Mr. Speaker, the prospect of biological weapons being used, whether it be by states, criminals or terrorists, horrifies and repulses all civilized people. Today the very idea of deliberately propagating diseases via bacteria, viruses, or toxins that affect humans, animals or plants is considered, justifiably, a taboo and is condemned by international treaty law and customary international law.
Since 1925, the Geneva Protocol has prohibited bacteriological warfare, in other words, biological weapons. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, better knows by its acronym, BTWC, completely prohibits the possession of such weapons. The BTWC, which was negotiated in 1972 and came into effect in 1975, was the first worldwide convention to prohibit an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. It set a universal standard and is an important pillar of international peace and security.
As I mentioned, Canada signed and ratified the BTWC in 1972 and strongly supports the convention. Canada attaches great importance to full compliance with the provisions of the convention and supports fully its purposes and provisions. To our profound regret, I remember well last summer, negotiations for such a protocol collapsed in July after seven years of hard work, denying the world truly its best chance to achieve a mechanism to impede the development and spread of biological weapons.
At the review conference, many other countries indicated that in light of the events of September 11, which subsequently followed and in light of subsequent bioterrorism attacks using anthrax, they were in the process of revising or supplementing their own legislation relevant to biological weapons.
National enforcement efforts cannot substitute for an international compliance mechanism aimed at preventing the development of biological weapons. It was that compliance mechanism that we were close too when it collapsed with the withdrawal of one of the major countries.
In themselves, national efforts are still valuable and necessary. Export and import controls, licensing, domestic inspection, verification and policing all complement and buttress the global ban on bio-weapons.
Article 4 of the BTWC would require state parties, in accordance with their own constitutional processes, to take measures to prohibit and prevent the development, the production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of banned substances and articles in their own domestic territories, jurisdiction or control. In view of the collapse of the protocol negotiations in July and then later of the terrorist threat which emerged only two months later, it is now appropriate to go beyond the strict requirements of that convention and to supplement our own existing Canadian legislation with an act which specifically prohibits both biological weapons and related agents.
The biological and toxin weapons convention implementation act, which I have been calling the BTWC for obvious reasons, would put Canada at the forefront of these efforts to prevent biological weapons proliferation and bioterrorism. It will allow Canada to fulfill its obligations under the BTWC better because we will have done domestically what we had failed do so internationally by ensuring that the convention's ban is be respected not only by the Government of Canada but also by individuals, organizations and institutions in Canada, and that is very important.
The vast majority of the biological agents and of the types of equipment which may be employed in the manufacture of biological weapons are dual use; that is to say, these substances and articles have legitimate, even vital roles in fields like science, pharmaceuticals, medicines and agriculture. Likewise bio-defence programs intended to develop detecting devices or vaccines, antidotes and protective gear to defend against biological warfare attack require biological agents and equipment. Dual use agents and equipment are therefore essential to our health, prosperity and security and also for the advancement of knowledge. That is why it gets to be a somewhat intricate matter.
However the BTWC recognizes the dual use nature of these substances and articles by allowing articles which have prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes and equipment not designed for hostile purposes. They will continue obviously to be allowed and these exemptions for legitimate use are preserved in the legislation we are speaking about today.
To give Canadians assurance that biological and toxin agents and dual use equipment are not turned to evil purposes or diverted from their intended peaceful purposes, regulations are required. Such regulations would also increase the confidence in other countries that Canada is harbouring no official or unofficial biological weapon programs and encourage compliance elsewhere with the convention. Reciprocal confidence reinforces itself, which again contributes to peace and stability both for Canadians and worldwide.
Subsequently, last December in Geneva at the fifth BTWC review conference, the Canadian delegation strove to promote an outcome which would have contributed to the convention's integrity and vitality by building bridges between regional groups, by advocating an enhanced review process, and by working for the adoption of new measures to strengthen the convention. That included a viable way forward to resume negotiations for what I mentioned earlier, the multilateral, legally binding compliance mechanism for the convention. It is therefore again unfortunate that the review conference was unable to achieve that outcome last December.
Let me assure the House that Canada has not given up its efforts to reinforce the global ban on germ weapons. We look forward to the review convention's resumption this coming November. We will indeed continue our efforts, as we have in the past, and we will work with other countries that are trying, like us, to accomplish the same aim.
The BTWC implementation act will therefore provide the legal basis to create a licensing regime for more complete control of biological substances and articles. It will also permit the establishment of a responsible authority and will set out the powers of inspectors charged with enforcing the act. It has been very carefully crafted to ensure that Canadian procedures will be compatible with any eventual international mechanism so that we will not have to go back and redo the process.
While the licensing regime and regulations should be rigorous, they must not be excessively burdensome for the legitimate users of biological agents. Indeed, we expect that the process of elaborating regulations and of establishing this new responsible authority and inspectorate will require intensive study and consultation with many sectors, including industry, farming, universities and medical, scientific and research sectors, all places where these agents may be used for very legitimate purposes.
Given that these are technical questions, it is important to get them right. A single solution will not work. The degree of control and safety required for a containment facility where highly contagious diseases are studied will obviously not work for a research institute doing work on low-risk pathogens.
This legislation will make Canada and the world safer. It will prevent the development and proliferation of biological weapons around the world. It will show that Canada is committed to fighting terrorism. At the same time, it demonstrates our active support of the BTWC and a multilateral approach based on rules, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. This is in line with the role that Canada has always played to increase co-operation for security. For this reason, I propose that we pass it quickly.