moved:
That, in the opinion of this House, the government should obtain the consent of two-thirds of the said House before revoking the mandate of an inquiry commission.
Mr. Speaker, the motion I am tabling today, Motion M-20, refers directly to events that occurred during the 35th Parliament and that continue to have repercussions today. The aim of this motion is to correct a practice by the government opposite and by the governments before it.
My motion reads:
That, in the opinion of this House, the government should obtain the consent of two-thirds of the said House before revoking the mandate of an inquiry commission.
You will understand that this motion is in reaction to the problems that occurred during the course of the latest commissions of inquiry set up by the government, more specifically, the Somalia inquiry.
You will recall that on July 2, the Minister of National Defence published the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, better known as the Létourneau Commission. The work of that commission became extremely important because of the events that were being revealed, but also because the media was following it closely.
In their final report, the commissioners expressed strongly their concern over the major obstacles they had to face in carrying out the work of the commission. So that the scope and the importance of my motion can really be understood, I will quote some parts of the report, including from the chairman of that commission, Mr. Justice Létourneau.
Mr. Justice Létourneau said:
The Inquiries Act provides the authority to subpoena witnesses, hear testimony, hire expert counsel and advisers, and assess evidence. Under normal circumstances, such powers should have given us the confidence to present our findings without qualification. However, on January 10, 1997, while Parliament was adjourned—
Mr. Justice Létourneau continued:
—the Minister of National Defence announced that cabinet had decided that this inquiry had gone on long enough, that all hearings must be cut off on or about March 31, 1997, and that a report with recommendations was required by June 30, 1997.
This was the response of the government to our letter setting out reporting date options and requesting an extension until at least December 31, 1997, a period of time that would have allowed us to conclude our search for the truth.
You must realize that the Létourneau Commission only had one objective, and it was to uncover the truth on extremely serious events surrounding actions by people in the Canadian Armed Forces.
Mr. Justice Létourneau continued:
The unexpected decision to impose a sudden time constraint on an inquiry of this magnitude is without precedent in Canada. There is no question that it has compromised and limited our search for the truth. It will also inhibit and delay corrective action to the very system that allowed the events to occur in the first place.
He continued, and this is important also:
As our investigation progressed, we were able to move closer to the key centres of responsibility as we moved up the chain of command. Unfortunately, the Minister's decision of January 10, 1997, eliminated any possibility of taking this course to its logical conclusion—
The minister, the Liberal cabinet, realizing that the investigations and the search for the truth carried out by Mr. Justice Létourneau were getting dangerously closer to the political decisions of that government, announced in January, on January 10 more precisely, that it had decided to put an end to the commission's work.
Need I remind this House that the commissioners were appointed by the Minister of National Defence, by the government opposite?
These commissioners can certainly not be said to be big, bad separatists or sovereignists who were there to break up the country. They were appointed by the government to seek out the truth. It would be one thing if he had been the only commissioner to make such remarks, but there were three of them saying the same thing.
One of them, Peter Desbarats, even wrote a book entitled Somalia Cover-Up , from which I would also like to quote, because he goes even further than Mr. Justice Létourneau. He wrote:
Before we had a chance to resume hearings in January, after the Christmas holiday, on January 10, the Minister of National Defence announced that the commission would wrap up the hearings by the end of March and table a final report by the end of June—This announcement floored us all. I expected the Minister of National Defence to give us one or two months less than what we asked for, but the decision to put an end to the inquiry was unprecedented. Even four decades of watching politicians did not prepare me for this.
This is not a man totally unfamiliar with how things are done in Ottawa. This is a man who studied political and governmental decisions extensively and was familiar with procedure. After all, he had been appointed to the commission on the basis of his great qualifications.
He wrote in his book that he simply could not believe that the Minister of National Defence would decide to suddenly end the inquiry, without warning, when it was so close to its goal of finding out exactly what had happened. So, the commissioners were about to uncover the truth when the government opposite, in a move that could almost be called dictatorial, put en end to the inquiry.
He also wrote, and I will end with this excerpt:
When observing my two fellow commissioners, I came to appreciate the expression—and this is very important—“judicial independence” as a reality. A government that acts so as to affect the independence of a public inquiry can only be foreign to our political traditions and jeopardize the principles of accountability.
This commissioner in the Somalia inquiry says that the government jeopardized the principles of accountability. This is a very harsh judgment. The author made a comparison with our American neighbours. As we know, Americans are very structured too. They have many commissions of inquiry, even more than here. We also know that the president enjoys a very strong central power. The author points out that:
In the United States, even a president could not stop the Watergate investigation. Here, a simple cabinet can put a stop to a federal inquiry for political reasons, and no one gets upset about it.
As for the in-depth analysis of the motion, all agree that public inquiries are essential elements of a democratic system. It is a universally recognized principle that, without the existence of public inquiries, administrative democracy would be meaningless. These inquiries are tools at the service of those who are governed, that is the citizens, to monitor their administrative institutions. They are tools given to Canadians and Quebeckers to know what goes on in the federal apparatus, since we are in the federal Parliament.
It is not the first time we look at this issue and at the powers of commissions of inquiry. In 1977, the Canadian Law Reform Commission described public inquiries as “a complement to the essential agencies of the state. They can investigate the government itself, a task which must of course be the mandate of a body outside the executive and the public service”.
The quasi-judicial process of which commissions of inquiry are a part is a major guarantee of objectivity, which is of considerable importance when an agency must assess the exigencies of public interest. By setting up boards or commissions with quasi-judiciary powers, the lawmakers institute a mechanism of preliminary investigation and participation by the governed in administrative action.
But these inquiries must be left to follow their course without undue interference by the government. This requires respect for the independence of the judiciary.
And what is the independence of the judiciary? I refer to it because it has already been addressed in this House. It must be understood that what I am proposing in Motion M-20 is a solution to establish some semblance of credibility in our democratic institutions, which suffer from undue interference by the government in the process of public inquiries. It must therefore be understood that the very principle of the independence of the judiciary is what justifies the adoption of this motion. In other words, once a government creates a commission of inquiry, because the situation requires it, because the situation is so important that a commission of inquiry is required, the commissioners must have complete freedom to conduct the inquiry.
And, among other things, the government should have seen to it that Mr. Justice Létourneau, a man with training, a highly credible individual with a law degree and many qualifications, had complete freedom to conduct the inquiry, to ask questions. Above all, there must be guarantees that the executive arm or the government will not interfere.
The legislation, because this is governed by section 2 of the Inquiries Act, stipulates that the governor in council may, whenever the governor in council deems it expedient, cause inquiry to be made into and concerning any matter connected with the good government of Canada or the conduct of any part of the public business thereof. When we look at the powers given the commissioner of a commission of inquiry, we see that the process must have been considered quasi-judicial. And there is a difference between a commission of inquiry and a decision by the superior court, for example, or the supreme court or the court of appeal.
For instance, commissioners have powers to summon witnesses, powers to enforce, and certain special powers associated with the inquiry, such as entering offices, examining documents or whatever.
In addition, section 12 of the legislation stipulates that commissioners may allow any person whose conduct is being investigated under this act to be represented by counsel. And in the Somalia inquiry we saw that, whenever members of the Canadian Armed Forces appeared before the commission, they were all accompanied by a lawyer, which is provided for in the act and which was completely legal.
This shows that a commission of inquiry is something very serious. We must give as much power as possible to those who hear witnesses and who search for the truth.
In conclusion, those who were here during the 35th Parliament, those who witnessed the whole debate on the Somalia inquiry, those who saw certain things the government did during the Krever inquiry and those who witnessed certain things in the past all feel that commissions of inquiry deserve the close attention of the members of this House. Commissions of inquiry deserve that we remove, once and for all, the possibility for the executive branch, the cabinet or a minister to suddenly revoke the mandate of a commission as important as the Somalia inquiry.
To support motion M-20 is to support the improvement of procedures regarding public inquiries. To support motion M-20 is to ensure that our institutions truly reflect the concern of Canadians and Quebeckers to maintain a sound and sustainable administrative democracy. To support motion M-20 is to choose to know the truth rather than to let the interests of the bureaucracy take precedence. To support motion M-20 is to give Canadians and Quebeckers an opportunity to adequately take part in the affairs of our society.
To those who are about to speak against this motion, or who do not really support it, I will simply say that to oppose motion M-20 is to allow the government opposite to once again muzzle commissions of inquiry.
To oppose Motion M-20 is to say that responsible individuals who agree to chair similar commissions could find themselves overnight with less time or insufficient time to really achieve the goal sought, that is, the truth.
To oppose the motion is to allow those who mock their integrity to move beyond all control.
I am convinced that this House, given the appropriateness of the purpose and the fact that the motion is an attempt to find a better approach in this House, will see that its sole purpose is “to obtain the consent of two-thirds of this House”. That means that people on both sides of the House must speak before a commission of inquiry is terminated.
Once a government decides to set up a commission of inquiry, I think it is up to the House of Commons to decide with the pros and cons of a debate here in the House whether the commission should be terminated.
I think that democracy in general would be the winner if this House passed the motion.