Debates of Nov. 18th, 1999

Youth Criminal Justice Act

[The Acting Speaker (Ms. Thibeault)]

It is my duty, pursuant to Standing Order 38, to inform the House that the question to be raised tonight at the time of adjournment is as follows: the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre, Bill C-80.

[Derek Lee, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Madam Speaker, today we are debating the youth criminal justice act. This is not the first time that I have had the opportunity to debate changes to the Young Offenders Act.

Earlier in the day I listened to hon. members discuss this. I heard members opposite suggest that it has taken an awful long time to get these amendments to the House. I am sure the record will show very clearly that there have been three separate bills to amend the Young Offenders Act over the years.

The act was first adopted in 1984. There have been three separate phases of amendment to that statute over the years. I would count this substantial rewrite by the Minister of Justice as the fourth.

Let us not forget that prior to the Young Offenders Act in 1984 there was a predecessor statute which dealt with young offenders. It had a slightly different name. It was called the Juvenile Delinquents Act. That statute provided a procedure for dealing with young offenders who committed crimes and breached the criminal code, some would say just as effectively, less or more effectively than the way we handle them now.

However, it is clear that our society, in modern times, has always had a statute to provide separate intervention and distinct measures to deal with young offenders. Whether we call them juveniles, children, boys and girls, non-adults, young adults, teenagers or adolescents, we have always in modern times had a statute to deal with them. There was nothing radically different about the Young Offenders Act of 1984.

I arrived in the House in 1988. Over the years after 1984 there continued to be a need to amend the statute, at least this is what Canadians told us. I was not in government then, but the government of the day accepted that changes were necessary. There were amendments dealing with some of the sentencing provisions for the more serious crimes, some of the procedures for the publication of names and that type of thing. All of these were attempting to improve the working of the statute.

It was clear in the early days that, while the government had passed the statute, the burden of administering it fell to the provinces. Going back 15 years one may question whether sufficient consultation took place prior to the passage of the Young Offenders Act in 1984 with reference to the role of the provincial administration.

It is the provinces that have to carry the financial burden of dealing separately with young offenders. It is only in a small number of cases that young offenders make their way into the ordinary criminal courts, which are provincially run. It is rarer still that they would find their way into a federal penitentiary, where anyone sentenced to two years or more would be confined. Most youth who get into trouble with the law are dealt with by provincial authorities.

I heard members opposite go through all of the old paradigms and clichés. They have referred to the absence of accountability. They have stated how bad and ineffective the Young Offenders Act is and that it lacks accountability.

Each one of us has an ugly case we can cite. We have all bumped into a policeman somewhere across the country who has said “My hands are tied. We could not do anything. He was a young offender”.

Well, to be sure that policemen had responded to the complaint, had made an arrest, had laid a charge, had appeared as a witness, if he or she was a witness, and saw the conviction, I do not call that having one's hands tied. I do not call that doing nothing. I do not call that zero response. That is precisely how we respond to anyone who is charged with a criminal offence.

I have often heard members in the opposition suggest that the Young Offenders Act is the cause of the crime. They have said that it is the Young Offenders Act which is at fault. Rarely do they point the finger at all of the other causes of crime.

Everyone in the House knows that the criminal code is not the cause of crime. It is not the criminal code that is the cause of a bank robbery. It is not the Young Offenders Act that is the cause of a crime. The Food and Drug Act is not the cause of drug smuggling.

The Young Offenders Act is not the cause of the crime that is committed. There are other causes out there. From time to time, I think some of us simply want to shoot the messenger, not understanding what the messenger is and not understanding the process.

The theme in the criminal code, the theme in youth justice is intervention, societal sanction for anti-social criminal acts committed by an adult or youth. The Young Offenders Act, the Juvenile Delinquents Act and this new youth criminal justice act provide appropriate levels and intensity of intervention when crimes are committed.

We all recognize that crime rates are now dropping. This may make the invective a little less sharp, but this is recognized as a good thing. Who gets the credit? It is certainly not the government members and it is certainly not the opposition members. Crime rates drop because the causes of crime drop. They are demographic, economic and administrative. We can always give some credit to our police forces that good job.

I want to address the level of intervention and also the intensity of that intervention in the youth criminal justice act. It is a combination of society's response under the criminal code and under the youth criminal justice act.

The youth criminal justice act, as does the current act which we hope will be replaced, provides different classes and different intensities of intervention based on the seriousness of the crime and the age of the offender. Most people would accept that a minor criminal offence committed by a 13 year old could be dealt with differently than the same relatively minor criminal offence committed by a 16 year old.

Under the new act, as generally the old act attempted to do, the higher the age of the convicted young person and the more serious crime that he or she is convicted of the more intense the intervention will be. There are all levels of intervention. Hopefully, the first thing is getting caught and having to deal with a parent or two. However, if by some misfortune a parent was not there for some of our youth, they would still have to deal with the police, the court and a judge.

The act provides flexibility. I think it is worth noting for our provinces that for the more serious crimes, the level of intervention is dictated by the attorney general of a province. The scheme of intervention is arranged by the attorney general not by the Government of Canada. That allows provincial flexibility in addressing this type of youth crime.

Two or three provinces do have successful regimes of Young Offenders Act intervention now. Quebec has been mentioned here as one province that does. The act is not intended to interfere with that.

The objective in these amendments is to provide an act for Canadian youth that provides a firm intervention, including hard time if it is appropriate. This will be in the hands of a judge so that the youth will not, hopefully, continue in a life of crime and can become a contributing member of our Canadian society.

[Stéphan Tremblay, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to address today such an important issue.

A renowned geneticist, Albert Jacquard, once said that a prison in a city means that there is something wrong in that city.

Today, we are dealing with a somewhat special kind of crime, youth crime. I think we all want to reduce crime in our communities. Obviously, this is a worthy and desirable goal. However, I do have some misgivings and some concerns about the measures to reduce crime.

We are dealing today with Bill C-3, which proposes a system I cannot agree with. Previously, when young offenders were arrested, they got some kind of special treatment. Instead of sending offenders under 18 years of age directly to prison, we directed them towards different facilities, in the hope that they would be able to get back on to the right track.

What this bill says is that we want to treat young offenders more harshly, to treat them as adults, depending, of course, on the seriousness of the crime. Yet we have to understand what impact that could have. I know there are hon. members here in this House, or members of their family, who have been victims of crime. And I know how frustrated or vindictive they must feel.

When we see these deplorable crimes reported on the front page of the newspaper, we have every right to think that it does not make sense and that something must be done. I agree, except that the easy way to solve this problem is to say that these young criminals must pay. They must pay like adults do and must be held responsible. There is certainly some logic in thinking this way, but actually it is false, and the statistics are there to prove it. Instead of talking about harsher sentences for young offenders, we should be talking about the root cause of crime.

Next week, we will be celebrating—although it will not really be a celebration—the tenth anniversary of the House's resolve to eliminate child poverty by the year 2000. Child poverty has nearly doubled since the House expressed that resolve. Why I am saying that? Because sometimes, and very often in disadvantaged areas, young people are unable to benefit from the physical and moral support of their father and mother. These young people are more likely than others to become juvenile delinquents.

I think there is a connection between the increase in poverty and the increase in crime. It may be the most important factor, and what we really should be discussing today are issues related to the root cause of crime. Unfortunately, we are not doing that because the minister has introduced a bill which will provide for harsher sentences, which I think will in no way benefit society.

If we lock up a young offender with other criminals, we are sending him to a school for crimes. He will be with individuals, young people and criminals, who are already frustrated with society, and who do not necessarily feel like respecting it. It is a little bit like sending him to a school for crimes.

I would rather we talked about alternatives to the prison system instead of contemplating putting a bandage on a wound. Yes, there is a wound; yes, crime is a problem. But let us see how we can heal the wound rather than putting a bandage on it, hoping it will solve the problem. I cannot support this approach.

What I am saying today is not born out of emotion, it is borne out by facts. My colleagues mentioned it before me: in Quebec we have had, and still have, a more preventative way of dealing with young offenders, in order to rehabilitate them. It works. The numbers are there to prove it. We have them. We can prove, based on statistics, that our way is better. I do not like to quantify human behaviour, but in this case, it clearly shows that the approach of Quebec is the best in Canada.

The bill that is before us today would have us believe that we should set all that aside, that its way of doing things is the right way. Unfortunately, its approach, which owes something to the Reform Party, is going to become law.

I believe it is deplorable, especially since in Quebec there is a consensus against this bill. If the federation were as flexible as some people claim, we, in Quebec, could say: if you want to try this approach, go ahead. But we, in Quebec, have our own approach, we believe in it and we want to carry on and even improve it, and we would like to have the opportunity and the freedom to maintain our approach toward crime.

This is why I seek unanimous consent so that Quebec can opt out of this measure and continue to ensure its criminals are dealt with the same way as today.

I seek the unanimous consent of the House.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. McClelland)]

Unfortunately, I did not understand the question.

[Stéphan Tremblay, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, what I was saying is Quebec's approach is original. It works, and the numbers are there to prove it, and it seems to me that Quebec ought to be able to continue with this approach. If the rest of Canada wants to deal more severely with its young offenders, so be it. It does not bother me. What I want, and this is why I seek the unanimous consent of the House, is for Quebec to be allowed to continue to proceed in its own way, and the rest of Canada to do as it pleases.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. McClelland)]

The hon. member for Lac-Saint-Jean has put a question to the House requesting unanimous consent. Is there unanimous consent?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[Some hon. members]

No.

[Stéphan Tremblay, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, is that what they call flexible federalism? If I were a federalist, I would consider flexibility as an asset, because each province could have its own system and become a testing ground of sorts.

But this bill is all for standardization, and it will eliminate good programs. What a disgrace, in my opinion.

Do you think a 14 year old who never reads a paper and does not know what is going on in politics will say to himself before committing any crime that, with Bill C-3, if he commit a crimes, he will spend more time in prison? Let us get real. It will not change anything.

Very often, young criminals are economically disadvantaged, they are less educated and are not too well informed. Do you think stiffer legislation will have an impact?

Studies in the U.S. confirm this. Stiffer legislation does not reduce the crime rate. I am all the more troubled by this because I am the youngest member in the House. If we do not deal with our young criminals the way we should and if we send them to the school for crime, we will be turning them into real criminals. Since they are young, we will have to put up with them for many more years to come, and fighting against crime will cost us even more.

I think this bill goes against common sense. I cannot overstate how much it goes against common sense. I would like to ask the members in the House to take note of the numbers, of the consensus and of a way of doing things that has been proven to work. This bill does not make any sense.

If the rest of Canada wishes to do as it pleases, if it believes that there is a better way, let it do so, I have nothing against that. But I cannot accept the rejection of a way of doing things that has been proven successful. It is not perfect, of course, and we are trying to improve it, but I think the rest of Canada should have followed this example.

Unfortunately, I have the impression that, for political reasons, the justice minister only wishes to show us that she is backing down, or that this is the Liberals' balanced approach. Maybe she wants to show us, like Reform, that the Liberals can give a little to the left, a little to the right, I do not know. I do not know what is going on in the minister's head, but I find it unfortunate, and I am disappointed.

[Dale Johnston, Reform, Wetaskiwin, AB]

Mr. Speaker, it is a real opportunity for me to be able to speak to the youth criminal justice act. We can only hope there is some justice in this act.

I do not think there is any justice when on a regular basis the House leader of the government leaps to his feet and moves closure on absolutely anything he chooses. Here we have another bill that is at least 190 or 200 pages long. We have had up to this point less than five hours of debate on it, and the House leader comes into the House and says that there is important stuff on the agenda. We have yet to see any of this important stuff. We have all looked over the agenda, the order paper and the Projected Order of Business, and none of it seems that crunchy.

One would think that an amendment to the youth criminal justice act would be worthy of more than six or seven hours of debate. There are 301 members in the House. How is it possible for this bill to be adequately debated at second reading in less than seven hours?

The short answer is that it is absolutely not possible. It is just another one of the government's absolutely arrogant, terrible, miserable ways. I am searching for a word because I am trying to keep within parliamentary language. It simply says that it has the majority and will use closure whenever it wants.

There was a time when closure was only brought to bear under the most dire of circumstances. It was something that had never been used in the House. For years and years and years closure was not a tool. We have to thank Pierre Elliott Trudeau for the unabashed use of closure. He used to say “It is 3 o'clock on Wednesday. I think we will call closure. Why not? We will call closure”. He did not need any more reason than that and the Liberal House leader today does not seem to need any more reason than that.

The member for Scarborough—Rouge River in his speech talked about how we must prevent youth crime and how penalizing young people was not the answer. Let us go along with the assumption that people should be held accountable for their actions. That is on the basis that I want the House to think about the remarks I will make on behalf of one of my constituents.

About four years ago I was going through downtown Leduc and I stopped in a little shop called Crafts and More. I went in and introduced myself as the member of parliament for Wetaskiwin and met a very nice lady named Donna Rowe. She said “Am I ever surprised to see you. You are the first federal politician who has come to see me in my shop. As a matter of fact your visit is quite timely because I have a story to tell you”.

This is Donna Rowe's story. I want the House to bear in mind that Donna Rowe is not talking about penalizing anyone. She is talking about one of the other words in the bill and that is justice. She is on a search for justice.

Two young people in their early teens who were known to the police—in other words they had records—broke into her late model, half-ton truck with a camper on top. It was custom painted to match her trailer. It was used in her business and was her sole vehicle. It was also used as a family vehicle. It was an essential part of her life.

These two young people cannot be named because they were under the age of 18 and therefore apparently not responsible for any action they took. We might think that is a fairly bold statement, but as the House hears what I have to say I believe I will bear that out.

They took her vehicle. That can come about in a lot of different ways. They were not, by the way, but let us suppose they were barefoot, there was snow on the ground, the vehicle was running, the door was open, and it was nice and warm in the truck.

No, they smashed the window. They got in. They hot-wired the truck. They got it running. They drove it until it would not drive any more. Then they got out of it. They kicked everything off it that they could: the mirrors, the lights, the windshield, the windows, the dials and the dash. They ripped everything off it that they could. Then they found a knife and slashed the seats and tried to set the truck on fire.

It was just a couple of kids out having some fund, I guess, before they went to choir practice, scouts or whatever. They were nice young guys but they were known to the police. They did have records, but we cannot mention that because they were under 18 and therefore not accountable, I guess, for the things they do.

Mrs. Rowe was devastated. She felt violated. She felt as though her security had been breached. She felt terribly inconvenienced, but she said “Thank heaven we have insurance”. She went to the insurance agent who said the truck was unfixable. It was an absolute total wreck and a write-off. The agent then asked how much she would take as a payout and offered to pay her out on it.

She knew she had to do something, that she had to replace it because she needed a vehicle. She received a payout from the insurance. What do we suppose happened to her insurance premiums? Did they go down because she had tough luck and had fallen on hard times? Hardly. They went through the roof because she made a claim.

She told the insurance company that she did not cause the claim. Her vehicle was stolen. They said “We don't give a rat's patootie”. It considered it a claim. A claim is a claim is a claim. She was treated the same way as if she were drunk and wrapped her truck around a telephone pole. Her rates would go up. She said she had no control over the situation. They broke into her vehicle, stole her vehicle and drove off.

What did Donna Rowe want from this situation? Did she want to have these guys flogged in front of the post office on payday? No. She wanted some justice and accountability. Were either of those young people asked to pay restitution to her so she could replace her vehicle? No. As a matter of fact her lawyer said that he did not even feel they owed her an apology.

No apology was needed, I guess because they were young people. The judge gave each of them one year of open custody and one year of probation. What is the difference? What is open custody? Does that mean that they cannot steal cars on Tuesdays and Thursdays? What does it mean? Neither one of them got any time. They made no restitution. They made no apology. They were not penalized in any way. They had open custody: “Away you go, see you next week” or whatever.

All Mrs. Rowe wanted was some justice and accountability. She felt that the justice system completely let her down, and she will forever and ever.

What is there in the bill to allay the fears of Mrs. Rowe and people like her? I know of a lot of other instances. It is a shame that I have such a short time to talk about them because a lot of other people have come to me with very similar stories. It is not about punitive action taken against people. It is about their doing something for the victims.

Is this a victimless crime? Absolutely not. Mrs. Rowe was a victim and she did not get any justice.

[John Bryden, Liberal, Wentworth—Burlington, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I was not really intending to speak in this particular debate, but I am one of those on this side who happens to be doing his House duty today. I have taken the opportunity as a result of that to look at this legislation and to give it particular attention.

There is an area of the legislation that especially interests me because of my background. I am a former journalist, and actually a police reporter at one time, and I spent a portion of my youth covering crime for newspapers. Any legislation has its flaws and has its merits. I do think that this bill, when it comes to the question of the publication of the names of young offenders, has taken a few positive steps in the direction of expanding the publication of these names, not as far as I would like it to go but it has still advanced the cause.

A lot of people will say or wonder why it should be an issue, the publication of the names of young offenders. The thought in the original Young Offenders Act was that young people, because we wanted to give them every opportunity to be rehabilitated, should have the full protection or as much protection as possible from publicity so that they would have every chance of putting their lives together as adults and to become good citizens.

But this universal ban on the publication of the names of young offenders—and the ban comes with teeth; the newspapers and the television stations that would dare publish these names can be subject to severe penalty if they do so—has come with some costs. One of those costs is that sometimes when young offenders who are well known to be repeat offenders and violent offenders were at large in the community, there was still no effective way to alert the community that these dangerous young people were in the community.

Indeed, there is an instance in my own riding of the local newspaper, the Hamilton Spectator , that dared a few months ago to run a picture of a dangerous young offender who had escaped custody. The newspaper took it upon itself to actually run that photograph to alert the community that this young person was at large. There is an ongoing controversy in the community right now as to whether the newspaper really overstepped the bounds. I have to say that on the face of it, the newspaper broke the law, but I think the newspaper has a legitimate argument that it broke the law in the public interest and we cannot go around breaking laws so the law must be changed.

I think, Mr. Speaker, one of the very positive attributes of this bill when it comes to the provisions for the publication of names is that it does provide in clause 109(4) if the police officer concerned or a youth justice court determines that a young offender at large is dangerous to the community or is in a state of escaping custody, then the youth justice judge or peace officer can seek an order to release the name and presumably, the photograph of the young offender to the media.

I submit to you, Mr. Speaker, that this is a very obvious and very necessary provision in this legislation. It is a very positive step indeed. I am sure my home newspaper will feel vindicated that the legislation is moving in precisely the direction that the newspaper determined was in the interests of the community to go. I have to give credit to the newspaper even though I cannot countenance breaking laws. At least the newspaper showed a lot of courage to look after the community interests and published the picture of what appears to be a very dangerous young person.

On the other hand, Mr. Speaker, this legislation also takes a step backward, in my view, when it comes to the issue of the publication of the names and identities of people who are young offenders. Previous to this legislation, or as it exists now before this legislation passes, we have provision for a young person who is facing charges on a very serious crime, murder or other serious crimes. We can transfer that young person to adult court to be tried as an adult. This legislation changes that around and says that particular young person can remain in youth court and be tried for adult sentencing. If you understand, Mr. Speaker, the young person charged with, say, first degree murder who could face a life sentence, instead of going to adult court would stay in youth court and if convicted, would face that adult sentence which could involve life imprisonment.

The problem in that is that under the current system, if that young person being tried for a major crime is transferred to adult court, that court proceeding is done in the open. The media would be able to follow that trial from its beginning to its conclusion. If there was a conviction, we would be able to see the history. It is very important that the public would have had the opportunity to see through the media the progress of that trial leading to a very serious sentence.

Unfortunately, at least in my view, in trying to make the system work better, and I accept that the government is trying to do something positive here, but in moving it back to youth court, the government is providing for publication of the identity of a young offender convicted of a very serious offence, an adult offence with an adult sentence, only after the conviction and only on sentencing.

I suggest to you, Mr. Speaker, that I think that the government has to look at that clause very carefully. I am not one who actually likes very often to cite the charter, but I have a genuine concern that when one is on trial for one's life, whether one is 16 or 60, that trial should be an open process. All the way along it should be an open process. Unfortunately the act as amended with this provision of moving serious offences from adult court back to youth court makes somewhat of a mistake. I do hope that the justice committee, when it reviews this legislation, gives serious consideration to that one particular clause.

Just another thing, Mr. Speaker. There is another clause here that spells out that young people who are victims of the crime committed by the young offender are not allowed to have their identities released either and nothing should be done to identify those young people.

We have a funny situation where the Reform Party, with all due respect, is constantly talking about how we must pay attention to the victims of crime. Here we have a case where, and I acknowledge that it is a very difficult issue for the government, if the victims of the crime are young people, they cannot have the satisfaction of being known to be the victims of the crime, because if they are known to be the victims of the crime, then we have the possibility that the young offender could be identified. Again, this is sort of the judgment of Solomon. We want to protect the identity of the young offender, yet we take away something from the victim of the young offender's crime. Again, I think that is something that needs to be at least debated in committee.

Finally, there is one general shortcoming that the bill does not address on the issue of the identification of young offenders. It is something that in my own experience I would like to see changed. I do not think perhaps I could persuade the justice committee to change it now. I really do think that we should have considered in the legislation the possibility of publicizing the identities of young offenders who have been convicted of summary offences.

Members opposite were talking on several occasions about young people doing vandalism and this kind of thing and getting away with it. They get a slap on the wrist or whatever in the court systems, and there seems to be no decent control on these people who do these petty crimes. Indeed, I think there is a great problem in our schools for young people who resort to acts that would be considered crimes of the type that would be dealt with by summary conviction. These are lesser crimes we might say, minor assaults and that kind of thing.

I would suggest that the real control on doing this kind of thing, as it was when I was young, is the danger that one's name would appear in the local weekly newspaper and one's parents would find out.

I think this is something that we should look at again and consider. It is not just a matter of banning the publication of serious offences. We should also consider the possibility that maybe we should allow the publication of identity for minor offences.

[René Canuel, Bloc, Matapédia—Matane, QC]

Mr. Speaker, my hon. colleagues all started by saying that it was a pleasure for them to speak on this bill today. Personally, I regret having to address this issue.

The House should never have had a debate on Bill C-3, and the justice minister is well aware of that. Over and over again, we have seen that it is not the Young Offenders Act but rather its implementation that leaves to be desired. Those who implement it appropriately succeed where others fail. Nevertheless, the Liberal government is being stubborn and is about to reform the spirit of this legislation.

Personally, before the bill was ever introduced, I would have liked the House to address some very basic issues. How is it that a 12, 13, 14 or 18 year old can become an offender? We never asked ourselves that question. We do not need to be a psychologist or a psychiatrist to answer that question.

These young people have gone through something that makes them feel unloved. They end up in a gang and seek some kind of recognition.

Even in grade school, some fourth or fifth graders show signs of being—and I hate the word—bad seeds and on their way to becoming offenders. And nothing is done about it. If we had the decency to take care of those young people, they would never end up in court.

Cuts in transfers to the provinces for education penalize teachers. They do not have the time to take care of their students and some of them see themselves as mere numbers in the system.

The Young Offenders Act was passed in 1982 and came into effect in 1984. It did not come up overnight. It is the result of several decades of thinking. In fact, one has to go back to 1857 to find the first measures giving special status to minor offenders. In 1908, we established the first youth justice system. The Juvenile Delinquents Act was designed to put young people back on the right track by minimizing their responsibility.

In Quebec, we have successful legislation and it is in our province that the delinquency rate is the lowest. When a young person is punished and sent to prison, the older inmates will show him ways to commit crimes with minimum consequences.

In the early 1970s, Quebec adopted two social measures that proved very useful with respect to the Young Offenders Act: legal aid and social services reform. In 1974, the first set of measures aimed at solving problems outside the judicial system was implemented. Now, the federal government wants to give the act more teeth.

I heard our friends in the Reform Party say that the names of young offenders should be published in newspaper or mentioned on the radio. Going to that kind of extreme is unworthy of responsible citizens. As I said earlier, responsibility starts in elementary school.

It is reported that 1.5 million children do not eat their fill. This year, in Quebec, there was a campaign to buy pencils for pupils in elementary schools. Some parents cannot afford to buy pencils. This is serious. Some children have nothing to eat for lunch. They see their schoolmates go to the cafeteria and take money out of their pocket to buy fruit and chocolate while they have nothing to eat. I do not know how that would make us feel. I do not know if we would not feel rebellious.

The government is saying, “Let us have stricter laws. Let us send them to jail and it will solve the problem. They will have time to think in jail”. We should ask ourselves what kind of thinking one can do in jail, other than becoming tougher and trying to find ways of getting out of there.

Of course, there is help available in our prisons. There are highly qualified people who try to help, but when someone is seething with revolt, it takes more than six months or a year to get over it. It takes years and, during those years, someone has to be close by, I would say every day. When a tree is sick, what do we do? We put a protective coating on it. When a young tree is not growing straight, what do we do? We do not stick it in the garage. We leave it outside and stake it.

We should do the same thing with young people, that is give them support instead of locking them up.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. McClelland)]

It being 5.15 p.m., pursuant to order made earlier today, all questions necessary to dispose of the second reading stage of Bill C-3 are deemed put, a recorded division deemed requested and deferred until Tuesday, November 23, 1999, at the expiry of the time provided for government orders.

[Derek Lee, Liberal, Scarborough—Rouge River, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. Given the wording of the House order, I think you would ordinarily find consent in the House to see the clock as 5.30 p.m. when Private Members' Business would commence. However, we would not commence Private Members' Business until the member was here.

I would ask that we suspend to the call of the Chair. It would not be later than when the hon. member, who is prepared to proceed, enters the House.

Mr. Speaker, may I simply leave the matter in your hands? I suggest we see the clock as 5.30 p.m.

[René Laurin, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I do not know exactly which procedure to use, but I suggest to the House that instead of pretending it is already 5.30 p.m., we have 15 more minutes to continue the debate on Bill C-3. This way, members who have not had the chance to speak could do so until 5.30 p.m., since we have the time. And when 5.30 p.m. comes, we will not have to fib, it will be the truth.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. McClelland)]

The member for Joliette has made a suggestion which makes great sense. However, the order that we adopted earlier today specifically said that the debate would be concluded at 5.15 p.m., which we have done. The debate was concluded at 5.15 p.m. in order to provide for 15 minute bells, but the vote was deferred until some other time.

Since the 15 minutes was not used for bells, the suggestion by the member for Joliette just plain makes sense. Unfortunately, we have already gone past that point.

[René Laurin, Bloc, Joliette, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I submit the following for your consideration: could you ask for unanimous consent to continue the debate until 5.30 p.m., before disposing of the suggestion made by my colleague?

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. McClelland)]

Yes, except that we have already put the question and have disposed of the debate. Had that been done earlier through unanimous consent, we could have done it. However, the horse has already left the stable so we cannot.

Is there unanimous consent to see the clock as 5.30 p.m.?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. McClelland)]

It being 5.30 p.m., the House will not proceed to the consideration of Private Members' Business as listed on today's order paper.

Criminal Code

[Maurice Vellacott, Reform, Wanuskewin, SK]

moved that Bill C-207, an act to amend the Criminal Code to prohibit coercion in medical procedures that offend a person's religion or belief that human life is inviolable, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to speak today to Bill C-207, an act to amend the Criminal Code to prohibit coercion in medical procedures.

The summary of the bill reads:

This enactment protect the right of health care practitioners and other persons to refuse, without fear of reprisal or other discriminatory coercion, to participate in medical procedures that offend a tenet of their religion, or their belief that human life if inviolable.

The purpose of the bill is to ensure that health care providers, particularly nurses, will not be forced to participate against their will in such things as abortion procedures or acts of euthanasia. The bill does not prohibit abortion itself, but makes it illegal to force another person to participate in an abortion procedure against their will.

There are legislative protections for health care workers already existing in many jurisdictions, including 45 out of 50 states in the U.S. But, incredibly, in Canada we do not yet have any legislative protections in either provincial or federal law.

This is tragic, because the need is great. There have been clear violations of the basic human rights and labour rights of nurses working in our country. Many have been denied employment. We have had conversations with and correspondence from different ones. They have been denied a promotion or have been dismissed for refusing to participate in abortion procedures. Other nurses, fearing the loss of a job and possibly a career, have violated their consciences in order to keep their jobs. This has created a great deal of psychological pain, since they entered that profession out of a desire to help and to heal, but now find themselves coerced into inflicting what their hearts tell them is the ultimate form of harm.

This situation facing nurses is described quite well by the organization called Nurses for Life. At least five things need to be kept in mind when considering the plight which a number of nurses in our country today find themselves in.

First, we need to keep in mind that although it is sometimes claimed that abortion is strictly a private matter between a pregnant women and her physician, nurses know that it is never the case. Doctors do not function without nurses who are intimate participants in assisting the doctor.

I just had a little baby boy who was born last Sunday evening. The doctor came in at the last moment. It was the nurses, those wonderful, gallant health care workers, who were there throughout, helping and assisting my wife until the birth. The doctor finally came in at the very last moment. We know the nurses are the ones who are intimately involved, as they are at the abortion stage.

The problem is that while doctors are free to perform or not perform abortions, and while pregnant women in our country are free to undergo or not to undergo an abortion, nurses have not been given the same freedom to choose whether or not they want to participate in this procedure. That is wrong.

Second, unlike doctors, we need to keep in mind that nurses are employees of hospitals. Their employment and their income is therefore dependent on their remaining in the good graces of hospital administrators in a way that doctors' employment and income is not.

Third, we need to keep in mind that even in the rare instances where nurses' employers accommodate their conscience right, these respect-for-life nurses can be singled out as non-conformists, who are not “team players”. This greatly inhibits their chance of promotion.

Fourth, it is becoming increasingly difficult for nurses to choose areas of practice in which they can avoid the problem of assisting in abortions, since the procedures are often performed more increasingly in wards other than obstetrics and gynaecology.

These concerns express the frustrations of hundreds of nurses across the country who have been unjustly coerced in one way or another. We have had contact with a number of them. Most of their stories have never gained the light of public attention. Some have, of course. One notable example involves the mistreatment of nurses at the Markham Stouffville Hospital in the Toronto area in Ontario. Eight nurses were dismissed from the hospital in 1994 because they would not assist in abortions. They took their complaint to the Ontario Human Rights Commission and waited five long years for a hearing, during which time one of those nurses died. At the last moment, right before the hearing that was scheduled for this year, the hospital agreed to settle. In addition to providing financial compensation to those nurses, this much delayed justice, the hospital also agreed to draft a strong policy statement protecting the conscience and the labour rights of nurses still at the hospital.

The situation pro-life nurses face in the workplace is clearly unacceptable. There is evidence at every turn that nurses are, or ought to be, entitled to legal protections. There is precedent for that.

First, section 2 of the charter of rights and freedoms guarantees freedom of conscience and religion.

Second, these freedoms are also listed in the Canadian Human Rights Act and in provincial human rights legislation.

Third, there is precedent in the fact that case law in both charter cases and in human rights cases overwhelmingly supports the protection of freedom of conscience and religion in our wonderful country of Canada. The nature of the various rulings in those cases indicate that if every unlawfully dismissed nurse were to lodge a formal complaint against her former employer, the employers would probably lose. However, why would we want to put those nurses through that stress, through the great cost and through the time before they get some justice for the situation?

Four, another precedent in terms of legal protection for them is the Code of Ethics of the Canadian Medical Association which clearly acknowledges the principle that health care workers possess—in this case it is doctors—conscience rights. It states that physicians are “to inform the patient when their personal morality would influence the recommendation or practice of any medical procedure that the patient needs or wants”. The wording clearly implies that while doctors must inform their patients of their personal convictions, they in no way have to abandon those convictions. In the matter of abortion, for example, doctors are required neither to perform abortions nor even to refer clients to abortionists. Therefore, doctors have that protection.

Fifth, as a precedent, medical facilities have acknowledged that nurses possess conscience rights. It is kind of scattered, sporadic and piecemeal in the country. I have already mentioned the Markham Stouffville Hospital in the Toronto area, which is the most recent example of a hospital drafting and implementing a policy statement to protect nurses.

The first key statement in its policy reads “All nurses with a religious objection to performing, or participating in, first trimester termination of pregnancy will be exempt”. Subsequent clauses repeat that affirmation for second and third trimester abortions. The only exception made to this policy is when a pregnancy accident has put the mother's life in danger.

Even with this kind of clarity from the charter, from human rights acts, from the Canadian Medical Association and the policy statements of selected hospitals, nurses' rights are still being violated to this day. Why is this? Why have these laws and policy statements not been sufficient? There are reasons why they are not sufficient.

I will begin with the charter. The charter cannot protect nurses from coercion in the workplace because it simply was not designed for that purpose. The charter can only be used to attack laws that are inconsistent with charter rights and says that the current violation of nurses' conscience rights is not being driven by any specific provincial or federal law. There is nothing to attack by means of the charter. The charter is therefore unable to help nurses in their present plight.

If the charter is of little help, what about human rights acts and commissions? Unfortunately, they are also insufficient. Human rights commissions attempt to remedy injustices after the fact, usually years after the fact. They are ineffective at preventing people from losing their jobs. In addition, they only address abuses that are brought forward by people with above average initiative who are familiar with their legal rights and are persistent, are like bulldogs, are obsessed and obstinate about getting some justice for this situation. As a result, many people would grow faint-hearted and not pursue it and injustices would go completely unnoticed.

On the whole, human rights commissions, because they are slow and reactive, are unable to provide nurses with the immediate proactive protections that they need to stay employed.

Last, we should consider the effectiveness of hospital policy statements. The problem here is that so few hospitals or health districts have such statements. I have mentioned the success story at the Markham Stouffville Hospital. However, we need to keep in mind that hospital adopted that policy only when it was on the brink of a hearing before the Ontario Human Rights Commission. It did the right thing, finally, but very reluctantly. Without pressure it would never have acted.

That is why separate and explicit conscience legislation for health care workers is needed. I believe it is the responsibility of the federal government. We need legislation such as Bill C-207.

The bill is limited in scope but it would provide some relief to nurses from the immediate threat they are facing today. In the future we will need more comprehensive legislation than this bill. I want to elaborate on that important point using the U.S. experience as an instructive example.

The conscience laws in the United States are uneven and create only a patchwork of protection for health care workers. Of the 45 state laws currently in place, some apply only to abortion while others apply to additional procedures. Some laws apply only to individuals while others apply to institutions as well. Some laws provide substantive protection while others provide only a legal cause of action for the individual.

The main reason for this unevenness is that the U.S. legislators, like legislators in other jurisdictions, have had as their goal the remedying of specific concrete threats to conscience rights as they have arisen. As we so often do, they have legislated in a reactive mode. Of particular note are the conscience laws passed in many states between 1973 and 1982. They were good but they were in reaction to other supreme court rulings at that time.

This legislating in a reactive mode has meant that in the U.S. there has not been a comprehensive, well thought out, well designed legal approach to protecting the freedoms of conscience and religion in the field of health care. Most conscience clause statutes protect the right to refuse to participate in only one or two procedures. These laws do not deal with emerging ethical issues like those relating to physician assisted suicide, fertility treatments or medical experimentation.

We ultimately need a comprehensive approach that will be able to address these rapid changes in technology. Some supporters of abortion on demand have scoffed at the idea of conscience rights as though it were merely a concern of pro-lifers. But as science marches on and as it marches forward, a surprising thing is going to happen. Mark my words. More and more people working in the health care field are going to find themselves facing troubling ethical decisions. Nursing ethicist Patricia Wall of McMaster University was right when she cautioned that ethical problems faced by health care workers are bound to snowball. They very well will.

In the area of reproductive technologies alone, increasingly sophisticated scientific developments may eventually offend even the most laissez-faire physicians. Without proper legislation there may come a day when no physician feels free from coercion to violate his or her conscience. If the health care customer is always right, then physicians and other health care workers will be forced to follow the dictates of those customers. It will not be what the doctor has ordered that will be important, but what the customer has ordered.

We need an approach that will bring together ethicists, scientists, attorneys, politicians, physicians, nurses, administrators, religious leaders and others able to contribute to the construction of a comprehensive approach.

My question would be: Why is the Liberal government not doing anything proactively to address this need for comprehensive legislation? Why is it that we cannot get a basic elementary bill like Bill C-207 passed in the Canadian House of Commons?

The Liberal government will not allow a vote on this bill so it will not become law. It is tragic. It went before a committee. One hundred MPs from all parties signed a petition to have this bill debated. I am confident the bill would have passed with a free vote in the House of Commons.

I would like to express my appreciation to those nurses who wrote to me and with whom I had conversations in support of my efforts to present this bill in the House. To them I express my sincere hope that future developments, social, political and technological, will one day refocus public attention on this issue of conscience rights for health care workers and that justice will eventually emerge for those presently being abused by medical employers with government approval.

[Yvon Charbonneau, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Health]

Madam Speaker, Bill C-207, introduced by the member for Wanuskewin, says much about health and some of the realities facing health care practitioners.

At first blush, one might think that this is a matter for the Minister of Health, but there is much more to the bill than that.

The bill also refers to the justice field and must also take into consideration the context of federal-provincial relations. In the many debates on this topic, it is often forgotten that the federal government, the provinces and the territories have a long tradition of working very closing together when it comes to the health care sector.

For example, there is the social union agreement signed at least one year ago by the federal government, nine provinces and three territories. This agreement is one of the very important results of this co-operation. And, as it says in the preamble to the framework agreement:

The following agreement is based upon a mutual respect between orders of government and a willingness to work more closely together to meet the needs of Canadians.

It is critical for the federal government to acknowledge that the regulation of health care professions and the development of employment standards for health care professions are areas of provincial and territorial jurisdiction. Why is this important as far as Bill C-207 is concerned? This bill deals with education and employment standards in health care. By law and according to the federal-provincial-territorial framework, these are areas of provincial and territorial responsibility. It therefore follows that to attempt to trump provincial and territorial jurisdiction through the creative use of the criminal code runs against all legal and policy protocols in health.

The purpose of Bill C-207 is to amend the criminal code in order to provide better protection to health care practitioners against any reprisals resulting from their decision not to perform certain medical procedures for religious or ethical reasons.

The bill proposes that the following three situations be considered offences: an employer who refuses to employ a health care practitioner and dismisses him for religious or ethical reasons; a health care educator who refuses to admit such a person to courses in a field of health care; and an officer of a professional association who takes similar action.

I would like to point out that Health Canada does not have a mandate to intervene in any case that is exclusively provincial or territorial. Health professionals are subject to private provincial or territorial legislation which has been passed to enable them to self-regulate the delivery of their professional services.

Moreover, the majority of these professionals are required to adhere to a code of ethics adapted to their profession. Such matters do not fall under Health Canada's jurisdiction, or that of the federal government.

The objective of the Canada Health Act is not to direct or control professionals, their employers or those training them, but to ensure that the Canadian public has reasonable access to insured and medically required services.

In addition to the provincial laws, each administration is protected by provincial and territorial human rights legislation, which not only constitutes a dissuasive element with respect to discrimination or reprisals, but also represents a suitable way of handling the type of violation we are talking about.

A further consideration that is important when reviewing Bill C-207 is the appropriate application of the criminal code. The criminal code is the ultimate statement of our fundamental values expressed as prohibitions.

In general, therefore, it ought to be used as a last resort, not the first one, when legal sanctions affecting the health field are involved. There are other legislative vehicles at both levels of jurisdiction that are appropriate for lesser offences.

Even when there is clearly a serious offence involved, the federal government has tended to use the criminal law power expressed in health legislation in preference to the criminal code for health matters.

Even if the contents of Bill C-207 were to fall within federal jurisdiction, which they do not, the criminal code would not be a suitable legal vehicle for regulating the performance or not of work related tasks on a day to day basis.

To conclude, I would strongly encourage all those with an interest in the issues raised by Bill C-207 to make a serious study of these issues in relation to compliance with the established jurisdictions over these matters. It will then be seen that the criminal code is not suitable to the issues raised, in particular the ones raised by Bill C-207.

A debate is also required on the ethics of health care delivery, which might yield some pertinent legal elements. Such a debate, however, would also have to take into consideration and respect areas of provincial jurisdiction, provincial legislation, and federal-provincial agreements in this area.

In closing, while the hon. member's bill does indeed deal with an important and sensitive matter, it remains an issue that falls outside the jurisdiction of Health Canada and the federal government.

[Greg Thompson, Progressive Conservative, Charlotte, NB]

Madam Speaker, with due respect I wish to move that this debate now cease. The member moving the motion is not in the House, nor is any member of his party. Therefore I move:

That this debate now cease.

[The Acting Speaker (Ms. Thibeault)]

The hon. member knows that the motion proposed is in order, but the Chair would need it in writing please now.

[Greg Thompson, Progressive Conservative, Charlotte, NB]

Madam Speaker, I notice the member is now back in the House. On that basis I am prepared to debate the bill.

I am disappointed that members of his own party, who feel very strongly about this, are not here to support the member. I know the member's intentions are good and I am going to mention some of them in my speech.

The bill was introduced in the first session of this parliament. At that time it was Bill C-461. It is a non-votable bill. It seeks to protect the right of health care practitioners and other persons to refuse without fear of reprisal or other discriminatory coercion to participate in medical procedures that offend a tenet of their religion or their belief that human life is inviolable. There is nothing wrong with that intention at all.

Prohibition of coercion by health care employers, educators and professional associations, if found guilty, they are to be on a summary conviction. I am not sure what this bill does but I want to remind the House that the criminal code already includes clauses for the protection of medical practitioners.

The point has to be taken as well in this debate that the Canadian Medical Association's own code of ethics as well as the physicians' charter both include stipulations that afford health care practitioners, and the important phrase is health care practitioners, the right to not perform procedures with which they disagree. That is already in their code and charter.

The preamble to the physicians' charter is important. This is what every doctor in the country lives by. The preamble states:

The goal of Canadian physicians, in partnership with their patients, is to provide the best health care possible. This Charter expresses what Canadian physicians need to achieve this goal.

It complements the Canadian Medical Association's policies and the Canadian Medical Association's Code of Ethics, which outlines the responsibilities of physicians to patients, society, the medical profession and themselves.

Through this preamble the physicians are reminded that although they have a tremendous duty to their patients, the medical community and the rest of society, they also are responsible to themselves, above all. That means that physicians are exempt—an important word—from performing procedures that go against their own personal values.

In addition to that—and this is important to remember—physicians can and often do refer patients to other doctors or health care practitioners in order for them to get the care they desire or deserve. A physician can refer to other physicians.

In section 2 of the physicians' charter, clause 7 states that physicians need to be able to practise medicine in accordance with professional and personal standards within the bounds of the Canadian Medical Association's code of ethics. Through this stipulation within the physicians' charter, health care providers have their rights and personal values protected. The key word is protected.

The charter deals with a quality of life for Canadian physicians. It states that physicians in this country have to be able to balance the demands of their profession with their own need for quality of life and personal health maintenance. Therefore, clause 18 within that section states that physicians need to be free from harassment, discrimination, intimidation or violence, both in training and in practising medicine.

Coercion, as mentioned in this bill, has already been dealt with through that section of the physicians' charter.