Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak on Bill C-295, an act to provide for the control of Canadian peacekeeping activities by Parliament and to amend the National Defence Act in consequence thereof.
I have no doubt that the bill was motivated by the concern of all members for the well-being of the Canadian forces personnel and for a wise and sound decision making process on the part of the government.
Unfortunately I have to say that after close study of the bill, in my opinion it might on serious consideration make the process a little worse than the situation that we now have in place. For that reason I oppose it.
Before describing the details of my opposition, I have a general observation to make that applies to much of the thinking that emanates from our hon. colleagues on the Reform benches. It is a tendency that I see reflected in this bill to look for American models in matters of public policy in Canada.
This tendency skews the vision and certainly on our part. I do not believe we can make policy on the basis of the trends and obsessions of our American neighbours, as much as we respect and admire them. We are not them and their examples are foreign to our needs and purposes.
The government has gone to great lengths to ensure a made in Canada defence policy. In fact, members of all parties were members of the special joint committee that put together an outstanding report. I say this not in any sense of gloating but in modesty. Ninety-five per cent of it is reflected in the white paper. It is a Canadian defence policy and one that reflects Canada's needs and aspirations. I for one-I am sure I am joined by many others-would want to keep it that way.
Bill C-295 would restrict the prerogative, the speed and the discretion of the crown to determine Canada's contribution to the United Nations for reasonable peace operations. Like other military operations, peacekeeping is carried out under the authority of the Minister of National Defence under the National Defence Act. It provides that the minister has the management and direction of the Canadian forces and of all matters pertaining to national defence. The bill would remove the responsibility and the discretion not only of the minister but also of the government respecting military operations.
As a result, the bill would adversely affect the speed with which the government can respond to UN requests for assistance in peace operations as well as the timeliness with which it can respond to changes in the peacekeeping mandate.
One of the major problems cited by many former Canadian UN commanders is that it takes too long for the international community to become involved in times of crisis. Most recently Major-General Romeo Dallaires has been an eloquent and passionate advocate of the need for speed in emergencies, claiming that he could have saved tens of thousands of lives had he received the troops he needed when he requested them.
Bill C-295, which would add another layer in the decision making process, would ensure that it would take still longer for Canada to become involved and to provide help. In an emergency we should treat it like one and act urgently. The bill would also create an unworkable structure for the management of international Canadian forces operations. All potential operations are evaluated against a series of guidelines that include the broad political and foreign policy context, the overall mission requirements and, of course, our own military capability.
The 1994 defence white paper outlines certain key principles intended to help the government assess the various factors to be considered before deciding whether Canada should participate in a mission. These guidelines are based on the peacekeeping experience we have acquired over the last 40 years. They also illustrate in a careful but pragmatic way the new international world order that has followed the end of the cold war.
The white paper highlights the key principles that must guide the design of all peacekeeping missions. These principles are as follows: first, there must be a clear and enforceable mandate; second, there must be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority; third, the national composition of the force must be appropriate to the mission, and there must be an effective process of consultation among mission partners; fourth, in missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there must be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures; finally, with the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, Canada's participation must be accepted by all parties to the conflict.
Canada's experience also suggests that successful missions are those that respect certain essential operation considerations. Some were touched on by the hon. member. The size, training and equipment of the force should be appropriate to the purpose at hand and remain so over the life of the mission. There should be a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure and clear rules of engagement.
To look at another aspect, I believe Bill C-295 would give up Canadian sovereign command of Canadian forces elements and would create in its place an unworkable command and control relationship. In this area, in particular, I have problems with the intent of the bill.
Canadian forces personnel now serving on peace operations are always commanded by a Canadian. Command of Canadian forces personnel is no longer given up to allied or UN command, as it was during the first and second world wars. Canadian units and personnel can only be placed under the operational control, not the operational command, of the UN or other multinational commanders for specific tasks.
The practical difference between the two is that when Canadian forces are deployed under operational control, changes to the task assigned or significant changes to the area of operation cannot be implemented. For example, the UN would have to seek Canadian approval to deploy Canadian forces UNPROFOR personnel to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia from Croatia, should the need arise. Such approval would not be required under operational command.
On the other hand, a non-Canadian commander who only has operational control cannot assign separate deployment of components of a unit. For example, the force commander of UNPROFOR who has operational control of Canadian forces personnel cannot unilaterally assign, for example, B company of 2-PPCLI to the British battalion. Such a deployment would require Canadian national approval. If the commander had operational command, there would be no requirement for such Canadian approval.
Currently, commanders of Canadian contingents are directly responsible to the chief of defence staff for the Canadian contribution to the overall mission and tasks of any given operation abroad. The subclause of Bill C-295 which calls for the Canadian commanding officer to be placed under UN or other international command would be contrary to current practice and would mean less, not more national control, something my instincts tell me is far from being the intent of the bill.
Bill C-295 would restrict Canada's capability to contribute to the strength of a fast reaction force on standby. As the hon. members probably know, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and myself have launched an initiative to assess the short, medium and long term implications of a United Nations fast reaction force and a possible Canadian contribution to this effort in the future.
Let us come back to Major-General Dallaire's plea for rapid deployment to Rwanda and in response to other international crises. Whether or not Canada participates in a given mission, when the decision is made to participate, timeliness is often crucial. This bill, if passed, would slow the decision-making process down almost every time there is a crisis.
In summation, I regret I do not support Bill C-295. I know the hon. member has put a lot of work into it and I appreciate the comments he has made. However, under the guise of providing greater control by the Parliament of Canada of international peacekeeping operations, I believe it tends to confuse certain key concepts, some of which I have alluded to. It reduces national authority over our peacekeeping troops abroad. It significantly restricts one of the government's prime assets, the flexibility and ability to manoeuvre and shape our resources to suit rapidly changing requirements in dangerous times.