Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for St. Albert will surely have the opportunity to speak after the member for Richelieu, with whom I will share my time.
The issue of a second House in Canada is not something new; it goes back to 1774. That year, the pyramid was started from the top, in the sense that institutions were established for the British North America of the time. In 1774, only institutions approved by a legislative council were set up. Our structures were rather simple, with a governor representing the Crown and a legislative council appointed by the governor.
This was a bit of a family compact. There was little discussion when laws were passed and budgets approved. When democratic movements called for an elected house to represent the population and have a say in the government of the colony of the time, many voiced their opposition to the idea.
In the end, rather significant support from the United Empire Loyalists led to our country's having elected houses. But do you know what happened at the same time? Canada was divided in two: Upper Canada and Lower Canada, to make sure that French Canadians would never succeed in passing their laws and in imposing them on the rest of the country.
Today, as we try to get our powers back and to govern ourselves, we meet with strong objections and are told that we cannot do that. Two hundred years ago, they would not let the majority govern in this country. The pendulum has swung back.
So, in 1791, the Constitutional Act amended the Quebec Act to create the Houses of Assembly. We still did not have a responsible government. However, we had an elected House of Assembly, with an extremely restricted role to play, and the legislative council was maintained in both Upper Canada and Lower Canada. While the Constitutional Act of 1791 was in force, this legislative council, whose members were appointed by the governor, systematically opposed every decision made by the House of Assembly. The elected representatives had little success in imposing their final decisions during the period from 1791 to 1838, at which time the Special Act was passed to suspend the Constitutional Act of 1791, following the Patriots' Rebellion in 1837.
The Union Act of 1840 maintained the legislative council and an elected House, of course, but the legislative council could oppose, under any circumstances, all the decisions made by the elected representatives of the population. For 16 years, the members of this legislative council would be appointed by the governor and could do everything they pleased to oppose the decisions of the elected representatives.
In 1858, a timid but still significant reform was initiated, with the election of the members of the legislative council, although vested rights were maintained. Those who had been appointed before the 1856 act, which provided for the election of the legislative council members, were able to keep their seats, but had to sit next to members who were elected on a rotational basis.
It must have been strange to have an elected member and a member appointed for life sitting side by side in the same House. It is as if my colleague, the hon. member for Shefford, was there for life and I had to go back to the voters every four years, I would not be too amused.
Change had begun, and with it government instability and the decision of the elite, not the public, to change the form of government. These were the people known as the Fathers of Confederation, the grand term used to describe those who decided that there would be a federal government in Canada's future. There was never any desire to consult the public about this.
A great Liberal, Antoine-Aimé Dorion, proposed in the House of Assembly in Parliament, here in Ottawa, that a referendum be held on the change in Canada's constitutional status in 1867. This highly democratic proposal to let the public decide on the future status of Canada was defeated. The changes proposed by a small elite were adopted. In Quebec, numerous county and municipal councils opposed the constitutional change, sensing the trap into which we were heading. By letting go of our equal representation in the Parliament of the United Canada, that is, from an institutional point of view, we were saddled with a lame duck. At the beginning we had a third of the seats in the Senate and the House of Commons, but today we no longer even guaranteed a quarter of the seats.
In the next election, Quebec will have only 75 members out of 301, which is below the critical threshold of 25 per cent representation which has always been one of Quebec's traditional demands.
Perhaps I may, oh irony of ironies, quote Senator Jean-Claude Rivest, who represents the district of Stadacona. Speaking before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, he said that 25 per cent was the minimum, was the critical mass Quebec needed in the House of Commons. This 25 per cent will be lost in the next election.
In 1867, they talked about what they would do with these institutions. When I say: "they", I am referring to the Fathers of Confederation. There were other constitutions in the past. There
was the Constitution of Great Britain and there was a tendency to refer to the Constitution of Great Britain, the United Kingdom.
The first preamble to the British North America Act, 1867, forms the basis of all provisions dealing with the Senate in our institutions. I will read it to you:
Whereas the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have expressed their desire to be federally united into one dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.
A constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom provides for two Houses of Parliament. In the United Kingdom, as in this country, there is a House of Commons, but also an upper House, the House of Lords. We wanted to establish one as well. I am not an agriculture critic but we have our own little lords.
So we established another House, the Senate. This House has the same powers the House of Lords had at the time: the power to fully obstruct decisions of the House of Commons. This was in 1867, when the House of Lords systematically opposed all bills that would give back to Ireland its institutions, which had been suspended for many years.
In any case, one would have to be totally lacking in political vision to be oblivious to the fact that someday, the other House, the Canadian Senate, which was not elected and was not accountable to any one would obstruct major legislation. We saw it happen during this Parliament.
Earlier, the hon. member for Kamouraska-Rivière-du-Loup referred to the bill concerning Pearson Airport. The bill was defeated in the Senate. An important bill on electoral boundaries readjustment, Bill C-69, on which the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs worked for weeks on end, was never passed and died on the Order Paper in the Senate.
There is something odd about an unelected house coming to tell us how to get ourselves elected.
We cannot, of course, as Bloc members and sovereignists, subscribe to the Reform proposals, which will perhaps be useful to a Canada in which Quebec is not represented, but we certainly cannot subscribe to a Senate which would be elected, effective and equal. If there were any equality, it would have to be between the two nations, the two founding peoples, not one between provinces. And what would an elected Senate mean? It would mean another House with popular legitimacy which would act as a buffer between the provincial and federal governments. If there is one thing we do not need right now, it is that.
The hon. member for Brome-Missisquoi has just said that a constitutional amendment is needed to abolish the Senate. Of course we need a constitutional amendment; it is the 7-50 rule which applies: 7 provinces representing 50 per cent of the Canadian population. Let the other provinces reach agreement among themselves to abolish the Senate and we will probably be rid of it.
I would like to close with an acknowledgment that, of course, there are some good people sitting in the other House. It is not my intention to discredit those who are there, but rather to state that, in 1996, the existence of a House of this nature is no longer justified. The best way to see it abolished quickly is to hit it where it hurts the most, in the pocket book, by choking off its operating funds, and then there is a good chance that it will fall on its own sword.