Mr. Speaker, I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in this debate. There has been much discussion on the accountability act since we came back here after the January election. It was discussed in detail by the House and then referred to the Senate. The Senate, as we have heard today on many occasions, spent a lot of time, energy and effort on it, and the senators have suggested a number of amendments. I believe there are 150 amendments. The bill is back before this House for debate.
I say at the outset that I do support the general principles set out in the proposed act, the broad thrust, so to speak. Some issues that I am passionate about are in here and I do support them. In my view, the most important concept by far is the one making deputy ministers accounting officers accountable to Parliament for the individual financial management of their respective departments. Others are some of the provisions concerning lobbying, the repeal of the section of the public service act that allows exempt staff preferential treatment in the civil service, appointments based upon merit, and certain provisions dealing with whistleblower legislation. I, as a member of Parliament, certainly do support them.
However, as has been pointed out by a number of speakers today, this is an omnibus bill. I believe it has about 220 pages. It deals with a whole host of issues dealing with political financing, oversight bodies, et cetera, much of which, I submit, has very little to do with accountability. I believe the previous speaker pointed that out in a question.
Just for the sake of reference, I note that there are many definitions of accountability. One that I use refers to the way in which office holders, elected and non-elected, explain the actions taken through the use of powers delegated to them by ministers or other office holders. When we refer to that definition and other definitions, we see that basically accountability is a duty to explain. It is the duty of those who are responsible to explain their actions. When we take that definition or any other definition of accountability, we can see that most of the provisions in the bill, not all but a lot of them, have very, very little to do with accountability.
To go back, the bill was referred to a legislative committee of the House. I want to thank each and every member of that committee for the time and effort they put into the bill. It was sent to the Senate. There were 150 amendments made and it was sent back to this House. I should point out for any viewers watching and listening today that a lot of these amendments are inconsequential. They are spelling errors or minor errors that were made in the original drafting of the legislation. Even some of the amendments that we are debating here today are not as substantive or fundamental as perhaps one would consider.
I would point out that we are in a minority government. No party has a majority. It is our duty and obligation to express the will of the Canadian people, so I say that once we have this debate here in Parliament, then we vote on the amendments. Then the accountability act of course will have to go back to the Senate. The accountability act will then become law and we can move on to other issues which, I submit, are just as important as the issue we are dealing with at present, or perhaps more.
I do want to spend a minute, if I may, talking about the issue that I think is so important in this proposed act. At present, I chair the Standing Committee on Public Accounts. There is a recommendation that we in our committee have made on a number of occasions and it is finally seeing the light of day in the accountability act. That, again, is the concept of making deputy ministers accounting officers to Parliament so that they are personally responsible for the financial and other administration of their particular departments. They would be accountable to organize resources, to deliver programs in compliance with government policies and provisions, to establish and monitor the system of internal control and the signing of accounts so that all accounts truly reflect the actual financial transactions that happened in their particular department, and of course there is the performance of other specific duties.
I say this in the context that deputy ministers have very difficult jobs in government now. They are under intense scrutiny from the media, the public, the courts, the opposition and oversight bodies. They answer not only to their ministers but to the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister. There is a whole host of horizontal issues that they have to deal with on a daily basis. Generally what I am saying is that Canada is well served by its deputy ministers.
However, when I look at what has come before the public accounts committee in the last six years, I believe the pendulum has swung too far in one direction, in that the deputy ministers are too much concerned with horizontal issues and policy issues and not as concerned as they ought to be with the actual day to day management of their respective departments.
Again, I believe that this provision, if it is coupled with other provisions I will speak to, will improve that particular situation. However, it will improve the situation only if other events happen.
One issue is the whole oversight regime of the Treasury Board Secretariat. In the public accounts committee, we are presently in the middle of a review of its mandate, roles and responsibilities, with particular emphasis on the change in regime with the expected proclamation of the federal accountability act.
Again I want to say that I believe a lot of work has to be done in developing just exactly what happens to these so-called accounting officers once the act is proclaimed and on the development of a protocol, the role of the comptroller general and how this new system will work. I believe there may be some in government here in Ottawa who just consider that nothing will change. I hope they are not right.
Another issue that of course is not covered in the act goes right to the foundation of accountability and again very much relates to the topic that I am discussing, That is the tenure of deputy ministers. This is another issue that the public accounts committee has recommended for on many occasions. It has been ignored by the government. The present government and the previous government have basically said that it is no business of Parliament. I find that distressing and disturbing. I do hope that the government will follow the recommendations of the public accounts committee and increase the tenure of deputy ministers so that we can get true accountability on the management of government operations.
However, what I find extremely puzzling in this particular legislation is the total disjointedness between what the act says and what the government has been doing since it was sworn in earlier this year.
We have had the Gomery commission. I have a copy of the report right here in my hand. It is called “Restoring Accountability”. It was a very extensive work and made 19 recommendations. The accountability act deals with about five of them.
I will talk about some of the most important. One is that to “redress the imbalance between resources available to the Government and those available to parliamentary committees and their members, the Government should substantially increase funding for parliamentary committees”. Another is that it should increase resources for the public accounts committee. Another is that there should be a charter for public civil servants. The list goes on and on. Thirteen of the 19 recommendations have been ignored by this bill, basically, and some others have had only partial attention paid to them. I find that extremely troubling. I am going to come back to that a little later.
All the actions of the government are totally disjointed from what the bill states. Right from the beginning, what did the Prime Minister do? The very first thing he did was appoint his co-chair to the Senate. What was the second thing he did? Does anyone know? He appointed his co-chair/senator to cabinet. That is what he did. Does that comply with what the bill states? Is that accountability?
We had established a couple of years ago a fundamental principle of accountability in that the committees of this institution elected their own chairs. What is the third thing that the Prime Minister did? The third thing he said was that is over. The committees that the government chairs would be appointed by the Prime Minister of Canada. He would tell those people that they are the chairs and that is how the system would operate.
Is that accountability? We have the muzzling of members of Parliament in this House. We have had the muzzling of the whole cabinet. We had the spectacle over the weekend of the Prime Minister's communications director writing secretly to the communications directors of all cabinet ministers asking for a review of their respective ministers. That is not accountability.
We had the appointments process right in the accountability act in the summary. It indicated that appointments would be based on merit. What has happened? Everyone in this institution knows what has happened. Everyone in Canada knows what has happened. Every appointment has been based upon one basic principle, membership in the Conservative Party. A person has to be a high ranking Tory.
I have been following this issue very closely since February. I cannot speak for all provinces so let me say east of Montreal. If there is anyone in this House that knows, of all the dozens and dozens of appointments that were made, of any person east of Montreal who was not a high ranking Conservative member, please stand up at the end of my speech and identify that person. I do not know that such a person exists. Is that accountability?
The point I am making is that there is a total, absolute, and utter disturbing disconnect between what the act states and the actions of the government.
I identified some of the broad thrusts that I certainly agree with and am very supportive of, but there are certain things that I really think should not be happening.
The whole act talks about compliance and the avoidance of sin. We do not need more rules. This is certainly the feeling of the Auditor General. She agrees with me on that. We have sufficient rules. We have the Financial Administration Act. We have a whole host of guidelines, policies and procedures issued by the Treasury Board Secretariat.
I believe from my experience that those are sufficient. They have to be understood. There has to be a culture of compliance. There has to be compliance in the fundamental principles of personal responsibility and accountability, and if there is any non-compliance, of course there must be sanctions.
The act calls for additional oversight bodies, a director of procurement, a director of advertising, and a director of prosecutions. It is my view that these oversight bodies are not needed. It amounts to Parliament abandoning its accountability role. It is up to Parliament and the committees of Parliament to hold the executive of government to account.
This institution is an institution of accountability. If we read the recommendations of Mr. Justice Gomery, he comes back to that fundamental principle. He comes back to restoring the imbalance that exists between the legislative branch of Parliament and the executive branch of government.
As I stated, there were 19 recommendations made and only five or six were partially adopted. I would ask members to read the recommendations. I would ask members to ask themselves why they were basically ignored and why there was no discussion about these individual very important recommendations.
The general problem is that there is an imbalance. I have pointed that out. We have the executive of government, the Governor General, the leader, the cabinet and the whole bureaucracy. We have of course the judicial arm and the legislative arm. It is our job and duty to approve appropriations, to pass legislation and, of course, hold the government to account.
Over the last 50 or 60 years we have allowed a very severe imbalance to develop between the legislative arm of government and the executive arm of government. Of course, the executive arm of government has allowed a very severe imbalance to develop between the executive generally and the office of the Prime Minister. We can see what is going on these days when the control is put on individual cabinet ministers. We do not have to say anything more. We can see what is going on.
Again, I am not suggesting that this started with the office of the present Prime Minister. This is a trend that has been developing for the last 40 or 50 years. It has gotten worse in the last eight months, but it did not start eight months ago.
In order to restore accountability, we have to cure the imbalance. I suggest and submit that the first step would be to read the first recommendation of the report of Mr. Justice Gomery. He talks about restoring that important balance that is necessary so that we have accountable institutions in Parliament. That is an issue that has been talked and written about but of course nothing ever gets done.
The point I am making is that there are some good provisions in this act. There are some that I support to my dying breath, but the act, to a large extent, has very little to do with accountability.
In closing, I agree with the overall thrust of the legislation. We have, kicking around the chamber, approximately 150 amendments. Some are very inconsequential. Some have been agreed to by the parties. It is up to us as parliamentarians to continue the debate.
It is a very complicated piece of legislation. We are getting into the law of unintended consequences, when we think it is good but when somebody else points out something in another act, it may not be as simple and uncomplicated as we first thought. Sometimes it takes a little more thinking and deliberation than we initially thought.
It is up to us to continue the debate and put the amendments to a vote in the chamber. We, representing the Canadian people, will vote on them. The amendments that pass this House will become law. The amendments that do not pass the House will not become law. Let us see the act become law as soon as possible.