moved:
That, in the opinion of the House, the government should move an amendment to the Competition Act so that the Commissioner of Competition have the power to initiate investigations of the price of gas and the role of refining margins in the determination of the said price.
Mr. Speaker, I believe that this debate affects all Canadians. Directly or indirectly, we are all gas consumers. The vehicles we use, whether cars or buses, run on gas or petroleum products. Consumers are also affected indirectly because what we buy is often transported by truck. This is therefore an extremely important debate.
As was mentioned, the motion asks:
That, in the opinion of the House, the government should move an amendment to the Competition Act so that the Commissioner of Competition have the power to initiate investigations of the price of gas and the role of refining margins in the determination of the said price.
The government is fond of saying that prices at the pump are determined by market forces.
Mr. Speaker, before I go on, I would like to say that I will be sharing my time with the member for Trois-Rivières. I believe that you already guessed as much.
The government and the big oil companies have often said that the price consumers pay is determined solely by market forces, which in turn are affected by international economic factors more than anything else.
This is a simplistic argument. Everyone knows that international events play a role in determining gas prices at the pump, but other factors also come into play. Moreover, if countries everywhere, and especially industrialized nations, were to exercise more self-discipline in terms of supply and use, we could easily exert greater control over this factor.
It is a poor, incomplete argument that lets the government shirk its responsibility to ensure that consumers and the public get their money's worth.
A second thing often mentioned is taxes. It is often the industry that brings this up. I remember hearing Carol Montreuil say during an interview on TVA on May 3 that the average profit per litre was around 2¢, while the government takes close to 40¢ per litre in taxes.
Obviously there are a number of issues raised in the statement of Mr. Montreuil, who, I would remind the House, is a spokesperson for the Canadian Petroleum Products Institute. First, the 2¢ he is referring to probably represents the retailer's margin. This margin usually varies between 3.5¢ and 6¢ per litre.
We can see that this is not a very big part of the significant variations that have been seen in the price of gas. I doubt that this 2¢ refers to the refining margins, which are much more problematic. This is why the motion specifically identifies the role of refining margins in determining the price at the pump as a factor that could explain this variation. I will come back to this later. However, what is interesting about the role of taxes is that someone who has been closely following the evolution of the gasoline market, especially in Quebec, in the greater Montreal area, sent me the calculations he did after hearing Mr. Montreuil's comments. I want to share them because I think they bring up an interesting question. There is no answer, but the question reflects the relevance of our motion.
He says:
Take the federal government, for example. There is the 10¢ excise tax and the 6% GST, which adds up to an average revenue of 16¢ per litre.
That is 16¢ per litre in federal taxes.
Approximately 30 billion litres are sold in Canada, netting the federal government $4.8 billion.
That means $4.8 billion in federal gas tax revenues. I will go on.
Taken together, Shell Canada and Esso recorded profits of $4.74 billion.
That is about the same amount collected in federal gas taxes. Combined profits of $4.74 billion is exactly what the federal government brings in. He asks the following question.
How can the government amass $4.8 billion by collecting 16¢ on every litre sold in Canada—
He noted that Shell Canada, with its 45% share of the refining industry, refines 1.8 million barrels a day and makes just two cents per litre but generates the same amount of revenue as the federal government. Something does not add up here if the federal government makes $4.8 billion with its 16¢ per litre while the two oil companies I mentioned, Shell and Esso, who make up 45% of the refining market, make as much as the federal government two cents per litre at a time.
So they ask themselves the question. Are they in fact perhaps making more than 2¢ per litre? That is the question we are seeking to answer in our motion. We want to find ways to get answers to the questions that people are asking themselves, that we are asking ourselves—extremely legitimate questions.
The major problem is that the Competition Act is not as stringent as it needs to be for the investigations that the commissioner might conduct to produce results. On the government side, they will tell us that there have been six investigations and that no one has ever been able to prove collusion. We are not saying there is collusion; we simply want the Competition Bureau to have the means to carry out these investigations, and that is what we are proposing in this motion.
Obviously, this is not the only solution, nor the only partial solution, that is needed. There will be others, and I know that the member for Trois-Rivières will be amending my motion shortly to include the petroleum monitoring agency and also to move to amend the act to decriminalize the anti-competitive pricing practices. That is, that the criminal offences attached to investigations into price-fixing—in particular, gasoline pricing, but it would apply to all prices—be eliminated, and be made civil issues instead.
I would like to come back to the refinery margins. As I said, the retailer's margin is 3.5¢ to 6¢ per litre. We think that this margin is relatively reasonable, and it has been stable over time. On the other hand, refinery margins have risen from an average of 6¢ or 7¢, which they were from 1998 to 2003, to the present average of 26¢ per litre.
How can we explain the refinery margin having risen so high, when the average in recent years, in the late 1990s and early part of this century, ranged back and forth between 6¢ and 8¢? According to the Association québécoise des indépendants du pétrole, at a 6¢ per litre profit to refineries, the oil companies are already making very attractive profits.
In the current situation, the five biggest oil companies control 90% of the refining market and are making excess profits of about 20¢ a litre. That amounts to $10 for every 50-litre fill-up we get. That means that wealth is being transferred from the public, from consumers, to the oil industry, which is already heavily favoured by this government, in terms of the tax system and the environment. We will have an opportunity to come back to this. As a result, we wonder about the reason for this excessive 26¢ margin. Obviously I am talking about an average for the 2006-07 year.
Recently, I heard Mr. Montreuil say again that in February the refinery margin was 0¢. Of course, he chose the worst month. However, based on the average, which is the indicator of the real situation, the margin is 26¢. Last year, it was about 19¢ or 20¢. So it has risen steadily. In our view, not only do we have to ask questions, but we must also be in a position to get some answers.
Obviously, refining operations are distributed regionally, as we have heard. For example, in the Montreal area, Petro-Canada and Shell do the refining. In the Quebec City area, it is Ultramar. In New Brunswick, Irving does it and in Nova Scotia, I believe it is Esso. Refining is currently experiencing an undercapacity. Is that intentional or not? These questions must be asked. Why is it that oil companies do not have any reserves and when disaster strikes, for instance, the price increases, but comes back down very little? Also, why is it that they cannot seem to plan ahead for the construction holidays, even though they always occur at the same time every year? These things can be anticipated, although, as we all know, a few days before the construction holidays or any other holiday, the price goes up.
The Competition Act therefore needs to be amended, first of all, to give the commissioner the authority to launch investigations, as needed. The commissioner must also be able to request that documents be submitted as evidence, which is currently not the case. The Competition Bureau needs to have real powers in order to properly complete the necessary investigations and to provide us with answers to our entirely legitimate questions.
Once again, I would like to say that we have no evidence of collusion. That is a fact. Perhaps there is no collusion at all. It would be in the best interests of the major oil companies, I think, for the Competition Act to be more rigorous in order to bring greater transparency to the situation and, by answering our questions, to dispel any doubts.
I therefore urge all members here in this House to vote in favour of this Bloc Québécois motion.