House of Commons Hansard #100 of the 35th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament's site.) The word of the day was csis.

Topics

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12:50 p.m.

The Acting Speaker (Mrs. Barnes)

My list shows the member for Durham. We have just heard from one side and we are alternating government and opposition and we now have the government speaker.

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12:50 p.m.

Liberal

Alex Shepherd Liberal Durham, ON

Madam Speaker, a clever motion has been put to the House that evokes a memory of transgressions from a bygone day. If approved, it would not serve the interest of Canadians or the lawful process that legislators designed to ensure their national security.

There are a large number of Canadians who are unclear about the role of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. These are serious people. If they are confused it is because they have been brought up on the myths about what an intelligence organization does.

I want to dispel some of these myths. Today I want to talk about what CSIS does and what it does not do.

There is the issue of law, of accountability and of democracy. The point I want to make is that CSIS exists because of those things, not despite them.

Nearly 50 years ago Canadians discovered, courtesy of Igor Gouzenko, that the Soviet Union was operating an espionage network here. The RCMP was asked to counter it and for decades it did. It became clear over time that police work and intelligence work were different. Police work involved enforcing the law, catching criminals and prosecuting them. Intelligence work involved warning governments and protecting people from acts by foreigners or by Canadians who threaten the security of our country.

The role of warner is very different from the role of enforcer. By its nature good warning requires good information. There are many ways to get information and some of them can conflict with civil liberties and the law. For that reason, among others, the Mackenzie commission of the late 1960s followed by the McDonald commission in the late 1970s both recommended that Canada's intelligence service be civilian in nature and that it be governed by a strict regime of law and accountability of review.

Simply put, CSIS exists because the government found that the rights of Canadians had not been adequately protected. In other words, the purpose of CSIS is to protect rights, to work within the law to be accountable to the elected Government of Canada.

There is probably no intelligence organization in the world that functions with a law that is so strict and comprehensive and as clear. The legislation governing some intelligence organizations elsewhere is often a few general paragraphs in length. Sometimes legislation does not even exist. The CSIS act is 29 pages long. Nine of those pages are devoted to outlining how what CSIS does is to be monitored, reviewed and approved by others outside. No other part of the federal bureaucracy is subject to such strict rules.

CSIS is under direct ministerial control and direction responsible to cabinet and responsible to Parliament. When CSIS engages in surveillance activities that are intrusive, such as electronic techniques, the director has to be personally satisfied in each case that the use of such techniques is necessary, that all other avenues have been exhausted and that the use of that technology is both lawful and within the mandate of the service. If it is not it does not happen. Even if the director thinks an action is justified, that is not good enough. The CSIS act requires him to secure the approval of the minister, the Solicitor General. If he does not approve, it does not happen. If he does, it does not end there. The case must be put to a judge on the Federal Court of Canada. There are no exceptions.

In addition, the law establishes two review agencies. One agency is internal with an independent auditor called the inspector general, with his own staff to report to the minister directly. He has complete access to literally everything that the service does.

The second review agency is external. We know it as the Security Intelligence Review Committee or, as some have mentioned, SIRC. It is independent both of CSIS and of government. SIRC also has its own staff. It has access to absolutely everything. It reports to Parliament annually. Its role, as it has described it, is to ensure that CSIS does things right and does the right things.

When CSIS was first created, SIRC found fault with some of what was done. It still does, but it stated in its 1991-92 report much has changed: "In the early years of this committee's mandate CSIS acted to a great extent as if it were simply a continuation of the RCMP security service. Despite public assertions to the contrary, SIRC felt that most CSIS targets, policies and procedures were virtually unchanged from those of a security service and that the CSIS preferred source of recruits was still the RCMP. It took over three years for this state of affairs to change significantly. CSIS is now virtually a new organization, hardly recognizable any more as the direct descendant of the security service of the RCMP. The number and type of CSIS targets, the rigorous justification required before anyone or any group is designated as a target, the lucidity, logic and balance of warrant affidavits submitted to the Federal Court, and the tone and content of reports by intelligence officers on target files have all changed significantly for the better. We still have criticisms to make, but our criticisms are no longer based upon strong and fundamental disagreement with the CSIS view of the world".

CSIS is a better organization because of that review process, but the mechanism of review and reporting have extended well beyond the work of that committee.

In 1987 Gordon Osbaldeston who had been clerk of the Privy Council was asked to look at CSIS. He recommended changes to the services top level organization, a new approach to training, development, and an improved infrastructure for CSIS. Those changes were made.

In 1989 Parliament reviewed the CSIS act, five years after it was created, and found that an organization to counter terrorism and espionage and to provide intelligence to the government was still needed in Canada.

In 1991 the then government responded to that parliamentary review. The best summary of its conclusions in terms of the service and the act of Parliament that governs it is provided by the title of the report, "On Course".

The third review since 1984 was done in the winter of 1992-93. The Solicitor General asked the director at that time to conduct a full review of the service and how it should change to take account of the end of the cold war and present and future threats to Canadian security. Today's service reflects the changed reality.

CSIS was created to enhance accountability, not evade it. CSIS was created to observe the rights and liberties of all Canadians. The law that governs CSIS is clear. The review that governs CSIS is comprehensive. The accountability of CSIS to the government is complete and the process of change and reform has been constant.

CSIS reflects our cultural diversity and many more women are part of the operation. Two out of three employees have been hired since 1984. The service has expanded dramatically its capacity for research and analysis including in depth long term studies of global security problems of relevance to Canada.

Hundreds of graduates in business administration, in history, in economics and in social sciences have been brought in. These people are not spies as some would prefer to believe. Many of them are analysts. Most are not sitting in some attic with a wire in their ear; they are at a desk reading. Much of what they analyse is open source material or information received from friends and allies.

The CIA estimates that 55 per cent of its finished intelligence product comes from open sources, in some areas 80 per cent. That makes two points. First, the other 20 per cent is also crucial. It is the stuff the guys they are trying to understand do not want them to know. It is what makes intelligence work differently and hopefully sometimes better than work produced internally from open sources. Second, the value added more often than not comes from brains, not bugging.

CSIS is not in the business of collecting information for collection sake. It is in the business of taking information, analysing it, integrating it, understanding it and then passing it on to the government. What CSIS does would be of no use if it kept the information for itself. It does not. Its role is to pass it on, to inform the government, to warn it and to reassure it. So the people are different and the focus is changing partly because old threats have disappeared and partly because new threats have emerged.

Security and intelligence was not the invention of the cold war. In Canada that function has been performed since the mid-nineteenth century when Sir John A. Macdonald asked the western frontier constabulary to patrol the borders of Upper Canada and to report on American Civil War activities that might affect Canada's security. The intelligence function was performed and continued until the cold war commenced. The beginning of the cold war was not the beginning of the need for intelligence, and the end of the cold war does not mean the end of that is near. Indeed some challenges have been made worse by the collapse of the Berlin wall.

There are two types of threats that CSIS is responsible for meeting. The first is public safety. The second is national security. I will deal with public safety first. Simply put, public safety involves protecting Canadians against violence. Violence can come from abroad through terrorism. Violence can be fostered here through extremism or the support of terrorism elsewhere. Warning of that potential violence and its prevention is called counterterrorism. That was not a worry for Canada for most of the forties, fifties and sixties, but with the explosion of terrorist groups and the incidents of the seventies it became a serious concern.

It became clear that Canada was not immune with the 1982 assassination of a Turkish diplomat in Ottawa. So too the takeover of the Turkish embassy in 1985 and the shocking tragedy that same year with Air India in which 329 Canadians died. CSIS shifted its responses and its resources to match the new threat.

In 1984 when CSIS was created only 20 per cent of its resources were devoted to counterterrorism and 80 per cent was devoted to counterintelligence. By 1992 the picture was dramatically different: a full 56 per cent of the operational resources were devoted by then to counterterrorism.

Public safety or the protection of Canadian lives is the number one priority. It is also the number one difficulty. The sources of terrorism geographically are diverse. Groups come and groups go. The inventions, activities, movements and targets of individuals and governments are almost impossible to predict. Their methods are by definition extreme. Their reach is global and the consequences of failure are severe.

The challenge of Canada's security service is to ensure this country is not the place where people are killed. That is not the only challenge. There are four others. We do not want to be the country where terrorism is planned. We do not want to be the country in which money for terrorism is raised. We do not want to be the country where the material to commit the act is bought.

We do not want to be the place where the terrorists hide after the deed is done.

In a sense dealing with the cold war was much easier. It was fairly obvious what countries the spies came from. Opposing intelligence specialists were extremely familiar with each other's habits. There was almost a code of conduct. It was all somewhat predictable, almost choreographed. That predictability, that order, is not there with terrorism.

The terrorist threat is not diminishing. The technology of terrorism is becoming more accessible, more convenient. The sources of terrorism remain strong: nationalism, religious and political extremism and state sponsored terrorism. There is a correlation between the proliferation of terrorism and the proliferation of regional conflict. Regional conflict continues. There is also a correlation between ethnic unrest and hatred and the proliferation of terrorism.

Looking at Asia, the former Soviet Union, eastern Europe, Africa and even Northern Ireland, it is clear that unrest will continue. Unfortunately Canadians will always be vulnerable. Our borders are open and long. We are a wealthy industrial society, a good target for extremists, a good place to secure equipment, technology and funds. Links of family, emotion, ideology and culture exist among millions of Canadians and societies abroad. When conflicts grip those countries the echoes can be felt here.

The concerns of Canada's security intelligence service are several: first, to prevent the spread of homeland conflicts to Canada; second, to prevent the exploitation of immigrant countries for fund raising to support those conflicts; and, third, to prevent terrorism or support for terrorism that originates here in relation to conflicts abroad.

The job of CSIS is early warning. It passes that information on to the government. Each year hundreds of threat assessments are prepared for the government by CSIS. The vast majority of them dealt with terrorism. Much of what it does involves dampening concerns rather than increasing them.

Let me now turn to the second major priority of CSIS, national security. Simply put, this is about spying. Its job is to counter that. That is why it is called counterintelligence. The focus is on the activities of the organization that are the creatures of foreign governments.

CSIS is concerned about countries that are one or more of the following: potential enemies equipped with weapons of mass destruction capable of striking Canada; countries that seek to develop such weapons through threat and theft of technology; countries that violate our sovereignty by meddling in our ethnic communities; countries that try to exercise repressive control over their citizens in Canada who are here on visitor exchanges; and countries that seek to prejudice our economic security by covertly gaining access to our leading edge technologies.

Throughout the cold war much of CSIS activity was devoted to countering those activities, but that was before the Berlin wall fell. What about the new world order? Unfortunately some of the new world order is not new. Arms control agreements have been negotiated and are substantially reducing the nuclear threat that is still there.

Other countries continue to conduct espionage operations here because the reasons for spying remain strong. Communists did not invent spying; the desire for national advantage did. Spying is a cheap way to acquire weapons technology whether conventional or weapons of mass destruction.

The proliferation problem is getting worse, not better. We have much of that technology here. It is at our nuclear, chemical and pharmaceutical industries; in our electronic sector; and in our machine tool capacities. As long as we are an open and wealthy country with a leading economy, countries will come here to spy and not simply for weapons. Developing countries eager to catch up with the rest of world find espionage a highly efficient way to modernize their economies. Former communist countries may begin to resort to intelligence gathering for the same reason. Everyone is after the competitive edge.

In conclusion, the motion admonishes the government for not having set up a royal commission. I have already mentioned the Security Intelligence Review Committee. In addition we have established a parliamentary committee to further examine specific aspects of CSIS.

This is not to detract from what may well have been useful exercises, but I have here summaries of various costs of royal commissions: aboriginal peoples, $13 million over nine months; national passenger transportation, $23 million over three months; Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future, $23 million over eight months; and reproductive technologies, $25 million over three years. The list goes on.

Members of the Bloc have accused the government of creating deficits on the backs of Quebecers. Here is a clear case of the Bloc proposing the wasting of taxpayers' money on more studies that benefit no one. More interesting is the fact that the Bloc members, through their own representation on parliamentary committees, are saying they are so inept to carry out investigative powers the electorate has bestowed on them that we have to pay outside experts to do their jobs.

I do not think the taxpayers of Canada and especially those in Quebec will be pleased to learn of that. This motion is an insult to all people of Canada who are so concerned about controlling government spending and getting our economic house in order.

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1:15 p.m.

Bloc

André Caron Bloc Jonquière, QC

Madam Speaker, I listened carefully to the excellent speech on CSIS made by my hon. colleague from Durham. It is no doubt necessary, in a modern state, to take special measures in order to ascertain that activities related to espionage, foreign interference and revolutionary subversion are not carried out within a state's territory. I think the member has explained very clearly why there is a need for an organization to monitor these kinds of activities. However, the opposition motion before us today deals with a somewhat different subject.

I am a little sensitive to these questions because my name was on the list of members of the Parti Quebecois that was stolen by members of the RCMP's security service in the 1970s. When I had the honour of being elected by the people of Jonquière to represent them in the House of Commons, some of my friends warned me, because I am a known sovereignist, a separatist as many of our colleagues opposite like to say. I was a separatist in the 1960s, and it looks like I am still a separatist in the 1990s.

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1:15 p.m.

Liberal

Peter Milliken Liberal Kingston and the Islands, ON

Yes, and next week you will be a federalist.

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1:15 p.m.

Bloc

André Caron Bloc Jonquière, QC

You may rest assured, my dear colleague from Kingston and the Islands, that I will be a sovereignist for the referendum.

When my friends saw that I was going to Ottawa as a member of Parliament, they told me that I would be under surveillance by the RCMP. I told them that I was not particularly worried because we are in a state governed by the rule of law and I did not think such a threat was real.

When I look at the issue before us today, I realize that CSIS seems to have taken questionable measures. But I am not supposed to worry because we have a review committee. I do not want to know what is going on in CSIS, but I want to rest assured that it is well supervised and monitored. However, present members of the review committee have been appointed by the previous government, and parties then represented in this House had their say in those appointments. There are three Conservatives, on Liberal and one New Democrat sitting on this committee. I imagine they are all good federalists, and people with a certain vision of Canada.

I do not trust those members. Sad to say, I do not trust them to see to it that my rights as a Canadian and a Quebecer are respected by CSIS. I am not sure they will do it. The Reform Party was infiltrated by CSIS, and I am not sure the same thing did not happen with the Bloc Quebecois.

Those issues are important. People are sceptical and the present review committee cannot set their minds at peace. Does my hon. colleague think it would be important, for the sake of democracy, to have a royal commission of inquiry even if there are costs involved? I think that in view of the present membership of the review committee, we should spend whatever money is needed. Would the hon. member for Durham agree that a royal commission should go to the bottom of those allegations made in the media about the Canadian Security Intelligence Service?

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1:20 p.m.

Liberal

Alex Shepherd Liberal Durham, ON

Madam Speaker, the essence of the hon. member's question is whether CSIS is accountable. I went through the process and CSIS seems to be just as accountable as every other government department through Parliament. That is a fundamental of our democratic system.

It is a ludicrous assumption to me if we are saying that a royal commission is needed every time something has to be investigated, whether it has to do with CSIS, the Department of Industry or anything else. What would be the purpose of Parliament if we resorted to a royal commission every time a problem arose? We have made too much use of royal commissions and studies. The Library of Parliament is full of them, many of which are just collecting dust. What we are saying is that to move away from that process is a total disregard of our parliamentary traditions.

More important is the cost. Clearly, the cost would be justifiable if there was an invasion of civil liberties, but the reality is that we have the functions here. There are all kinds of systems which scrutinize CSIS. Why spend the extra money? With the deficit running at billions of dollars it seems totally ludicrous that we would even think about a royal commission on something that already has tremendous investigative advantages.

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1:20 p.m.

Reform

Margaret Bridgman Reform Surrey North, BC

Madam Speaker, I would like the hon. member to clarify a couple of points in relation to the actual function of CSIS. I thank him for the overview.

It is my understanding from his presentation that CSIS was actually born from the RCMP out of a need to counteract Russian spying at that time. Since the cold war has ended and the Berlin wall has dropped the need which originally called for the start up of CSIS is gone.

When the cold war existed 80 per cent of CSIS activity was in counterintelligence which falls under the national security point of the two points outlined. Considering there is now no cold war tends to imply that the public safety component of CSIS should probably go back to the RCMP. It seems to be an early warning system and once it is identified is referred to the appropriate

sources to carry out in any event. Under national security I believe the counterintelligence involvement is now 56 per cent. I am wondering if the role of CSIS is becoming unnecessary. Maybe we should be looking at some other component.

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1:20 p.m.

Liberal

Alex Shepherd Liberal Durham, ON

Madam Speaker, the essence of the hon. member's question is whether it go back to the RCMP. The hon. member wonders why the RCMP cannot carry out those functions.

My dissertation tried to point out the significant difference between law enforcement and intelligence gathering. It appears the birth of CSIS and indeed other intelligence gathering organizations like the CIA were predicated on the assumption that they had a unique role.

The second part of the hon. member's question was whether there is a need for that today. It does not take much reading of our local newspapers to see that terrorism still exists around the world. We have been treated to the terrors of Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Hercegovina and other areas. These do have attachments to Canada; people who live here have relatives in those countries and so forth.

The answer is yes, it appears there is a need. In fact due to the globalization and technology there may well be a greater need today than there ever was before.

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1:25 p.m.

Reform

John Duncan Reform North Island—Powell River, BC

Madam Speaker, I will be splitting my time with my colleague from Crowfoot.

It is a pleasure to rise today to contribute to the debate on the security of our country. I am aware that by its very nature and its inception in 1984, CSIS and much of its work must be kept secret. The lives of individuals involved in CSIS work, contacts and ultimately all Canadians would be at risk if the wrong information got into the wrong hands. However this does not and should not preclude parliamentarians on behalf of all Canadians from discussing this secret agency, its work, mandate, activities, and the manner in which we review the scope of activity, namely through the Security Intelligence Review Committee otherwise known as SIRC.

The work of CSIS in protecting the interests and security of Canadians is not in question. Canada being such an open society must be as vigilant as ever to the threat of subversive action. We must be conscious and sensitive to Canada becoming a proxy battlefield between immigrant groups who want to continue their hostilities on our soil. Remembering that Canada has the highest rate of immigration in the western world and therefore has extra exposure in that regard, we must be vigilant.

While it is important to acknowledge these potential threats and reaffirm our support for CSIS, it does not mean that CSIS is ultra vires or some untouchable CIA type derivative. Accountability still remains the hallmark of the nature of this country, its public servants, politicians and those on the public payroll.

Canada is one of the few western democracies to give its security service an explicit statutory charter. It provides a defined mandate for the operations of the agency. It interposes a system of judicially defined authorized warrants in the agency's use of intrusive investigation techniques. It establishes monitoring and review bodies. These purport to ensure that the agency does not indeed act outside the limits of its mandate.

Therefore the question is: Is it doing so? It became obvious during the four years of existence of the McDonald commission in the late 1970s that illegalities and improprieties were rampant in the security service branch of the RCMP. The principal recommendations of that report called for an entirely civilian security agency. This agency was to be politically accountable and subject to strict review. The report concluded that law enforcement and security work are incompatible.

Accordingly, Bill C-157 which was introduced in May 1983 was put into effect in order to form this new security agency. However, it died on the order paper after much debate, committee review and public criticism. During the next session of the 32nd Parliament Bill C-9 was introduced and incorporated virtually all of the proposed changes and amendments as prescribed during the Bill C-157 debate. This was proclaimed in August 1984.

The act assigns the management and control of CSIS to the director, a cabinet appointee. The Solicitor General is given an active supervisory role. Originally the bill had adopted a model similar to Australian legislation which would not have given the minister any operational role whatsoever. This was ostensibly to ensure that CSIS could not be used for partisan purposes. The act now provides that the minister has an override and must approve all warrant applications. The act also establishes the office of Inspector General and the Security Intelligence Review Committee. The Inspector General is to monitor CSIS operations and to report to the deputy Solicitor General and to SIRC on the legality and propriety of these operations.

SIRC is a committee composed of five Privy Councillors appointed after consultation by the Prime Minister with opposition leaders in the House of Commons. It is to conduct a review of CSIS operations and to report to the minister and Parliament on them. It also has a variety of investigative duties; deals with complaints and acts as an appeal board with respect to security assessments and security influenced decisions under the Citizenship and Immigration Act.

During its 10 years CSIS has had growing pains. The House of Commons set up a special committee in 1989 to review the CSIS act and the Security Offences Act. The committee had 117 recommendations. Its report called "In Flux but not in Crisis" generally concluded that the system was sound and any reform should be based on the continuance and extension of already established institutions.

The government's response set out its belief that legislative changes in the CSIS act and the Security Offences Act were not needed. Further it was unwilling to contemplate structural changes.

In February 1991 a debate was held on an opposition motion that the House of Commons concur in the committee's report which recommended a parliamentary subcommittee on national security. The subcommittee held its first meeting in June 1991.

On May 3, 1994 this same standing committee on justice and legal affairs re-established the subcommittee on national security which is the committee currently looking into the Bristow affair. The motion was a close vote and almost did not happen.

Let me now turn to the formation of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, euphemistically known as SIRC. In 1984 the then newly installed Tory government announced the initial membership of SIRC. In order to meet the requirements as prescribed in the act as a condition to sit on SIRC, two individuals had to be sworn in as Privy Councillors on the day of their appointments. The politics had begun, the die was cast and suspicions were raised. Naturally, due to the Privy Council appointment requirements, four of the first five appointees were ex-cabinet ministers and the fifth a well placed Quebec City lawyer.

Today we have five politically appointed partisan individuals on the review committee; three from the Tories, one from the Liberals and one from the NDP. This was a Mulroneyism.

What is its function? The security committee is to act as the eyes and ears of the public and Parliament on CSIS. The committee is intended to be independent of the government and its operations but responsible to the Parliament of Canada. The CSIS act provides that its members are appointed by the Governor General in Council after consultation with the leaders of all parties having more than 12 members in the House of Commons.

Is it independent? Is it another politically charged patronage agency made up primarily of Tory cronies? Is it conducting constructive and an apolitical review of CSIS and its activities? We need to know and perhaps the only way is to investigate the investigators.

We do not want to emulate the travesties perpetrated by our neighbours who have created monsters in the form of the CIA. If we are not vigilant and take the time to review agencies like CSIS after 10 years of work, it is easy to lose control of their function and scope of activity.

Under the legislation SIRC does not have access to cabinet documents. For this reason I suggest that the requirement that members of SIRC have Privy Council designation or past cabinet experience is unnecessary and should be abolished. Instead have individuals cleared by the RCMP and if they meet the top security clearance available they fit.

Why would one require a PC designation when one does not have access to cabinet documents? This change would lend itself to appointing independent members and not has been cabinet members.

I would also like to recommend changes to the length of appointments to SIRC. Currently the five-year appointment allows a former administration to protect itself from a new administration. At the present time we have the first of the Tory appointments to SIRC expiring in December 1996 and the latest one in 1998. All may survive this administration, assuming the next election is held before December 1996. Four or five will survive if the election is held before November 1997.

At the same time the Liberal committee appointee, Michel Robert, the same individual who worked Saturdays and has a non-tendered $249,000 contract from the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, ensures that the current administration has one of its cronies who can keep track of things. It is a joke and nothing more than political patronage that surely does not lend itself to independent review of CSIS operations.

What we need is legislative permanence being granted the parliamentary subcommittee on security and legislative authority as well. This will at least meet the original recommendation of the 1991 review of national security and give us a body whose investigative powers include the ability to investigate cabinet, which SIRC cannot.

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1:35 p.m.

Liberal

Derek Lee Liberal Scarborough—Rouge River, ON

Madam Speaker, I want to recognize the very thorough job my colleague opposite has done in preparing and delivering this speech. It was refreshing to hear recalled some items of recent history.

I appreciated the relatively thorough research that he obviously did in relation to the mechanism for appointing members to the Security Intelligence Review Committee. He has articulated a concern in relation to those appointments, i.e., the method by which consultation is or is not done with leaders of the parties in the House of Commons before such appointments are made. This is a point that I raised in the House in the last Parliament.

At that time, as an individual member, I appeared not to have been heard by the then Prime Minister, who is solely responsible for those appointments, so the hon. member's remarks are refreshing.

I would like to ask him if he could elaborate on what process would be used in relation to a possible parliamentary subcommittee that would be different from what exists now in Parliament, where there is a subcommittee whose mandate includes the general area of oversight of the security intelligence envelope.

Could he elaborate or provide more particulars as to how he would change what is there now in relation to parliamentary committee operations?

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1:35 p.m.

Reform

John Duncan Reform North Island—Powell River, BC

Madam Speaker, I would like to recognize the very important role that the member opposite has played in establishing that subcommittee. He has been the driving force. I must say I have had a crash course in CSIS since notification that this motion was coming forward.

I would like to see permanence of that standing subcommittee through legislative authority. I would also like to see the standing subcommittee have a very real role in the appointments to SIRC. In other words they should have a vetting role as opposed to just an interview role.

I would certainly be open to any other constructive suggestions the member might have.

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1:40 p.m.

Reform

Jack Ramsay Reform Crowfoot, AB

Madam Speaker, the overriding question that must be answered regarding the Brian McInnis-Grant Bristow affair is whether CSIS and other institutions of government were politicized by the Brian Mulroney government and whether the McInnis-Bristow incident was the premeditated extension of that politicization.

Rod Stamler, a former assistant commissioner of the RCMP has indicated clearly, not only in Paul Palango's book Above the Law , but in open line radio programs across the country that the RCMP was politicized by the Mulroney government and that it was denied a free hand in the investigation of political and other corruption in Canada.

When we look for evidence of this very serious allegation we see several disturbing incidents. We see the accusation of Shelly Ann Clark about deception and deceit in the Canada-U.S. free trade deal and her continuous complaint that her concerns were never fully investigated by the RCMP.

We see the accusation of Glen Kealy of kickback schemes run by members of the Mulroney government and in particular the case of Roch LaSalle which has never been finalized in court. We also see the case of Alan Eagleson, a close friend of the former Prime Minister, where detailed evidence of wrongdoing was placed in the hands of the RCMP, the Metro Toronto Police and the Law Society of Upper Canada and absolutely nothing of consequence was done.

Yet the U.S. justice department, after looking at the very same evidence, have laid 34 indictments against Mr. Eagleson, issued a warrant for his arrest, have frozen his American bank account and have initiated extradition proceedings to have him stand trial in the United States.

These incidents strongly support the allegations of Mr. Stamler that there has been political interference in the administration of the RCMP and in the administration of justice, that politicization of the RCMP under the Mulroney government did occur and that evidence of wrongdoing by government members and friends of government was not, and has not, been properly investigated.

I have been advised by individuals close to the situation that it would be much easier to politicize the Canadian Security Intelligence Service than to politicize the RCMP. When I asked my sources to explain this I was told that the Solicitor General has the power under the federal statutes to demand secret and classified information, including complete files and names of informants from CSIS.

This is supported by the fact that at least eight boxes of secret and highly classified documents seized from Brian McInnis's residence came directly from the Solicitor General's office. Why does the Solicitor General have to have possession of such highly secret documents? Why does he have to have possession of CSIS documents at all?

This is evidence that Doug Lewis, the former Solicitor General, was directly involved in the operation of CSIS. This was not an arm's length relationship. Mr. Lewis was directly involved.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act grants the Solicitor General full knowledge and power of direction over the policies, operations and management of CSIS. As well, the assistant deputy Solicitor General sits on the CSIS target approval and review committee and has direct input into what groups and individuals are targeted by CSIS.

The question is to what extent, if any, did the former Solicitor General politicize CSIS either through the assistant deputy Solicitor General who sat on the committee that determined who and what CSIS was to target or his own direct involvement or both? This question must be answered.

In the speech the Solicitor General gave in the House today he attempted to negate the Bloc's request for a royal commission hearing into this matter by claiming that SIRC has a mandate to do the same work. This is not true. SIRC advised the subcommittee looking into this matter that it could not investigate matters once they reached the Solicitor General's office. This means that SIRC has no power whatsoever to determine whether the former Solicitor General politicized CSIS. This is a central question

beyond the mandate of SIRC. Was CSIS used for political purposes under the direction of Doug Lewis?

Therefore, there is a need to look not just at this matter but to look at the whole question of the politicizing of our federal institutions by the Mulroney government, including CSIS and the RCMP.

There is the clear suggestion that there has been a deliberate dismantling of the division of power between those who create the law and those who administer and enforce the law. This is the much broader and more serious question raised by this whole McInnis-Bristow issue and that is has the rule of law been destroyed or harmed in this country?

Therefore I reject the submission made in this House today by the present Solicitor General that SIRC can do the job. It is obvious SIRC cannot look into misuse and abuse of political powers within the office of the former Solicitor General or any other institution of government. Therefore its mandate is inadequate.

Our hopes must rest with the subcommittee. If the subcommittee fails to get to the bottom of the issue and answer all relevant questions, the demand for a full scale inquiry will be justified at that point.

SupplyGovernment Orders

1:45 p.m.

Liberal

Derek Lee Liberal Scarborough—Rouge River, ON

Madam Speaker, I must admit that it was with some surprise that I took note last night of the opposition motion that a royal commission be invoked to deal with a number of allegations that have been put in the media of late, over the last month or two, in relation to both the mandate of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the security of documentation that emanates from CSIS and as it might make its way to the minister who reports to this House for CSIS which is the Solicitor General.

These events out of which the allegations arose took place two, three, four years ago. In any event, the opposition has made its motion. Before dealing with the substance of the motion I would take note, as others perhaps have done before me, that the use of the word illegal in the motion might be construed as unparliamentary. That word has been found to be unparliamentary in the past. I recognize the courtesy of the opposition in changing the wording of the motion earlier today to allegations of illegal activities.

I would have preferred to see the words allegations of improper activities because no one has been very particular about what illegality there might have been.

Any illegality there might have been would surely have been related to the mandate of CSIS. To draw an analogy, if someone in the department of agriculture decides they are going to do something involving the Department of Health that is surely not a matter of illegality per se.

In any event, I will abandon the technical issues and attempt to speak to the motion.

Other colleagues in the House have noted appropriately the work of CSIS on behalf of Canadians. CSIS has for 10 years been carrying on this type of work which involves gathering and analysis of intelligence and preparation of security clearances, providing security reports and analysis to other departments of government.

The member who just spoke referred to a security clearance by the RCMP. The RCMP does not do security clearances. This is the job carried out for Canadians by CSIS.

The work of CSIS focuses primarily around what are called threats to the security of Canada and these defined threats are outlined in section 2 of the CSIS act and they include espionage and foreign influenced activities. Sometimes CSIS activity is described under the category of counter intelligence. Some of that work includes the so-called spying which occurs in Canada on the part of some operations of other governments.

There is the area of counter terrorism. Terrorism may or may not involve a foreign government and there is also a category of threat to Canada which we call subversion but in relation to which the service does not carry on any investigative activity without the expressed consent of the Solicitor General. The last time we checked here on the parliamentary side we did not find any ongoing CSIS operations in relation to subversion.

Most of what CSIS does, most of the good work it does, never gets reported. Because of the nature of the work it does not prepare press releases every Friday afternoon for consumption by the media or for that matter consumption by anyone. Most of its good work is done quietly at desks using paper and computers and good common sense. That work carries on both in making security assessments and in the gathering of data mostly from open source. Most of the data it gathers come from open sources and it also has data that come from other non-open sources which it gathers using appropriate and legal methods.

It assists both the Government of Canada and generally the citizenry by keeping an eye on foreign government theft of industrial secrets and it also keeps an eye on what we would call foreign meddling, meddling in Canada by governments outside Canada using whatever means it wishes. That is probably a bit of a cat and mouse game that goes on in all countries of the world.

Why does the official opposition request a royal commission? We have in this country a statute that governs CSIS, a statute that by comparison to other countries in the world is relatively modern, up to date, effective.

I am not one of those who takes the view that the CSIS statute is perfect. The record will show that I have attempted to make constructive comments both in the House and in the CSIS five year review on ways in which we could alter the CSIS statute. I point out that not all countries do have statutes that govern their security intelligence system.

As we speak today, I understand that the people of Great Britain are about to invoke a statute which was recently passed and codify a statute which oversees and regulates the work of the security agency known as MI5. That is quite a step for the people of Great Britain to take. They have never had a statute that governed the area that James Bond used to work in. They will then develop their statute as they see fit.

Australia has a foreign intelligence gathering agency which has no statute. I believe that everyone in the agency is employed by contract to one person and that person is employed by their government. A single person constitutes this particular agency. There is no statute that would confirm or deny even the existence of the operations which that agency carries out.

In addition to our statute which has a series of sections that oversees and monitors what CSIS does, we have the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC, whose job it is to review all of the work of CSIS, all of the work done under its mandate, to make sure that work is done within the law and efficaciously. There is a whole range of challenges there for the Security Intelligence Review Committee.

SupplyGovernment Orders

1:55 p.m.

The Speaker

It being 2 p.m., pursuant to Standing Order 30(5), the House will now proceed to statements by members, pursuant to Standing Order 31.

Dominic CardilloStatements By Members

1:55 p.m.

Liberal

Janko Peric Liberal Cambridge, ON

Mr. Speaker, I would like to join my colleagues from Kitchener and Waterloo in paying homage to Kitchener Mayor Dominic Cardillo.

Dominic Cardillo is being honoured today by the citizens of Kitchener for his tremendous contribution to their city. He was first elected as alderman in 1963 and has served as mayor of Kitchener for the last 11 years. Such longevity during a time when politicians are not very popular is a testament to Dom's integrity and hard work.

Mayor Cardillo must be congratulated for his tireless promotion of the interests of Kitchener. During his tenure Kitchener has grown in population and has matured as a city. His greatest achievement is the new city hall which provides a strong, people oriented focus to the municipal government and downtown Kitchener.

Dom Cardillo has been a model civic leader whose dedication to the interests of his constituents will long be remembered.

Defence ConversionStatements By Members

1:55 p.m.

Bloc

Yves Rocheleau Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC

Mr. Speaker, in the red book, the Liberal Party promised to support defence conversion. However, this promise applies only to the English-speaking provinces, as the CNTU revealed yesterday.

The Maritime provinces, which lost 3,000 jobs when military bases were closed, have now received $20 million to help diversify their economy. Quebec lost nearly 1,000 jobs as a result of similar cuts and received a meagre $200,000.

Furthermore, during the past four years, Quebec's defence industry lost 7,000 jobs and is still waiting for the federal government to adjust Defence Industry Productivity Program.

This is one more example of the injustice done to Quebec. The Prime Minister's only concern is how to put Quebec in its place, and he is doing a good job of it.

Yorkton-MelvilleStatements By Members

1:55 p.m.

Reform

Garry Breitkreuz Reform Yorkton—Melville, SK

Mr. Speaker, I am proud to report that this past week the 10th Annual Canadian Student Leadership Conference was held in my riding of Yorkton-Melville. This conference originated 10 years ago in Yorkton and has been growing ever since.

This year over 1,000 high school delegates and leaders came from every province and territory in Canada, and even some students from south of the border. It was an opportunity for them to share their experiences with other student leaders and to encourage one another in achieving their dreams.

At the same time as the student leadership conference, the first annual Canadian high school finals rodeo championship was held in Yorkton as well. This rodeo was also a highly successful event and I am proud to report that the best high school rodeo team is from Saskatchewan.

The top male high school champion was Jason Resch from Saskatchewan and the top female high school rodeo champion was

Kelly Rood, also from Saskatchewan. Let us tip our hats to our future leaders. Congratulations to all the organizers and participants.

By the way, the conference next year will be held in Bathurst, New Brunswick.

Criminal CodeStatements By Members

1:55 p.m.

Liberal

Gurbax Malhi Liberal Bramalea—Gore—Malton, ON

Mr. Speaker, last week I received letters on a very serious issue from the mayors of Brampton and Mississauga and the Coalition for the safety of our daughters.

Both Mississauga and Brampton have bylaws that prevent strip clubs from hiring persons under the age of 18. But many municipalities across Canada do not have such bylaws in place or do not have adequate resources to enforce them.

I join with the mayors of Brampton and Mississauga and with the coalition in calling upon the Minister of Justice to immediately amend the Criminal Code of Canada to provide for the prosecution of strip club owners who employ persons under the age of 18.

Autumn FairsStatements By Members

1:55 p.m.

Liberal

Pat O'Brien Liberal London—Middlesex, ON

Mr. Speaker, as the colours of the country's landscape begin to change and farmers begin to harvest their crops, the annual fall fairs are now in full swing. The fair is a longstanding tradition in Canadian communities where families, friends and neighbours come together to celebrate the autumn season.

In my riding of London-Middlesex I have had the opportunity to attend and participate in the Dorchester Fair; the Thorndale Fall Fair; the Lambeth Harvest Festival; the Iderton Fair; and southwestern Ontario's largest, the Western Fair.

Tremendous community spirit and long hours of hard work make these fairs memorable events enjoyed by both my rural and urban constituents alike.

Congratulations to all the dedicated people in London-Middlesex who worked so hard to make fairs the great success they are.

Gun ControlStatements By Members

1:55 p.m.

Liberal

Barry Campbell Liberal St. Paul's, ON

Mr. Speaker, millions of Canadians are quite distressed by the attempt of some to distract us from the legitimate debate which must take place about guns in Canadian society.

A large majority of Canadians want tougher gun control because the presence of guns in our cities, our towns and our homes decreases the safety of all of us. I understand the need of hunters and farmers for long guns but gun ownership in this country is a privilege, not a right.

These are the basic facts: Guns kill people and handguns in particular have no other purpose. Registration of all weapons would only be a minor inconvenience for those who need long guns to hunt. Handguns and assault weapons are not needed for hunting or by farmers for pest control.

I respect the right of Canadians to choose their hobbies but hobbies should not dictate public policy. Demolition car drivers do not control highway policy. Sport shooters should not try to dictate gun policy.

I urge the government to ensure that public safety is paramount in our gun policies. All considerations are not equal in this debate. We must address the smuggling of weapons and the use of guns in the commission of an offence, but outlawing handguns and a registration system will contribute to a safer Canada.

Registered Retirement Savings PlansStatements By Members

September 29th, 1994 / 1:55 p.m.

Bloc

Maurice Dumas Bloc Argenteuil—Papineau, QC

Mr. Speaker, the Minister of Finance is determined to remain silent about any plans he may have to tax our RRSPs and refuses to make a formal commitment not to tax them.

The Minister of Finance turns a deaf ear to public opinion and is using current consultations to deflect any questions. Senior citizens have often saved for years to have a decent income in their old age.

What is the minister telling them today? That he cannot guarantee their incomes will not be further reduced.

The government wants to change the rules in the middle of the game. Although the minister has been stalling for several days, he will have to make a decision. Seniors hope he will select the only fair option: no taxation of RRSPs.

Canadian Broadcasting CorporationStatements By Members

2:05 p.m.

Reform

Cliff Breitkreuz Reform Yellowhead, AB

Mr. Speaker, remember when you were a kid and your mother forced you to eat broccoli even though you despised it? It looks like good old mother corp is trying to force Canadians to swallow yet another concocted dish. This one tastes more like stale fish.

First, the government floated the idea of taxing theatre tickets and movie rentals to raise revenues for the floundering CBC. I guess giving it over one billion bucks per year just is not enough. Now CBC television wants cable companies across the country to carry a new French language all-news station. It seems the companies do not want to carry it so mother corp wants the CRTC to force them to run it, even if no one wants the service, and this with our national debt exploding at over $530 billion.

At least when mom forced us to eat our broccoli she had our best interests in mind and she did not charge us for it.

Humanitarian AidStatements By Members

2:05 p.m.

Liberal

Jane Stewart Liberal Brant, ON

Mr. Speaker, Canadians in their actions are demonstrating our prowess as peacekeepers and as providers of humanitarian aid.

I think of a resident of Brant and a good friend of mine, Sidne Maddison, who one day in June received a phone call asking for her assistance in Rwanda with Médecins sans frontières . By the end of the day she had left her job and her family and left for Rwanda to act as a nurse.

On her return home she spoke of other Canadians who worked with her in her organization, in the Canadian Red Cross, and of course our armed forces personnel who daily risked their lives in the name of peace.

These people truly are ambassadors for Canada. I salute them for their courage, for their commitment to humanity, and for extending the good name of Canada across the world.

BraveryStatements By Members

2:05 p.m.

Liberal

Geoff Regan Liberal Halifax West, NS

Mr. Speaker, last Sunday a man was saved from drowning in Prospect Bay by two brave men. Gary and Richard Peddle of Whites Lake in my riding of Halifax West demonstrated great courage as they pulled 74-year old John Laverdure from the water.

Mr. Laverdure, a neighbour of the Peddle family, was more than a metre under when Gary plunged into the chilly waters of Prospect Bay and pulled back to the boat. District 4 volunteer firefighters are also to be commended for aiding Mr. Laverdure once back to the wharf.

I am pleased to inform the House that John Laverdure has been released from hospital and is very well, thanks to the efforts of Richard, Gary, and the entire Peddle family. It is indeed heart warming to know that such acts of selflessness and bravery still exist.

National Translation DayStatements By Members

2:05 p.m.

Liberal

Ronald J. Duhamel Liberal St. Boniface, MB

Mr. Speaker, tomorrow we celebrate National Translation Day. Many of us on Parliament Hill regularly take advantage of the exceptional services provided by interpreters, translators and terminologists who belong to the Canadian Union of Professional and Technical Employees.

You will know, Mr. Speaker, that translation is offered in both official languages and indeed in over 100 languages for the Government of Canada, its elected members and its civil service. We are fortunate to have such dedicated, efficient, capable personnel to provide us with these exceptional services.

I extend to them very sincere thanks on behalf of all of us in the House.