Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to the bill on the long term management of nuclear fuel waste.
First, I would like to draw a parallel with the discussions on open line shows this morning. Yesterday, the finance minister gave his economic update. On a local radio show in my riding people were expressing their views on various elements of the minister's statement, including the debt.
Why am I talking about the debt? People where saying that over the past 30 years previous governments had been accumulating the debt. The government is now taking steps to pay it down as quickly as possible so that future generations are not stuck with reimbursing the amounts borrowed by previous generations.
What I want to stress here is responsibility. We must take responsibility for what we are doing now and for what we did in the past. When it comes to the nuclear world, nuclear waste in particular, we are told, depending on the source, that nuclear waste can last 200 years, 300 years or 500 years. Other sources mention 1,000 years, or even several thousands of years.
How can we deal responsibly with waste that will affect people throughout the world for hundreds, even thousands of years?
Since we have been talking about the nuclear industry for a number of years, I would like to step into the past and point out a few things about the background to the bill.
In February 1998, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency published the “Report of the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management and Disposal Concept Environmental Assessment Panel”, known as the Seaborn report.
In a 1978 joint statement, the governments of Canada and Ontario asked Atomic Energy Canada Limited to develop a concept for the deep geological disposal of nuclear fuel waste.
In a later joint statement, in 1981, they agreed not to go ahead with the selection of a site for that purpose without first holding proper public hearings at the federal level and submitting the concept to the approval of Canadian and provincial authorities.
In September 1988, the federal Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources referred the concept, along with a broad range of nuclear fuel waste management issues, for public review.
On October 4 1989, the federal Minister of the Environment appointed an independent environmental assessment panel to conduct the review.
At that time, the panel's mandate was to review a concept rather than a specific project at a specific site. The panel was also mandated to review a proposal for which the implementing agency was not identified, and to establish a scientific review group of distinguished independent experts to examine the safety and scientific acceptability of the proposal. The mandate also involved reviewing a broad range of policy issues. Finally, all those elements had to be reviewed in the five provinces concerned.
AECL describes its concept as a method of geological disposal of nuclear fuel waste in which the waste form is either used CANDU, or Canada deuterium uranium, fuel or the solidified high level waste from reprocessing. The waste form is sealed in a container designed to last at least 500 years and possibly much longer.
Waste containers are placed within the confines of underground disposal rooms or in boreholes drilled from the rooms. The disposal rooms are between 500 and 1,000 metres below the surface. The geological medium is plutonic rock of the Canadian Shield.
Such a facility would cost an estimated $8.7 billion to $13.3 billion in 1991 dollars, depending on the amount of waste to be disposed of. The panel conducted its review in several provinces, including Quebec and Ontario. It did environmental impact assessments and consulted the public, namely the natives.
Among other activities, the terms of reference directed the panel to examine the criteria by which the safety and acceptability of the concept for long term waste management and disposal should be evaluated. It also required the panel to prepare a final report addressing whether AECL's concept is safe and acceptable or should be modified, and the future steps to be taken in managing nuclear fuel wastes in Canada.
Here are some key panel conclusions. Broad public support is necessary in Canada to ensure the acceptability of a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes. Safety is a key part but only one part of acceptability. Safety must be viewed from two complementary perspectives: technical and social.
To be considered acceptable, a concept for managing nuclear fuel wastes must have broad public support, as I was saying earlier, and must be advanced by a stable and trustworthy proponent and overseen by a trustworthy regulator. Therefore, for the public, the level of confidence in the people and organizations managing nuclear wastes is very important.
After applying these criteria to the AECL disposal concept, the panel came to a number of key conclusions.
The key panel conclusions are the following: from a technical perspective, the panel believes that safety of the AECL concept has been on balance adequately demonstrated for a conceptual stage of development, but from a social perspective, it has not. It also says that, as it stands, the AECL concept for deep geological disposal has not been demonstrated to have broad public support. The concept in its current form does not have the required level of acceptability to be adopted as Canada's approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes.
Then the panel considered the steps that must be taken to ensure the safe and acceptable long term management of nuclear fuel wastes in Canada.
Here are its main recommendations.
A number of additional steps are required to develop an approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes in a way that could achieve broad public support.
Among other things, we should issue a policy statement governing the management of these wastes; initiate an aboriginal participation process; create a nuclear fuel waste management organization, or NFWMA—but its better to use the full name, so we know what we are talking about; a public review of the regulatory documents of the AECB through effective consultation processes.
We also need to develop a comprehensive public participation plan, to develop an ethical and social assessment framework and to compare the options for the management of nuclear wastes.
Taking into account the views of participants in our public hearings and our own analysis, the commission developed the following basic recommendations to governments with respect to a management agency.
It was recommended that a nuclear fuel waste management organization be established quickly, at arm's length from the utilities and AECL, with the sole purpose of managing and co-ordinating the full range of activities relating to the long term management of nuclear fuel wastes.
Another recommendation was that the agency be fully funded in all its operations from a segregated fund to which only the producers and owners of nuclear fuel wastes would contribute.
It was also recommended that its board of directors, appointed by the federal government, be representative of key stakeholders, and that it have a strong and active advisory council representative of a wide variety of interested parties.
It was also recommended that its purposes, responsibilities and accountability, particularly in relation to the ownership of the wastes, be clearly and explicitly spelled out, preferably in legislation or in its charter of incorporation.
It was also recommended that it be subject to multiple oversight mechanisms, including federal regulatory control with respect to its scientific-technical work and the adequacy of its financial guarantees, to policy direction from the federal government and to regular public review, preferably by parliament.
Finally, the commission pointed out that until the foregoing steps have been completed and broad public acceptance of a nuclear fuel waste management approach has been achieved, the search for a specific site should not proceed.
If the AECL concept is chosen as the most acceptable option after implementation of the steps recommended above, governments should direct the NFWMA, together with Natural Resources Canada and the AECB or its successor, to undertake a review all the social and technical shortcomings identified by the scientific review group and other review participants, to establish their priority and to generate a plan to address them. The nuclear fuel waste management organization should make its plan public, carry out public consultations and then implement its plan.
As members will recall in the Seaborn report, the panel recommended that the federal government establish a management committee with the objective of finding solutions for nuclear fuel waste management and implementing them.
However there has been a change of approach and through Bill C-27 the government has decided to pass the waste management responsibility off to the provinces. In Quebec, Hydro-Quebec should be the one in charge of establishing a waste management organization. I point out that the WMO must establish, by appointing its members, an advisory committee to study proposals and make recommendations.
The idea is to establish a waste management organization whose objective will be to set out nuclear fuel waste management proposals for the federal government and to implement the proposal it accepts. The WMO established by Hydro-Quebec must then make available to Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and to any owners of nuclear fuel waste produced in Canada, at a reasonable cost of course, nuclear fuel waste management services as provided in the proposal approved by the governor in council.
When I gave details about Hydro-Quebec,, I must say that I was venturing an opinion and was interpreting a little. Would Hydro-Québec make recommendations? If so, would it do so individually or in conjunction with the group mentioned in the bill? This group is comprised of the Ontario Power Generation, Hydro-Québec, a New Brunswick power corporation and Atomic Energy of Canada.
Some aspects of the bill are not clear. For example, we presume that all these stakeholders will work on a nuclear waste management policy but we can also presume that this would be done individually.
As for financing, the nuclear energy corporations, such as Hydro-Québec and Atomic Energy of Canada, would individually or jointly, as I said earlier, create a trust fund that would be used for implementing the approved waste management proposal.
Under the bill, Hydro-Quebec would have to pay, 10 days after the day on which the bill came into force, $20 million for its fund, and $4 million in each subsequent year. Afterward, the waste management organization, Hydro-Québec, would be able to propose shares to the federal government.
We also know that there is interest on any late payment. I suppose members know about this. We all get into situations where payments are due but not in arrears, of course. If the funds or the interest are not paid, the bill provides for fines not exceeding $300,000 for each day on which the offence is committed.
In this trust, the first withdrawal of funds must be for an authorized construction or storage activity. The funds must be used to implement the proposal approved by the minister.
Examination of the bill shows that the proposal to the minister should include three management approaches, particularly concerning the following: disposal in the Canadian Shield; storage on site at nuclear plants; centralized storage, either above or below ground; a comparison of the benefits, risks and costs taking into account the economic area to be determined; a description of management services; an implementation plan; a timeframe, and especially a program for public consultation and an annual financing formula for policy implementation.
However there is a hitch in the bill, which provides, as I read it and I think that I am right, that only the minister can hold public consultations. As we know, consultation is crucial because we also know that the capacity to rely on those who will manage nuclear waste is just as crucial.
Of course the waste management organization will have to submit an annual report of its activities. The form, the updated estimated total cost, the financing formula, the amount of the deposit to be paid, of course, and the amount of the final guarantees to be included in the annual report must be approved by the minister.
All these reports will be tabled and the minister will make a public announcement in this regard. Let me repeat that this report still provides for fines of $50,000 to $300,000 per day of violation. Should we consider that as an incentive for the tabling of these reports on time? I think so. Are the fines too high given the importance of the reports to be tabled? It is a question worth asking. The members will answer if they want to.
The Canadian government is the only one that regulates the nuclear industry. It has invested more than $5 billion in this area over the years and approximately $150 million a year since 1994, whereas all the other countries of the world, even those that use nuclear energy the most, are reviewing their use of this type of energy and are even thinking about progressively decommissioning their nuclear power plants and opting for alternative energy sources.
The Liberal government is determined to promote this type of energy as an interesting alternative to fossil fuels, which create more pollution in spite of the virulent public opposition and the major problem of radioactive waste. Last year, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited estimated that it would cost $377 million to decontaminate its plants and dispose of the waste.
However, the Seaborn panel clearly indicated in 1998 that the estimated cost of a long term nuclear waste management facility ranged from $8.7 billion to $13.3 billion in 1991 . Today, the amount is estimated at $15 billion for most countries, such as France and the United States.
Therefore, the amount of $20 billion, plus $4 million annually for Quebec, raises questions in our minds. Will it be enough? In November 1999, at a meeting of the parties to the convention on climate change held in Bonn, Germany, Canada proposed a plan that would give emission credits to countries that export nuclear reactors, which would enable Canada to meet its targets indirectly without reducing its own emissions.
Despite growing opposition from the people, Canada is continuing down the nuclear path instead of favouring renewable energy and adopting strong policies for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
During the last election campaign, the Bloc Quebecois promised to suggest that the federal government cancel any funding to the nuclear fission industry and that the $150 million that go to that industry every year be retargeted for research and development in the area of clean energy.
Since this opens the door to exporting nuclear waste, one has to wonder if the government really understands the public's opposition to this type of project.
On the subject of importation, in a previous committee sitting, I had the opportunity to discuss with officials from the Department of Natural Resources.
I asked one of them, with respect to importing nuclear wastes, if the waste management organization were to find relatively good solutions—being taken for granted, of course, that we support nuclear projects and therefore consider that the proposals are relatively good—should we fear that nuclear waste might be imported to get a better return on our investment in various waste management programs or projects that Canada might implement?
This is a major risk because in every one of our communities there are waste disposal sites for solid waste or domestic waste. We know what this is all about. When I was on the municipal council in Sherbrooke, we had a waste disposal site. There is one in my ward. One can imagine the problem it creates.
When it comes to the management of nuclear waste or any other kind of waste—of course technically they cannot be compared, although as far as a process is concerned it is the same thing—nobody wants it in their backyard. We all know that. We do not want to see waste imported because it has happened before. It has happened in Quebec and I am convinced it has happened in other provinces too. We should avoid it.
In view of the fact that often the only thing that matters for our Liberal government is money, I am afraid that at some time in the future waste will be imported to make our nuclear waste management system more profitable.
It is something we must keep in mind because the official from the Department of Natural Resources told me that for the time being they had more than enough to do in dealing with our own waste. What concerns me, not to say scares me, is the fact that he said that for the time being they are not considering this.
When I am told “For the time being, we are not planning on it”, am I to understand that their plans may change tomorrow, next week or next year?
That is why the bill must really be transparent. All its details must be clear, precise and, to the extent possible, be assessed. Moreover, even though consultation is provided for in the legislation, we must never neglect to consult. The population must be consulted.
Even if the urgency is evident, we believe that public consultation—and let it be clear that we do not want the kind of bogus consultation that was held in regards to MOX and that lasted only 28 days—is necessary and fundamental.
Another thing will have to be closely considered. The bill intends to force Quebec or, more precisely, Hydro-Quebec to operate according to the proposal that will be adopted by the natural resources minister in Ottawa and to the criteria set by him. Is Quebec really in agreement with these criteria? That is what we will determine later.
We also have a concern about the fines provided for in the bill. Do members not think that the fines imposed for each day of infraction are excessive, considering that this type of bill always contains variable factors? We know that the bill contains provisions allowing additional delay, but the issue of fines is still of concern us.
If we look briefly at the situation of Canada's nuclear power stations, we find that the obligation to treat nuclear fuel waste is unfortunately something that the Bloc Quebecois cannot oppose, but we do strongly oppose the use of fuel and the operation of power plants using nuclear fission.
As members know, in his most recent report, the auditor general clearly indicated that the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission needs to improve its regulatory regime for power reactors. Among other things, the audit pointed out that the commission does not use quantitative measures to rate nuclear power facilities.
According to the auditor general, the rating systems used are not always based on specific criteria but rather on the judgment and expertise of staff.
While we do not believe that the staff would be dishonest and is probably competent, we would like to point out that the auditor general said, and I quote:
The criteria for what is acceptable or unacceptable are subjective and could be misunderstood.
Moreover, as the auditor general pointed out in the report, CNSC faces significant difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified staff. Combined with its current regulatory regime, which relies heavily on the expertise and judgment of staff, the lack of human resource capacity could impact its ability to function adequately in the future.
Considering that only a responsible approach is necessary on this matter, the Bloc Quebecois will support Bill C-27, while maintaining major reservations. The Bloc Quebecois will continue to follow the matter very carefully because there are major issues involved in this bill.
These issues relate to the huge economic investment required for a management regime based on the protection of the environment and of the health of Quebecers. The Canadian people and even the American people would be affected by this bill. While Mr. Bush is not giving a lot of hope on this matter and the Canadian government has a strange approach toward this, we consider it our duty to ensure first and foremost that the bill does not have negative consequences and that the issues will be carefully considered at all stages. At this point, we agree on the bill but we have very major reservations.
In conclusion, people need to have a good relationship with the main stakeholders, as, of course, with the federal government in its responsibilities on waste management. There must also be a trust relationship with the fuel nuclear waste management organization.
If it is possible to create this trust, we will get the support of the public. The public will have to be consulted, but it has to be real consultation and not token consultation, as I said earlier.
The bill will have to be very specific on the potential for importing nuclear waste. It must be clear that the waste management organization's sole purpose is to manage nuclear waste from Quebec and Canada. We know very well that nobody would accept nuclear waste from other countries, with all the risks involved.
Our responsibility today is crucial. We are making decisions that will have an impact on events that could occur in hundreds or thousands of years. Some people are used to managing without any long term vision but here we need to consider future generations, and much more than the next few generations, as we are talking about hundreds and thousands of years.
We will get a chance in committee to deal with various aspects of the bill and we retain the right to move amendments to Bill C-27.