moved:
That, in the opinion of this House, the government should consider the advisability of amending Canada's system of arms export controls by requiring that export permits for military products be granted only after the Department of Foreign Affairs has conducted and tabled in the House of Commons a Security Impact Assessment determining that the proposed export will enhance international security.
Madam Speaker, I rise today to ask the House to support Motion No. 290 which calls on the government to consider improving Canada's regime for controlling arms exports. I am proposing that the government should be required to determine that a particular export of military equipment would improve international security and table that security impact assessment in the House of Commons before granting an export permit.
This motion addresses the continuing threat that the international arms trade poses to international security over so much of the developing world. The persistence of the trade in arms at unacceptable levels in the aftermath of the cold war is creating a residual harvest of death that must not be overlooked in the sigh of relief that comes from not being as close as we were for years to the nuclear abyss. The arms trade today is fueled both by the hangover of the cold war and by the unabated addiction of the developed economies to the economic spin-offs of military spending.
The hangover is the need to get rid of stockpiles of outdated weapons and equipment while retrieving some economic benefit. In Canada we have seen this aspect of the problem in the government's attempts to peddle Canada's fleet of CF-5s, first to Namibia and now reportedly to the Philippines through some American broker that wants to barter the planes for a gold mine.
Elsewhere, as highlighted recently in a Veterans Against Nuclear Arms newsletter, the American government has recently sold off large quantities of inventoried advanced weaponry to more than 60 countries at bargain basement prices, worsening arms races between Turkey and Greece, Israel and Egypt and Chile and Argentina.
Equally ominous, the Russian arms industry is reported by the International Institute for Strategic Studies to be accumulating large stockpiles of military equipment and supplies that were ordered by the Russian armed forces but for which the Russian state is now in no position to pay.
The arms industries resist the shrinkage of military spending in the wake of the cold war through attempts to persuade governments they still need the "baroque arsenals" of the cold war, to borrow a term from the prominent British disarmament expert, Mary Kaldor, or that they need to continue to invest large sums of money in R and D for new weapons.
They also resist the shrinkage in their opportunities by cultivating new markets in developing countries. In a report released earlier this month, the International Institute for Strategic Studies has shown that the post-cold war decline in the international arms trade has reversed this year as arms suppliers eagerly seek out growing markets in the Middle East financed by rising oil prices and in east Asia, where there is a nascent arms race beginning to spiral into dangerous proportions.
As Oscar Arias, Nobel peace prize winner and former president of Costa Rica, has recently pointed out, there is something perverse in the fact that the five permanent members of the security council who are supposed to be promoting peace are also the five largest arms exporters and hence promoters of war and insecurity.
In Canada, we certainly conform to the perverse trend that Arias points out. There seems to be little indication of a fundamental rethinking of Canadian security policy. At the same time, as reported in recent issues of the Ploughshares Monitor , Canadian exports to non-NATO countries are going up with aggressive marketing in the east Asian region.
Potentially the most dangerous component in the cold war's harvest of death is the continued threat posed by the existence of
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons grade nuclear material. Our cautious optimism about the steps taken recently toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty should not lead us to underestimate the scale of the dangers that will persist until the nuclear genie is put back in the bottle.
There is the environmental problem of storing plutonium which remains highly toxic for thousands of years, a problem that directly affects Canada because the Liberal government has expressed support for the idea of burning the world's weapons grade plutonium in Candu reactors and presumably burying the waste somewhere in the Canadian shield.
There is the possibility of nuclear terrorism, either through the theft of a nuclear weapon or through the construction of a nuclear device by a terrorist organization or rogue state.
I found Walter Lequeur's conclusion in a recent article in Foreign Affairs that such an event, far from a remote possibility, was better described as ``apocolyse soon'', to be highly unsettling. Not to mention that if Candus in Canada begin to use plutonium it will only be a matter of time before other Candu possessing countries argue that they too could have access to plutonium, with all the danger that such a development would involve for nuclear weapons proliferation.
The Liberal government's decision to go ahead with the sale of a Candu reactor to China, with no environmental assessment or public consultation, and in the full knowledge of China's willingness to help some countries develop a nuclear capability, gives Canada little moral authority to preach to the world about nuclear responsibility.
The flourishing of the arms trade and the persistence of the nuclear threat, despite the end of the cold war, has been a matter of immense disappointment, if not surprise, to those who thought that there were grounds for optimism at the end of the cold war in 1989.
For one thing, the collapse of the communist regimes came about in large part as a result of the mobilizing of popular democratic movements. If people power could bring down the military industrial complex in the east there was the prospect that the much more developed democracies could so in the west, especially since the military contest which had legitimized grotesque levels of public expenditures on the military had disappeared.
There were, therefore, high expectations that the end of the cold war could bring a large peace dividend to the former contestants in the cold war and to the international community at large. Military budgets could be greatly reduced and public spending could be redirected to more socially useful ends. International assistance could be given over entirely to legitimate development programs rather than military assistance.
This optimism rested on the assumption that with the end of the cold war and its horrifyingly surreal definition of international security as residing in the nuclear balance of terror, it would open up some political space for an authentic conception of international security as residing in the elimination of poverty, respect for the environment, respect for basic human and political rights and the notion of common security as opposed to collective security based on nuclear terror.
Governments could spend on international development and engage constructively in the political development of many developing societies as a way of achieving genuine international security rather than propping up authoritarian regimes as cold war stooges and militarizing their regional conflicts.
This assumption has not proved true. In the first place, the madness of the nuclear arms race and balance of terror has not given way to the hoped for conception of common security based on strengthening the international community through poverty reduction and environmental protection. It has instead been replaced by a vision of international society in some powerful circles which attaches no meaning or value to the international community at all, and which prefers a world where the U.S. plays the role of global policemen picking and choosing what merits intervention and concern. The jobs can sometimes be contracted out to countries like Canada as long as there are no vital strategic interests at stake.
In this dominant, neo-liberal vision of the world as a giant, unified marketplace, a playground for the few hundred multinationals that dominate international trade and where states are increasingly becoming marginal actors, the idea of common security is as scarce as the idea of the common good.
Globalization usually figures centrally in criticisms of the drift of the world economy. However, it must also be of great concern to those concerned about international conflict and the arms trade.
The proponents of globalization offer no prescription for the deep poverty and social and institutional underdevelopment of so many societies rooted in the accelerated polarization that is taking place as the market becomes the only forum for the international community. The resulting poverty and environmental degradation will be the main source of international conflict in the coming years.
A second danger posed by globalization is the complete absence of a moral compass for public policy generally and foreign and defence policy particularly. The growth of the notion that states do not have responsibilities that may interfere with the commercial interests of companies has led to the neutering of the state as a morally proactive agent in the arms trade as in so many other areas of public policy.
When the president of the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada says, as quoted in the June issue of the Ploughshares Monitor that ``it is not for those who manufacture or assemble weapons to grapple with the moral issue of who the arms should or should not be sold to'', we are not surprised.
However, it is outrageous for the Liberal government to adopt such a position. When the Minister of Industry says, quoting again the same issue of the Ploughshares Monitor , that ``We need to recognize that there are and always will be conflicts-that we have Canadian defence firms with expertise, we have Canadians who are employed in these businesses, and we want them to succeed''. When we hear that kind of quote we know that the moral handicap which I talked about is now epidemic and metastasizing throughout the body politic.
The ethos of globalization has not offered a new vision of international security. It not only offers no solutions to the development problems that fuel international conflict and hence the arms trade, it offers no moral regime in the context of which governments could regulate the arms trade, which like all other human endeavours in the dominant market paradigm is seen as a market opportunity rather than as an ethical challenge.
Let me now turn to the particular problems of Canadian involvement in the international arms trade and propose a way forward to meet the challenges of developing a responsible public policy in response to the arms trade.
The Canadian defence industry is, according to the 1995 report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agent, the 10th largest exporter in the world. Since the end of the cold war it has experienced a loss of American orders and has become proportionately more dependent on Canadian government orders. However, it has managed to catch the international trend and capture a growing export market in non-NATO countries.
One of the defining characteristics of Canadian exports is its role as a supplier of parts and components to American suppliers, a trait that led a recent Ploughshares Monitor article to label the Canadian industry as a bit player.
These exports are unregulated and unreported, making it difficult to trace the end user of parts. This has not stopped others from reporting on how often Canadian exports end up in the hands of regimes with appalling human rights records or who are engaged in destabilizing defence policies.
It also means that the policy decisions about where our military exports should be permitted is handed over to the Americans, not a very reassuring situation. When the Pentagon advises the Clinton administration, as it recently has, to lift the ban on exporting high technology weapons to Latin America, Canada becomes a silent partner to such a disastrous policy. To allow Latin American militaries access to high tech weapons threatens to turn back the clock on the process of democratization. It will reinvigorate the military establishments, whose past excesses are contained only under very fragile truces with civilian authorities in many Latin American societies, and will siphon moneys badly needed for social development into the sinkhole of growing military budgets.
What needs to be done to improve this situation? At the most fundamental level, Canadians need to insist on at least a little intellectual consistency in Canadian defence and foreign policy from the Liberal government.
The government cannot take a leading role in the movement to abolish anti-personnel mines, a commendable course of action, and turn a blind eye to the export of arms or components through American intermediaries to human rights abusers.
The government cannot take pride in the peacekeeping operations of the Canadian Armed Forces and at the same time allow Canadian arms exporters to supply arms to the same local conflicts which the peacekeepers might be sent to address.
Look at Canadian military exports to Turkey, which totalled close to $26 million from the years 1990 to 1993, and may include a potential sale of CF-5s to the Turkish air force. Why should a government that otherwise professes to be seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict between Turkey and Greece, or the Turkish government and the Kurdish community in Turkey for that matter, be arming the Turkish government?
The same could be said of the dramatic cuts in Canadian development assistance under the Liberals. They are part of the international trend to abandon the poorest of the poor to the mercies of the global market, a policy which will only engender more international and civil conflict and the need for even more peacekeeping missions.
You should not boast of your skills as a firefighter if in your spare time you are an arsonist, or at the very least play a lot with matches.
The motion I am putting forward today is a proposal for a concrete improvement to the Canadian regime for arms export controls. It is inspired by Ernie Regehr's proposal published recently in the Ploughshare's Monitor .
The proposal set out in the motion would require the government to prepare a security impact assessment before granting any export permit. It would have to table the report in the House of Commons. This measure would bring two major improvements to the current regime.
First, it would place an onus on the government to show not only that the receiving party met certain standards of not being on a particular blacklist of sanctioned states, but the government would have to demonstrate that a particular export would enhance international security. This would force the government to pause before allowing an export to a country or region that might otherwise have an acceptable bill of health in terms of human rights performance or not being in a particular conflict at the present time but which in any case could be destabilized by an emerging arms race.
For instance, the government would be forced to demonstrate how particular arms exports to east Asia or the Middle East, where destabilizing arms races are now escalating, would serve the interests of regional or global security.
The second benefit would of course be increased transparency, a chronic problem in the international arms trade which is habitually conducted under the table. The tabling of the security impact assessment in the House of Commons would in itself add to the transparency of this secretive trade. Greater transparency will in and of itself assist in the task of building responsible behaviour in the arms industry.
This proposal is not of course the only improvement needed to our public policies on arms exports. One of the main problems remains the export of components to American manufacturers of weapons systems and other military equipment. Because there is no export control or even reporting at all for the export of arms or components to the United States, Canadians have no way of knowing who the end users of Canadian exports are, or more to the point, who is killed or terrorized by such weapons and by whom. Without some regime to bring this problem under control, Canadians remain in the hands of American policy makers for the moral decisions about to whom lethal instruments made in Canada should be sold. Clearly this is not an acceptable situation.
This motion, had it been chosen to be votable and debated and voted on, would have been an opportunity for the House of Commons to have expressed itself on what I regard as a morally urgent matter. Unfortunately it was not so chosen, so we only have this hour of debate before us today and we are not really in a position to seek unanimous consent for the passage of the motion at this time.
I hope this might be one small step toward moving the government in this direction. I recall when the Liberals were in opposition many suggestions were put forward in the spirit of this private member's motion, in particular by the member who is now the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Liberal government.
I am hoping for a sympathetic hearing from the government on this. It is an opportunity to follow up on the goodwill created by the government through its actions with respect to the banning of anti-personnel land mines. If that stands alone, if it is not followed
up by meaningful action on the arms trade, then certainly the community within Canada which concerns itself with the arms trade will not be deceived. It will not think that the government's actions will suffice if the government does not go beyond the land mines strategy which it has now and seeks to do something about something we can do right here in Canada now.
We do not have to wait for an international consensus on how Canada regulates its exports of arms. This is something we can do ourselves. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is very good at creating international discussions. He is very good at creating the image of something being done or something about to be done. We wish him well in all that.
However here in our own backyard, here in our own regime with respect to how we regulate the export of arms, the government can act now. It could have acted today by facilitating the passage of this motion. Certainly many Canadians are with me at this time in hoping that the government will soon act on this issue.