Mr. Speaker, I want to address Motions Nos. 6 and 9 put forward by the Bloc Quebecois.
These motions would strike out the provisions allowing a court, when there is agreement by the spouses, to award an amount that is different from the amount set out in the guidelines. Now, since provisions already exist in the legislation allowing a court to award a different amount, when there is proof that the child already has an advantage in relation to the amounts set out in the guidelines, meaning that the child already gets more than what the guidelines provide for, it has to be inferred that these provisions deal with cases where the parents have negotiated and reached an agreement whereby the child would get less that what is set out in the guidelines.
Therefore this motion, as the text indicates, would strike out new subclauses (7) and (8) of new clause 15.1 of the Divorce Act. Indeed, these new subclauses show an intent to allow the court to set aside the application of the guidelines when two conditions are met: first, when there is agreement between the spouses and, second, when the court feels that the amount proposed for child support is reasonable.
We cannot accept these provisions. The main reason we supported the bill, even though we proposed amendments to improve it, is that we felt that the principle of guidelines is desirable for a vast majority of families, be it for spousal support or for child support.
Almost all of those who have examined the issues of corollary relief, visiting rights, custody, and alimony support the implementation of guidelines. Let me give a few examples.
The now defunct Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women wrote in March 1994: "As participants in consultation hearings have indicated, parents and children who are involved in litigation over custody and visiting rights experience a great deal of emotional, physical and financial stress that is costly for the publicly financed judicial system, social programs and education."
A lawyer in private practice, who sat on the Canadian bar committee, has emphasized also that the interesting thing with guidelines is their coherence, and coherence makes for predictability, and predictability avoids going to court.
Mrs. Lavigne, then president of the CACSW, wrote this: "The setting of the level of support is also a source of conflict and resentment. Some think it is too little, and others think it is too much."
As a matter of fact, courts, lawyers and parents themselves find it hard to make a fair assessment of costs incurred for children, and they lack benchmarks to set a fair and just level of support.
If binding rules do not seem desirable, guidelines are nonetheless to be made available to parties in order to make the process easier.
So, the guidelines will contribute first to standardizing the amounts awarded, which should reduce the incidence of poverty for women and children. Another benefit, however, and a major one at that, is that this new way of doing things will greatly reduce negotiations between parents on the amount of child support.
This amendment is quite significant, since we know that although a woman is represented by her lawyer, she can still fall victim to threats, blackmail and physical or moral weariness, and tell her lawyer to accept an otherwise unacceptable proposal.
The only way to reduce tensions and unsuccessful negotiations, which penalize children in the end, is for the guidelines to be as widely applied as possible. That is why subclauses (7) and (8) are unacceptable and contrary to the principles underlying the guidelines.
Indeed, this would take us back to the current situation where one parent, usually the father, is in a strong bargaining position, since he is usually better off, and can negotiate a settlement that is to his own advantage, but only to his own advantage. In the interests of all concerned, the amount of child support must not be determined in the context of preliminary negotiations.
Finally, we must not forget that women have been demanding guidelines for a long time now precisely to avoid the pressure, threats, and blackmail that often come with the negotiation of corollary relief provisions in divorce proceedings.
In enacting guidelines, governments are trying to set out a more neutral process for former spouses and their children. Thus, it is not recommended to favour provisions that go counter to these guidelines and, unfortunately in too many cases, force women to accept settlements that are unfair for them and their children.
So, this is the purpose of the motion I brought forward. I want to have struck out the provisions allowing a judge, with the consent of both spouses, to make a child support order different from what is set out in the guidelines. We find these provisions somewhat risky. On the one hand, in the proposed child support guidelines to be used as the draft regulations, clause 5 provides for a court, on application by one of the spouses, to award an amount different from what is set out in the guidelines, if the order causes excessive hardship to the spouse making the application or to the child in respect of whom the order was made.
Therefore, Parliament is allowing the guidelines to be set aside in some special cases. We in the Bloc Quebecois would like the government to support our amendment.