait until the Security Intelligence Review Committee has completed its job and submitted its report to the Solicitor General. This should be done shortly. Once the report has been submitted, as parliamentarians we will be able to take the necessary steps.

[Suzanne Tremblay, Bloc, Rimouski—Témiscouata, QC]

Madam Speaker, I want to congratulate my colleague for his very enlightening speech. I also want to congratulate him on making his remarks entirely in French, from beginning to end, which is a first in this House for him.

If I understood the member correctly, the Solicitor General rubber-stamps special mandates, and one must trust that everything is in order since the agency publishes a new annual report every year.

I read the report made public in 1993. It is a ten-page document, with each page only half full to make room for some very interesting graphics. It is not with such a report, that would hardly meet grade 12 standards, that we are going to reassure the population regarding certain allegations.

The Bloc Quebecois has never questioned the need for such an agency. I believe that any self-respecting nation ought to have this kind of agency; there is no doubt about that. The point we raised is that allegations were made and if the Solicitor General approves everything, this means that he knew that someone was spying on the Reform Party from within. This is intolerable.

That is why, in case of allegations, one must go beyond the annual report. Do you know how difficult it is to get into CSIS? It takes about one hour to get all the doors unlocked. If they see you coming, they obviously have the time to put any file they do not want you to see in false-bottom drawers. There is no guarantee that an investigation can get all the facts. If something is secret, top secret, or top, top, top secret, obviously you will not find it lying on a table. It will be securely locked up in a file drawer nobody has access to.

How can we guarantee that an investigation will get to the bottom of things? That is what we are wondering. This is the reason why we say that it is all nice and dandy to wait for the report, but the allegations are too serious. We are just about to enter very difficult times in Canada. We are no fools, but we want to make sure that what happened in 1970 will not happen again. We do not want to see history repeat itself. We want to go through this difficult transition as adults and in accordance with democratic principles, not with a top secret service which is going to plant bombs whenever it pleases.

So I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to the Solicitor General how can he guarantee that we are protected from such an occurrence?

[Patrick Gagnon, Liberal, Bonaventure—Îles-De-La-Madeleine, QC]

Madam Speaker, first of all, the allegations made before CIRC about CSIS will be examined. This is not an annual report, but rather a report that will examine the issues and the allegations that have been made against the intelligence service by the opposition. I must conclude, however, that there are members on this side of the House who are on the sub-committee looking at allegations about our security intelligence service.

I can also tell you that, in answer to the member for Rimouski-Témiscouata, one of the things we have recognized, particularly with respect to the CIRC and CSIS, is that it is unacceptable that such a group be asked to spy on a legitimate political party. I think that everyone in this House recognizes that this is not the goal of this government and that if it has already been done-I was not there then-but I can tell you this: I know these are difficult times, but I am nevertheless happy to hear that the hon. member recognizes the importance of having an intelligence service with a mandate to ensure Canada's integrity, particularly in light of the industrial and technological espionage that we see nowadays.

I can assure the member that it is not the goal of the service to spy on political groups.