Mr. Speaker, I would first like to congratulate our colleague for introducing his bill, even though when we first read it in the Bloc Québécois, my colleagues and I and our research service were somewhat concerned about the possibility that it might be criminalizing some behaviour for no reason. I will provide more examples later. However, I know that the member for Edmonton—Leduc has been a serious member in the past, that he has served this House well, and I do not doubt that his motives are noble. Nonetheless, we have some concerns.
One of Quebec's premiers whom we hold in high esteem was called René Lévesque and was a powerful communicator. In the early 1960s, he said—and think how true this is today—that information was power. Obviously, the more information one has, the better a citizen one can be, and obviously, the better a member of Parliament.
The member for Edmonton—Leduc, who also chairs the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, is asking us to consider the extent to which the circulation of nominative information can be used for fraudulent purposes. Personal information about our identity, access to our credit, our telephone number—that is the example the member gave in his remarks—is what is called, generically, nominative information. If I understand correctly, the member is afraid that nominative information might be used for fraudulent purposes.
Certainly, in a world where networks, computers, communications and even cybernetics are burgeoning sciences, this question is a very relevant one.
The member told us that section 403 of the Criminal Code—and I will come back to this—is not completely adequate when it comes to a number of wrongful acts that he is afraid will occur. He therefore wants better protection. He is concerned about the reality of impersonation by telephone.
It is true that as potential consumers we are all very often solicited over the phone. You are familiar with my fundamentally generous nature and my propensity for communicating. I respond to every telephone survey that comes my way. Obviously, when there are political questions, I do have the ethics and honesty to say that I am a member of Parliament. Often it is young students who are earning their living by telemarketing, and I would not want to do wrong by them. Perhaps there are even some of our young pages who have done this in the past.
It is true that we are constantly at the mercy of this kind of solicitation, of being preyed on by telemarketers. The member for Edmonton—Leduc explained to us that there is unfortunately no real recourse, that the Criminal Code was powerless and that it was possible to obtain nominative, personal and confidential information over the phone.
That being said, our colleague’s objectives are extremely noble and we are prepared to look at how far we must go in amending the Criminal Code, but we have some concerns. The member can perhaps tell me whether our concern is warranted.
Let us imagine the following situation. Hon. members know what a powerful motivation love is in life—there is nothing grander and more beautiful than love—and how great we feel when we are in love. Now, let us imagine the situation where a person meets someone, a new love interest. You know how it is. But the truth of the matter is that we never know exactly how the relationship will turn out. So, this person calls the workplace of the someone in question to get his or her telephone number or information about this person he or she hopes to have a date with.
In the opinion of the hon. member for Edmonton—Leduc, who believes in love and in interpersonal relationships, is this a case for summary conviction, where a person might be liable to a sentence?
My colleagues in our caucus and our research staff were wondering how far-reaching this bill was. I am convinced, of course, that the hon. member for Edmonton—Leduc does not wish for such behaviour to be criminalized.
We are asking ourselves this question: How far should we go in our quest for privacy protection? We would have been more comfortable if the government had amended the Access to Information Act instead, as promised during the election campaign. We were also expecting Bill C-2 to be amended in a more fundamental way than it has so far.
Once again, we are starting from the premise that the member is serious, that he has served this House well, that his objective is honourable, and that he is worried about the networks, about computers. In his speech, the member talked about data brokers. When I was health critic, I remember having met people who specialized in managing information, computer data, for example, concerning what type of citizen was more likely to develop certain types of illnesses over others. As an MP, I have even met people from companies that specialize in the kind of billing used by general practitioners, since these doctors are statistically more likely to recommend certain types of medication over others.
Protecting personal data is a very worrisome topic. We must ask ourselves if this is not something that could lead to harm, a barrier that society does not want to breach.
Our fellow citizens should know that there exists at this time, in the Criminal Code, a section that provides for prosecution of anyone who personates a third party or against anyone who attempts to obtain information for more or less malicious purposes. I will take the time to read this entire section of the Criminal Code because I believe that sharing information is important. I would very much like to discuss with the member for Edmonton—Leduc the scope of his bill.
Section 403 of the Criminal Code states:
Every one who fraudulently personates any person, living or dead...is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or an offence punishable on summary conviction.
There is intent to personate that is punishable as a criminal offence. The Criminal Code adds—and that is what we refer to as mens rea in legal language—:
(a) with intent to gain advantage for himself or another person,—
Obviously, telemarketers and others would fall under this provision of the bill.
Section 403 of the Criminal Code also states:
(b) with intent to obtain any property or an interest in any property,—
In addition to the intent to personate, there is a gain, a more pecuniary interest. There is an interest in a property or the intent to obtain it.
Section 403, which deals with both personation and obtaining a property, adds:
(c) with intent to cause disadvantage to the person whom he personates or another person.
Earlier I was talking about malicious intent; I think we find it synthesized in section 403(c):
with intent to cause disadvantage to the person whom he personates or another person.
I have only a minute left? Time flies. In that case, I will wrap up.
From the outside it seemed that the provisions of section 403 offered some protection. However, the hon. member seemed to be saying that it was not sufficient for cross-border trade or for telemarketing.
Again, in closing, we have concerns about using criminalization because we are nonetheless talking about 10 years in prison. We fear this is a bit excessive, but I would be pleased to discuss this with my colleague and ask him about his true intentions. I am not questioning his intention to serve the House well, with the serious—