Mr. Speaker, if my colleagues opposite will just bear with me, they will see where I am headed. Members of the Canadian forces have been patient; for five, and in some cases even ten, years they have been waiting in vain for reform from the government. The member has been listening to me for only two minutes. He can listen a bit longer if he is interested in the point we are trying to make.
I was reading the final “whereas” in the resolution tabled before the standing committee on November 25, 1999, which states the following:
And whereas, the Canadian Forces continue to experience problems with respect to housing, quality of life issues, troop fatigue based upon increased deployments, ageing equipment in need of replacement and the loss of key capabilities;
It ought to be of interest to government members to hear about the shortcomings of the armed forces and what they are lacking.
Be it resolved that the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) request the Government of Canada embark upon a five-year plan, commencing immediately, to substantially increase the budget of the Department of National Defence as a percentage of the GDP to revitalize, modernize and ensure an effective, combat capable Canadian Forces.
We have some comments on this. Moreover, we presented a dissenting report for the following reasons.
In committee we indicated that the resolution might have been acceptable to us if certain points were modified. We suggested that the government's objectives be reassessed. We called for the control over military spending to also be reassessed, and more attention focussed on it.
Why did we move this amendment and vote against the main proposal? In its first report, the committee asked that additional moneys be immediately provided to the Department of National Defence. The Bloc Quebecois' position on the issue of supplementary estimates for national defence has always been the same and still is.
We are not opposed, in principle, to increasing the army's budget if we come to the conclusion that there is no other way to meet the needs of the army, and if the objectives of the government and of Canada regarding peacekeeping operations, including peacemaking and promotion of peace and democracy in foreign countries, are still within our means. We must have the means to fulfil our ambitions. Canada has ambitions; it wants to look good abroad, but can we still afford our ambitious objectives?
It might be advisable to ask ourselves that question once again. The white paper on defence was written in 1994, but the world situation has evolved enormously since. It has totally changed over the past six years. There are now 22 theatres of threatened peace or of war where countries are tearing each other or themselves to pieces, where democracy is in jeopardy. Canada is involved in most missions to these regions.
Now, in the year 2000, does Canada—even though it continues to be a promoter of peace—still have the means to participate in these missions? Do we have to take part in every mission, or should we be selective? Should Canada be involved in these missions if we decide to be present everywhere? Should we participate in the same way that all the other countries do, or should we specialize in a certain role?
For example, we could play a role relating to communications, diplomacy or health care. We must ask ourselves these questions once again. Does Canada still have the means to send aircraft, including F-18s, and heavy equipment abroad to fulfil these obligations?
We cannot let our allies think we will provide thousands, millions and billions of dollars to help maintain peace, when at home one child in five is starving. Peace starts at home.
If Canadians cannot live in peace at home because they do not feel secure and do not have bread to feed their children, if Canadians and Quebecers lack this assurance at home, how can they properly support a peacekeeping presence abroad? Charity begins at home.
Canada will enjoy influence and credibility abroad when the people there know that Canada treats its own people and their children well first, before attempting to look after the children of others.
This is a concern of the Bloc Quebecois. We must be sure all the savings possible in the army have been made before new funds are injected. The auditor general has repeatedly pointed to mismanagement of funds in the army.
In November, 1999, in chapter 26, the auditor noted the following “The audit found that in some areas, controls over financial and material resources have weakened”. Therefore, before additional funds are injected, we must look into the present management, which is the source of the waste.
In this same chapter 26, the auditor general noted—in 1999, not ages ago, but quite recently—as follows “Allegations of such abuses of resources as unauthorized upgrading of official residences and misappropriation of government property have not always been dealt with adequately”. Let the government start by looking into this before considering whether there is a need to increase the budget.
That was not all the auditor general had to say. In chapter 27 of the same report, he commented that the Department of National Defence had not always put out calls for tender, “thus forgoing the benefits of price competition”. A total of $3 billion, or 30%, of the national defence budget of $10 billion is spent annually on untendered contracts. This is not negligible. It is an extremely large amount and they do not see anything wrong with operating this way.
DND authorities are authorized to make purchases using expenditure cards with which they are issued. Are those purchases always made at the best price? We do not know because there are no calls for tender. In the worst case scenario, some people may be using the system to indulge in patronage, to buy from friends, from people who are helping the government stay in power.
It is important that we be sure that this money is being properly spent before approving increases.
The other point that I wished to make is that we must review our international objectives. If Canada cannot afford to take part in international peacekeeping missions, it should re-examine its policies now, inform its allies accordingly, and tell them what role we intend to play in future and how much we are prepared to invest.
